1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01300 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Jeff A. Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se August 24, 2017 ______________ Decision ______________ CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge: Statement of the Case On September 6, 2016, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guideline E.1 The SOR further informed Applicant that, based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. Applicant answered the SOR on October 24, 2016, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on November 22, 2016. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on November 22, 2016, scheduling the hearing for December 14, 2016. The hearing was convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GX) 1 through 1 I considered the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006, as well as the new Adjudicative Guidelines, effective June 8, 2017. My decision would be the same if the case was considered under the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006. 2 5, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf. The record was left open until January 17, 2017, for receipt of additional documentation. On January 25, 2017, Applicant offered an exhibit in an untimely fashion. As Department Counsel had no objection to this tardy submission, it was admitted into evidence as Applicant’s Exhibit A. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on December 27, 2016. Findings of Fact Applicant admitted to the allegations in SOR ¶ 1.a. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is a 39-year-old employee of a defense contractor. (TR at page 15 lines 2~3, and GX 1 at page 5.) He has been employed with the defense contractor since November of 2015. (TR at page 17 lines 12~18.) He has held a security clearance since 2009. (TR at page 16 line 18 to page 17 line 11.) He is married, and has one child, age three. (TR at page 15 lines 4~15.) Guideline E – Personal Conduct 1.a. In August of 2015, Applicant was terminated by his former employer. (TR at page 18 line 3 to page 30 line 2, at page 36 line 4 to page 37 line 3, at page 40 line 17 to page 41 line 1, and GXs 3~5.) He admits to violating the privacy of a fellow employee by improperly accessing that employee’s paystub. (Id.) He was also found liable of, and the Government’s evidence supports, Misuse of Company Assets and Incorrect Time Charging. (GX 3.) This allegation is found against Applicant. Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 3 drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Directive ¶ E3.1.14 requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” A person who applies for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). Analysis Guideline E - Personal Conduct The security concern relating to the guideline for Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. One is potentially applicable in this case: (d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the 4 individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or government protected information; (2) any disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and (4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources, Applicant improperly accessed the personal information of a fellow employee, misused his employer’s assets, and incorrectly overcharged his employer as to the time he worked on his employer’s tasks. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions. AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 including: (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; (b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully; (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; (e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; 5 (f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability; and (g) association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, has ceased, or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations. None of these apply. Applicant’s actions were not minor, were fairly recent, and demonstrate a pattern of dishonestly and rule violations. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline E in my whole-person analysis. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the Personal Conduct security concerns. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant 6 Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. ________________________ Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge