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   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
       DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
    )  ISCR Case No. 16-02558 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance   ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Caroline E. Heintzelman, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Ryan C. Nerney, Esq. 
 
 
___________ 
 
Decision 
___________ 
 
HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant used marijuana four or five times from 2006 to 2009 and once in 
February 2014. In August 2014, Applicant stole two or three hydrocodone pills, and in 
December 2014, he stole two or three oxycodone pills. He consumed the pills. In August 
and December 2014, he was holding a security clearance. Personal conduct security 
concerns are mitigated; however, drug involvement security concerns are not mitigated. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.      
  
Statement of the Case 
  
On September 16, 2009, March 4, 2010, and June 4, 2015, Applicant completed 
and signed SCAs. (GE 1, 2, 3) On September 30, 2016, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued a statement of reasons (SOR) 
to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry, February 20, 1960; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), January 2, 1992; and the 
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, 
effective on September 1, 2006 (Sept. 1, 2006 AGs).  
 
The  (SOR) detailed reasons why the DOD CAF did not find under the Directive 
that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant a security 
clearance for Applicant and recommended referral to an administrative judge to 
determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. 
 
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(Hearing Exhibit (HE) 2) Specifically, the SOR set forth security concerns arising under 
Guidelines H (drug involvement) and E (personal conduct). (HE 2) 
  
On January 17, 2017, Applicant responded to the SOR and requested a hearing. 
(HE 3) On March 15, 2017, Department Counsel was ready to proceed. On March 28, 
2017, the case was assigned to me. On March 29, 2017, the Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing, setting the hearing for April 19, 2017. 
(HE 1) Applicant’s hearing was held as scheduled.  
  
During the hearing, Department Counsel offered six exhibits; Applicant offered 
three exhibits; there were no objections; and all proffered exhibits were admitted into 
evidence. (Transcript (Tr.) 10-12; GE 1-6; Applicant Exhibits (AE) A-C) On April 20, 2017, 
Applicant provided one exhibit, which was admitted without objection. (AE D) On April 27, 
2017, DOHA received the transcript of the hearing.  
 
While this case was pending a decision, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
issued Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing in Appendix A the National 
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs) which he made applicable to 
all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified 
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The new AGs supersede the Sept. 1, 
2006 AGs and are effective “for all covered individuals” on or after June 8, 2017. 
Accordingly, I have evaluated Applicant’s security clearance eligibility under the new 
AGs.1 
 
Findings of Fact2 
 
 Applicant’s SOR response admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c. (HE 3) 
He also partially admitted SOR ¶ 2.a. He denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a. He also 
provided extenuating and mitigating information. Applicant’s admissions are accepted as 
findings of fact. Additional findings of fact follow.  
 
Applicant is 29 years old, and a DOD contractor employed him as a technician 
since 2014. (Tr. 21) In 2006, he graduated from high school, and in 2013, he received an 
associate’s degree. (Tr. 52) He is a senior in college. (AE C) He served in the Air Force 
from January 2010 to January 2014; he did not receive non-judicial punishment or a 
reprimand; he received an Air Force Achievement Medal (AFAM) and Meritorious Unit 
Commendation (MUC); his specialty was network administrator; and he received an 
honorable discharge.  (Tr. 22-23, 52) He was an honor graduate in Air Force basic training 
and technical training. (AE C) He served two deployments to a combat zone. (AE C) In 
2011, he married; and in 2014, he divorced. (Tr. 24) He does not have any children. (Tr. 
24) After leaving active duty, he retained his security clearance, and he continued to retain 
                                            
1 Application of the AGs that were in effect as of the issuance of the SOR would not change my 
decision in this case. The new AGs are available at http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/5220-6 R20170608.pdf.  
 
2 Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available 
in the cited exhibits. 
 
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it after he was employed by his current employer. (Tr. 54) His security clearance was 
suspended after he revealed his illegal drug use on his June 4, 2015 SCA. (Tr. 54) 
 
Drug Involvement 
 
Applicant used marijuana four or five times from 2006 to 2009. (Tr. 26-27, 41) He 
did not use marijuana when he was in the Air Force. (Tr. 27-28) In February 2014, shortly 
after he left active duty, he used marijuana with friends at a super bowl party. (Tr. 28, 49) 
He was not aware that his security clearance continued after he left active duty. (Tr. 28) 
He would not have used marijuana if he had been aware that his security clearance 
remained in effect after he left active duty. (Tr. 29) He did not use any marijuana after 
February 2014. (Tr. 29) He does not intend to use marijuana in the future. He did not use 
marijuana while working for his current employer. (Tr. 30) He does not associate with 
marijuana users. (Tr. 37) 
 
In 2014, Applicant felt that he was under exceptional stress from work, school, and 
marital problems. (Tr. 30-31) In June 2014, Applicant began working for his current 
employer. (Tr. 37) In August 2014, he took two or three hydrocodone pills, and in 
December 2014, he took two or three oxycodone pills from a relative’s prescription drug 
supply, and he consumed them. (Tr. 31-32, 45-47) He denied that he drove a vehicle after 
consuming the prescription drugs. (Tr. 54) His current employer employed him at the time 
he used the hydrocodone and oxycodone. (Tr. 32) He does not intend to abuse 
prescription drugs or use marijuana in the future, and he expressed his remorse about 
abusing prescription drugs and using marijuana. (Tr. 32-33, 36) He has learned how to 
manage stress without abusing prescription drugs. (Tr. 33, 36) He was very ashamed of 
his theft of the prescription drugs. (Tr. 48, 51) He continues to visit the relative’s home 
where he stole the prescription drugs. (Tr. 53)  
 
In Applicant’s June 4, 2015 SCA and November 13, 2015 Office of Personnel 
Management personal subject interviews (OPM PSIs), he disclosed his marijuana use in 
2014, and his hydrocodone and oxycodone use in 2014. (GE 1; GE 4) He did not disclose 
his marijuana use or abuse of prescription drugs to his security officer. (Tr. 39) He did not 
disclose the theft of the prescription drugs to his relative who was the victim of the theft. 
(Tr. 48) He disclosed his illegal drug use to his supervisor. (Tr. 39) In January and March 
2017, he completed urinalysis tests, which were negative for use of illegal drugs. (Tr. 40-
41; AE A) He has not received any drug abuse counseling or therapy. (Tr. 53) He provided 
a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, 
acknowledging that any future illegal drug use is grounds for revocation of his security 
clearance. (AE D) 
 
Character Evidence 
 
 A witness, who had frequent social contact with Applicant for two years, described 
Applicant as honest, reliable, diligent, trustworthy, and responsible. (Tr. 15-20; AE B) An 
Air Force technical sergeant, who had social and work contact with Applicant for six years, 
described him as professional, dedicated, and diligent. (AE B) A co-worker, who has 
known Applicant for two years at work and socially, said Applicant is committed, honest, 
 
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honorable, and loyal. (AE B) The three statements support Applicant’s access to 
classified information. (Tr. 15-20; AE B) Applicant described himself as honest, 
trustworthy, and reliable, and he believes he has an excellent reputation. (Tr. 35)  
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive 
Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, 
“no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control 
access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual 
is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President 
has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for 
access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within 
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are 
applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.  
 
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance 
decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a 
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. 
Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole or 
in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or 
patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the 
President, Secretary of Defense, and DNI have established for issuing a clearance. 
  
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 
(App. Bd. May 2, 1996). 
 
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Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it 
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” 
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a 
mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 
(App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, 
on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Drug Involvement 
 
AG ¶ 24 articulates the security concern for drug involvement: 
 
The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of 
prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances 
that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner 
inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may 
lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises 
questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as 
defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in 
this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. 
 
AG ¶ 25 lists three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) any substance misuse (see above definition); 
 
(c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, 
processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of 
drug paraphernalia; and 
 
(f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or 
holding a sensitive position. 
 
Applicant’s June 4, 2015 SCA, November 13, 2015 OPM PSIs, SCA, and hearing 
record establish Applicant possessed and used marijuana,3 and he abused prescription 
drugs while holding a security clearance. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25(f) are established.  
 
                                            
 3 Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V, as referred to in the Controlled Substances Act are contained in 
21 U.S.C. § 812(c). Marijuana is a Schedule (Sch.) I controlled substances. See Drug Enforcement 
Administration listing at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1308/1308 11.htm. See also Gonzales 
v. Raish, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (discussing placement of marijuana on Schedule I). 
 
