1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) --- ) ISCR Case No. 16-00401 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Carroll J. Connelley, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ GALES, Robert Robinson, Administrative Judge: Applicant mitigated the security concerns regarding foreign influence. Eligibility for a security clearance and access to classified information is granted. Statement of the Case On May 20, 2015, Applicant applied for a security clearance and submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) version of a Security Clearance Application.1 On June 9, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to her, under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended and modified; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended and modified (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information (December 29, 2005) applicable to all adjudications and other determinations made under the Directive, effective September 1, 2006.2 The SOR 1 Item 2 (e-QIP, dated May 20, 2015). 2 alleged security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and detailed reasons why the DOD adjudicators were unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The SOR recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. It is unclear when Applicant received the SOR, as there is no receipt in the case file. In a sworn statement, dated July 5, 2016, Applicant responded to the SOR and elected to have her case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.3 A complete copy of the Government’s file of relevant material (FORM) was mailed to Applicant by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) on October 31, 2016, and she was afforded an opportunity, within a period of 30 days after receipt of the FORM, to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. In addition to the FORM, Applicant was furnished a copy of the Directive as well as the previous Adjudicative Guidelines applicable to her case. Applicant received the FORM on November 14, 2016. Applicant’s response was due on December 14, 2016. Applicant took advantage of that opportunity, and on December 9, 2016, she submitted several documents to which there was no objection. The case was assigned to me on August 10, 2017. Rulings on Procedure Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain enumerated facts pertaining to the People’s Republic of China (China) appearing in 11 U.S. Government publications which were identified, but only fragments of extracts of those publications were attached to the request. Facts are proper for administrative notice when they are easily verifiable by an authorized source and relevant and material to the case. In this instance, the Government relied on source information regarding China in publications of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, and the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission. The press release from the U.S. Department of Justice was presented apparently to substantiate that China actively pursues collection of U.S. economic and propriety information, and, therefore, Applicant’s relationships with her various family members and extended family members in China raises suspicion of her. The case cited does not involve Applicant personally, nor does it involve espionage through any familial relationship. The anecdotal evidence of criminal wrongdoing of other U.S. citizens is of decreased relevance to an assessment of Applicant’s security suitability, especially where 2 Effective June 8, 2017, by Directive 4 of the Security Executive Agent (SEAD 4), dated December 10, 2016, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, were established to supersede all previously issued national security adjudicative criteria or guidelines. Accordingly, those guidelines previously implemented on September 1, 2006, under which this security clearance review case was initiated, no longer apply. In comparing the two versions, there is no substantial difference that might have a negative effect on Applicant in this case. 3 Item 1 (Answer to the SOR, dated July 5, 2016). 3 there is no evidence that Applicant, or any member of her family or extended family, was ever involved in any aspect of the cited case or ever targeted by any Chinese intelligence official. Furthermore, the press release is little more than a self-congratulatory public relations product issued by a public relations office, with the collateral effect of deterring other criminals contemplating possible attacks on our national security. After weighing the reliability of the source documentation and assessing the relevancy and materiality of the facts proposed by the Government, pursuant to Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence, I take administrative notice of certain facts,4 as set forth below under the China subsection. However, while I do not reject the facts set forth in the press release, the inference that somehow Applicant and/or her family, or her extended family, participated in criminal activity was not argued during the hearing and is specifically rejected. Findings of Fact In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted, with comments, two of the factual allegations pertaining to foreign influence (¶¶ 1.a. and 1.d.) of the SOR. Applicant’s admissions and comments are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact: Applicant is a 28-year-old employee of a defense contractor. She has been a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) engineer with the company since November 2014. She is a 2007 high school graduate, and she received a bachelor’s degree in 2011, and a master’s degree in 2013. She has never served with the U.S. military or any other military. She was granted a secret security clearance in 2009, and at some unspecified point was granted an interim top secret security clearance with access to sensitive compartmented information (TS-SCI). In 2012, that TS-SCI was suspended when Applicant self-reported an incident of misdemeanor misconduct. Applicant has never been married, and she has no children. Foreign Influence5 Applicant is a native-born U.S. citizen. Her mother is a naturalized U.S. citizen (naturalized in 1979) born in Taiwan, and residing in the United States. It is unclear if she 4 Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)). The most common basis for administrative notice at ISCR proceedings is to notice facts that are either well known or from government reports. See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). Requests for administrative notice may utilize authoritative information or sources from the internet. See, e.g. