KEYWORD: Guideline G; Guideline J; Guideline E
DIGEST: Applicant has not rebutted the presumption that the Judge considered all of the
evidence in the record, nor has he shown that the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that
was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 16-01684.a1
DATE: 08/09/2017
DATE: August 9, 2017
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 16-01684
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Ryan C. Nerney, Esq.
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On June
13, 2016, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision–security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption), Guideline J (Criminal
Conduct), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct)1 of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan.
2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). On May 9, 2017, after conducting a hearing, Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Carol G. Ricciardello denied Applicant’s
request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
1The Judge withdrew the Guideline E allegation upon motion by Department Counsel.  Decision at 2.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Consistent with the following, we affirm.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis
The Judge summarized her essential findings in the Analysis portion of her decision.  She
found that Applicant had been arrested for DUI in 2008.  Although the charge was dismissed,
Applicant went to an alcohol and drug safety course and his license was suspended.  He was charged
with DUI again in 2010 and convicted the following year.  He was ordered to attend an alcohol
safety course and to pay fines.  In addition, his license was suspended.  Applicant was diagnosed
with alcohol abuse.  In 2015, Applicant’s car struck another one, and he received his third DUI
charge, as a consequence of which he was sentenced to five days in jail, a fine, and attendance at an
alcohol safety course.  
The Judge stated that Applicant was 27 at the time of his first arrest, so that his offenses
could not plausibly be attributed to youthful indiscretion.  She noted that it had been two years since
his last incident.  However, she also noted that by the date of her decision it was only a few months
since Applicant was released from probation.  She stated that each time he was arrested or convicted
he had an opportunity to learn but failed to do so.  She stated that, given the number of his offenses,
his having attended alcohol safety courses several times, and his continued consumption of alcohol,
the two years since his last offense are not enough to show that Applicant’s security-significant
conduct is behind him.
Discussion
Applicant cites to matters that, he believes, the Judge did not consider, such as his having
held a clearance for many years without incident or concern, his evidence that he consumes alcohol
only rarely, the family problems that he was undergoing in 2015, etc.  Applicant has not rebutted
the presumption that the Judge considered all of the evidence in the record, nor has he shown that
the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 13-00502 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 7, 2017).  We give due consideration to the
Hearing Office cases that Applicant cites in his Appeal Brief.  They are not sufficient to show
undermine the Judge’s adverse findings.  In any event, Hearing Office cases are not binding on other
Hearing Office Judges or on the Appeal Board.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 15-01416 at 3 (App. Bd.
Feb. 15, 2017). 
The Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the
decision.  The decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  See also Directive, Encl. 2, App. A ¶ 2(b):  “Any
doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in
favor of the national security.”
Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Ra’anan            
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody            
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy             
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board