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AG ¶ 26 details conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt 
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance 
misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and 
has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: 
 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 
 
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and 
 
(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future 
involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security 
eligibility; 
 
(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness 
during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended; and 
 
(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, 
including, but not limited to, rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, 
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional. 
  
The DOHA Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving 
the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows:  
 
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance 
eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of 
a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government 
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the 
applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The 
standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in 
Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access 
to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” 
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b).  
 
ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013).  
  
AG ¶ 26(a) can mitigate security concerns when drug offenses are not recent. 
There are no “bright line” rules for determining when such conduct is “recent.” The 
determination must be based “on a careful evaluation of the totality of the record within 
the parameters set by the directive.” ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 
 
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2004). If the evidence shows “a significant period of time has passed without any evidence 
of misconduct,” then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time 
demonstrates “changed circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform 
or rehabilitation.”4 After careful analysis of the facts and the Appeal Board’s decisions, I 
conclude insufficient time has elapsed since Applicant’s most recent abuse of prescription 
drugs in December 2014, and AG ¶ 26(a) does not fully apply. 
 
AG ¶ 26(b) partially applies. Applicant acknowledged his drug involvement and 
substance misuse. He provided some evidence of actions taken to overcome this 
problem. He ended his association with his drug-using associates and contacts. He does 
not go to the environment where illegal drugs were used. He provided a signed statement 
of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, and he 
acknowledged that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of his 
security clearance. However, he has not provided a sufficient pattern of abstinence from 
misuse of prescription drugs.  
 
Applicant used marijuana four or five times from 2006 to 2009 and once in 
February 2014. In August 2014, Applicant stole two or three hydrocodone pills, and in 
December 2014, he stole two or three oxycodone pills from a relative’s prescription drug 
supply. He consumed the stolen pills. He was employed by a DOD contractor and holding 
a security clearance when he committed the thefts and used the stolen prescription drugs. 
He did not receive drug counseling. His conduct while holding a security clearance is 
recent, serious, and drug involvement security concerns are not mitigated.  
                                            
4 ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). In ISCR Case No. 04-09239 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Dec. 20, 2006), the Appeal Board reversed the judge’s decision denying a clearance, focusing on the 
absence of drug use for five years prior to the hearing. The Appeal Board determined that the judge 
excessively emphasized the drug use while holding a security clearance, and the 20 plus years of drug use, 
and gave too little weight to lifestyle changes and therapy. For the recency analysis the Appeal Board 
stated: 
  
Compare ISCR Case No. 98-0394 at 4 (App. Bd. June 10, 1999) (although the passage of 
three years since the applicant's last act of misconduct did not, standing alone, compel the 
administrative judge to apply Criminal Conduct Mitigating Condition 1 as a matter of law, 
the Judge erred by failing to give an explanation why the Judge decided not to apply that 
mitigating condition in light of the particular record evidence in the case) with ISCR Case 
No. 01-02860 at 3 (App. Bd. May 7, 2002) (“The administrative judge articulated a rational 
basis for why she had doubts about the sufficiency of Applicant's efforts at alcohol 
rehabilitation.”) (citation format corrections added). 
 
See also ISCR Case No. 02-08032 at 8 (App. Bd. May 14, 2004) (reversing an unfavorable security 
clearance decision because the administrative judge failed to explain why drug use was not mitigated after 
the passage of more than six years from the previous drug abuse). In ISCR Case No. 05-11392 at 1-3 (App. 
Bd. Dec. 11, 2006) the Appeal Board, affirmed the administrative judge’s decision to revoke an applicant’s 
security clearance after considering the recency analysis of an administrative judge stating:  
 
The administrative judge made sustainable findings as to a lengthy and serious history of 
improper or illegal drug use by a 57-year-old Applicant who was familiar with the security 
clearance process. That history included illegal marijuana use two to three times a year 
from 1974 to 2002 [drug use ended four years before hearing].  It also included the illegal 
purchase of marijuana and the use of marijuana while holding a security clearance. 
 
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Personal Conduct 
 
AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern stating: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect 
classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to 
cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security 
investigative or adjudicative processes.  
 
 AG ¶ 16 describes three conditions that could raise a security concern and may 
be disqualifying in this case:  
 
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, 
but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person 
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack 
of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard 
classified or sensitive information; 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information, 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with 
rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual 
may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This 
includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or 
unreliable behavior . . . ; (3) a pattern of . . . rule violations; and 
 
(e) personal conduct . . . that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, 
manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or 
group. Such conduct includes: (1) engaging in activities which, if known, 
could affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing. 
 
The SOR cross-alleges under the personal conduct guideline the same conduct 
alleged under the drug involvement guideline. All of Applicant’s conduct causing a 
security concern is explicitly covered under Guideline H, and that conduct is sufficient to 
warrant revocation of his security clearance. AG ¶¶ 16(c) and 16(d) do not apply. 
Applicant’s involvement with marijuana and abuse of prescription drugs adversely affects 
his professional and community standing. However, this conduct does not create a 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress because security officials and his 
supervisor are aware of it. AG ¶ 16(a) is not established. Guidelines H and E address 
identical issues involving judgment, trustworthiness, and reliability. Guideline E concerns 
 
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are a duplication of the concerns under Guideline H, and accordingly, personal conduct 
security concerns are found for Applicant. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
     
Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security 
clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines” and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guidelines H and 
E are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were 
addressed under those guidelines but some warrant additional comment. 
 
Applicant is 29 years old, and a DOD contractor has employed him as a technician 
since 2014. In 2013, he received an associate’s degree, and he is currently a senior in 
college. He served in the Air Force from January 2010 to January 2014; he did not 
received non-judicial punishment or a reprimand; he received an AFAM and MUC; his Air 
Force specialty was network administrator; and he received an honorable discharge.  He 
was an honor graduate in Air Force basic training and technical training. He served two 
deployments to a combat zone.  In 2011, he married; and in 2014, he divorced. Three 
colleagues described Applicant as honest, reliable, diligent, trustworthy, responsible, 
professional, dedicated, honorable, and loyal. Their statements support Applicant’s 
access to classified information.  
 
Applicant disclosed his drug involvement on his June 4, 2015 SCA and November 
13, 2015 OPM PSI and to his supervisor. In January and March 2017, his urinalysis tests 
were negative for use of illegal drugs. He provided a signed statement of intent to abstain 
from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future illegal 
drug use is grounds for revocation of his security clearance. He expressed remorse for 
his marijuana possession and use as well as his abuse of prescription drugs. 
 
The evidence against reinstatement of his security clearance is more substantial. 
Applicant used marijuana four or five times from 2006 to 2009 and once in February 2014. 
In August 2014, Applicant stole two or three hydrocodone pills, and in December 2014, 
he stole two or three oxycodone pills from a relative’s prescription drug supply. He 
 
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consumed the stolen pills. He was employed by a DOD contractor and holding a security 
clearance in 2014 when he committed the thefts and used the stolen prescription drugs. 
He has not received any drug abuse counseling or therapy. His thefts and abuse of 
prescription drugs were while holding a security clearance, and this conduct raises a 
serious security concern. The protection of national security relies on applicants to comply 
with rules, regulations, and laws. He did not establish his reliability, trustworthiness, and 
ability to protect classified information. 
 
It is well settled that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security 
clearance eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of a 
security clearance. See Dorfmont, 913 F. 2d at 1401. Unmitigated security concerns lead 
me to conclude that grant of a security clearance to Applicant is not warranted at this 
time. This decision should not be construed as a determination that Applicant cannot or 
will not attain the state of reform necessary for award of a security clearance in the future. 
With a track record of behavior consistent with his obligation to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations, he may well be able to demonstrate persuasive evidence of his security 
clearance worthiness.  
 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, 
and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Personal 
conduct security concerns are mitigated as a duplication of the drug involvement security 
concerns; however, drug involvement security concerns are not mitigated. It is not clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant security clearance 
eligibility at this time.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
  
Paragraph 1, Guideline H:     AGAINST APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c:  Against Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline E:     FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant  
  
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the 
interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
_________________________ 
Mark Harvey 
Administrative Judge