KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to
the applicant to establish mitigation. Applicant had not sought financial counseling and “[n]o
information was provided regarding the current status of the SOR debts or her current financial
condition.” Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 15-08130.a1
DATE: 08/03/2017
DATE: August 3, 2017
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 15-08130
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On June
14, 2016, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of
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Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a decision
on the written record.  On May 31, 2017, after the considering the record, Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Gregg A. Cervi denied Applicant’s request
for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because her debts
were the result of circumstances beyond her control (e.g., medical problems and unemployment),
and she has an excellent employment record and has held a clearance for 20 years without incident. 
In the alternative, she asks that the Board grant her a waiver or conditional clearance.  The Board
does not have authority to grant waivers, or interim, conditional or probationary clearances.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-04289 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 9, 2015).  Applicant’s argument does not
demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 15-01652 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul.
7, 2017).
Applicant elected to have her case decided on the written record, and then did not respond
to the government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM).  Based on the record that was before him,
the Judge found Applicant had ten delinquent consumer and medical debts totaling approximately
$23,000.  In reaching his adverse decision he specifically considered the fact that Applicant had
successfully worked for more than 20 years supporting the Department of Defense as an employee
or contractor and had incurred medical debts while unemployed.  However, he also noted she had
not sought financial counseling and “[n]o information was provided regarding the current status of
the SOR debts or her current financial condition.”  Decision at 2.  In light of the foregoing, the
Judge’s conclusion  that “Applicant has not shown that her financial problems are being resolved
or are under control” is sustainable.  Id. at 5.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision under Guideline F is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to law.  “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 
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Order
The decision is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Ra’anan         
Michael. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy             
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields         
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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