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (citing internet sources for numerous documents). In this instance, although Department Counsel has selected only certain pages of facts appearing in the identified publications, I have not limited myself to only those facts, but have considered the publications in their entirety. 5 General source information pertaining to Applicant and her family members discussed below can be found in the following exhibits: Item 1, supra note 3; Item 2, supra note 1; Item 3 (Personal Subject Interview, dated January 19, 2012); and Item 4 (Personal Subject Interview, dated July 2, 2015). 4 has had any positions other than homemaker. Applicant’s father is a naturalized U.S. citizen (naturalized in 1990) born in China, and residing in the United States. Before his retirement, he operated a U.S. – based business which required frequent travel to China because China was a big purchaser of his products. After he “retired,” he continued to serve as a consultant for several years, but no longer does so. He is in his 70s. Because of her father’s extensive travel when she was growing up, Applicant rarely saw him or spent time with him. In 1999, because of relationship issues between her parents, Applicant and her mother followed her father to China in the hopes of strengthening the family relationship. Applicant spent three of the four and one-half school years in China attending a boarding school, and each summer, Applicant and her mother returned to the United States. In 2003, Applicant and her mother returned to the United States permanently. Her father remained in China as a business consultant until 2011. Applicant subsequently learned that her father had been engaged in an extra-marital affair, causing the relationship problems between her parents, and Applicant stopped speaking with her father for several years. The marital relationship was apparently eventually partially restored, and Applicant recently resumed speaking to her father. Although her father returned to the United States to reside here, he has returned several times for a few months for traditional Chinese medical treatments to address several serious medical conditions. While in China, her father would stay with his sister. As of October 2016, Applicant’s father no longer planned to return to China for medical treatment as he believes he is too old to fly. Applicant also has a half-sister who is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in China, but residing in the United States. There are two other members of Applicant’s extended family who remain citizen- residents of China. Her father’s sister, a homemaker who was a retired bookkeeper, passed away in 2014. Her widowed husband is a retired clerk whom Applicant last saw in 2008. Applicant’s cousin is or was a clerk for a hotel, supermarket, and a clothing store. Applicant last saw him for two hours in 2014, and before that, had not seen him since 2008. Applicant communicates with her uncle and cousin about twice per year, usually to say hello on the New Year and one other time during the year. The lack of contact is for no particular reason other than Applicant and her extended family were never close to begin with and they “grew up on other sides of the world.” No member of Applicant’s family or extended family was ever affiliated with the Chinese government, its military, or intelligence services. Applicant noted that the “United States has always been [her] home, [her] culture, a place where [she is] proud to be in, and honored to be a citizen of.” Applicant has no assets or financial interests in China. Her father does not own a home in China, and when he resided there, he generally resided with his now-deceased sister. China China has an authoritarian Communist government, with powerful military forces, including strategic nuclear weapons and missiles. It is geographically vast and has a population of over a billion people. It has significant resources and an economy that in 5 recent years has expanded substantially. In China, reported human rights problems include suppression of political dissent, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced confessions, disappearance, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, and “arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life.” China also monitors telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions, e-mail, text messaging, and internet communications, and sometimes nonconsensual monitoring with listening devices and surreptitious searching of hotel guestrooms. China has been characterized as “the most aggressive country conducting espionage against the United States, focusing on obtaining U.S. information and technologies beneficial to China’s military modernization and economic development.” Those activities include economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, export control violations, and technology transfer. It actively collects military, economic and proprietary, industrial information about the United States of the following types, including: information and communications technology; military technologies, particularly marine systems and aerospace and aeronautics; civilian and dual-use technologies, especially clean technologies, advanced materials and manufacturing techniques, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and related technologies, and agricultural technology; and business information, especially energy and other natural resources and macroeconomic information. Americans of Chinese ancestry are considered prime intelligence targets by China. “The crux of the Chinese approach is not to try to exploit a perceived vulnerability but to appeal to an individual’s desire to help China out in some way . . . ethnic targeting to arouse feelings of obligation is the single most distinctive feature of Chinese intelligence operations.” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have characterized China’s espionage and industrial theft activities as the leading threat to the security of U.S. technology. While there have been a number of criminal incidents involving individuals, companies, and Chinese intelligence officers improperly acquiring U.S. economic intelligence and proprietary information, there is no direct or indirect connection to, or involvement with, Applicant, her family, or her extended family. Policies The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”6 As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant an applicant eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”7 6 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 7 Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified. 6 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the guidelines in SEAD 4. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. An administrative judge need not view the guidelines as inflexible, ironclad rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a meaningful decision. In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial evidence.”8 The Government initially has the burden of producing evidence to establish a potentially disqualifying condition under the Directive, and has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Once the Government has produced substantial evidence of a disqualifying condition, under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant has the burden of persuasion to present evidence in refutation, explanation, extenuation or mitigation, sufficient to overcome the doubts raised by the Government’s case. The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government.9 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship that the Government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Furthermore, “security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”10 Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”11 Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in 8 “Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all contrary evidence in the record.” ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) (citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). 9 See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 10 Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 11 See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. 7 part, on any express or implied determination as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication the Applicant has or has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. Analysis Guideline B, Foreign Influence The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 6. Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. The guideline notes a condition that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 7: (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Applicant’s father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, temporarily resided in China and did business or served as a consultant there for several years, and after he retired in the United States, he returned to China for traditional medical treatment on a periodic basis. He now permanently resides in the United States, and he has no plans on returning to China. Her uncle and cousin, both Chinese citizens, reside in China. When foreign family ties are involved, the totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family member must be analyzed.12 If only one relative lives in a foreign country, and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information.13 The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a 12 ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). 13 See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 at 12 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 8 foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. Moreover, Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.14 Furthermore, “even friendly countries can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.”15 Friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. It is reasonable to presume that a contentious relationship, or the absence of a democratic government, is not determinative, but it may make it more likely that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a U.S. citizen through relatives or associates in that foreign country. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue.16 In this instance, as noted above, there is substantial evidence to reflect that China aggressively engages in economic espionage or military intelligence activity directed toward the United States. The activities of Chinese authorities are sufficient to establish a “heightened risk” – a risk that is greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government. AG ¶ 7(a) has been established as it pertains to Applicant’s uncle and cousin, but not to Applicant’s father. The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate security concerns arising from foreign influence under AG ¶ 8: (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 14 ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004) (“The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”). 15 ISCR Case No. 00-00317 at 6 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). 16 See ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006). 9 (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) apply. At the outset of this analysis, it is important to note that Applicant has vastly differing relationships and frequency of contacts with her various family members. Her mother’s status and her half-sister’s status are of little concern to the Government as there is no SOR allegation pertaining to them. On the other hand, the status of Applicant’s father, uncle, and cousin is different, and they are focused upon in the SOR. The security concern with respect to Applicant’s father has been greatly reduced, and the heightened risk surrounding him has been eliminated, since the SOR was issued. He no longer works, consults, resides, or seeks traditional medical treatment in China. Now that he has retired in the United States, and considers himself to be too old to travel by plane, he has no intentions of returning to China. He is a naturalized U.S. senior citizen residing in the United States. Furthermore, while Applicant’s relationship with her father has seemingly thawed over time, it still is not as close as the traditional father-daughter relationship. Applicant’s relationship with her uncle and cousin is very different. As Chinese citizen-residents, they require the most scrutiny. Applicant’s relationship with them is, for the most part, non-existent. Her uncle is a retired clerk whom Applicant last saw in 2008. Applicant’s cousin is or was a clerk for a hotel, supermarket, and a clothing store, and Applicant last saw him for two hours in 2014, and before that, had not seen him since 2008. Applicant communicates with her uncle and cousin twice a year, usually to say hello on the New Year and one other time during the year. The lack of contact is for no particular reason other than Applicant and her extended family were never close to begin with and they “grew up on other sides of the world.” Applicant’s relationship with them is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. As noted above, there is no evidence that these relatives have been political activists, challenging the policies of the Chinese Government. There is no evidence these relatives currently work for or have ever worked for the Chinese Government, military, or intelligence service. Likewise, there is no evidence that terrorists or the Chinese Government have approached or threatened Applicant or her relatives for any reason. And, there is no evidence that those family members in China currently engage in activities which would bring attention to them or that they or other Chinese elements are even aware of Applicant’s work. As such, there is a reduced possibility that these relatives would be targets for coercion or exploitation.17 17 The Appeal Board has ruled that in the analysis of countervailing evidence, it is legal error to give significant weight to any of the following facts or factors: applicant’s ties to the United States (ISCR Case No. 02-13595 at 5 (App. Bd. May 10, 2005)); lack of prominence of relatives living in a foreign country (Id.); “family members’ low-key and noncontroversial lifestyle, and the fact that the foreign government has not contacted them about Applicant” (ISCR Case No. 04-12500 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006); one relative living in a foreign country may be sufficient to negate FIMC 1 (ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006)); a foreign relative’s fragile health (ISCR Case No. 02- 29403 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 14, 2004)), advanced age (ISCR Case No. 02-00305 at 7 (App. Bd. Feb. 12, 2003), financial 10 Applicant’s ties to the United States run deep. She was born in the United States. While she attended boarding school in China for several years, she graduated from high school and earned two degrees from universities in the United States, and has worked here. Her deep relationship with the United States weighs against a security concern for the relationships she has with an uncle and cousin. She can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Her parents and half-sister, all naturalized U.S. citizens, reside in the United States. Applicant’s values are U.S. values. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at SEAD 4, App. A, ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under SEAD 4, App. A, ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. Moreover, I have evaluated the various aspects of this case in light of the totality of the record evidence and have not merely performed a piecemeal analysis.18 There is some evidence against mitigating Applicant’s circumstances. She attended boarding school in China for several years; her father worked in and with China for many years; after he retired, her father returned to China periodically for traditional Chinese medical treatment; and she has an uncle and cousin who are Chinese citizen- residents. independence (ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005), or lack of financial dependency upon applicant (ISCR Case No. 03-15205 at 4 (App. Bd. Jan 21, 2005)); foreign relatives spend part of each year in the U.S. (ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005)); the lack of any connection between the foreign relative and the foreign government in question (ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005)); the absence of any attempt at exploitation in the past (ISCR Case No. 03-15205 at 4 (App. Bd. Jan. 21, 2005)); and a foreign country’s friendly relationship with the U.S., its stable, democratic government, or its extensive foreign military agreements with the United States (ISCR Case No. 02-22461 at 5-6 (App. Bd. Oct. 27, 2005)). Notwithstanding the Appeal Board’s position, I conclude that many of these factors are pertinent to the analysis in this case under the whole person concept; however, I will give limited weight to such factors in compliance with the Appeal Board’s jurisprudence. 18 See U.S. v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1966); See also ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2, 2006). 11 The mitigating evidence under the whole-person concept is simply more substantial. Applicant’s entire life is now centered in the United States. This is where she was born, where she graduated from high school, where she obtained two degrees, and where she has worked. Her deep relationship with the United States weighs against a security concern for the rather distant relationships she has with an uncle and cousin. She can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Her parents and half-sister, all naturalized U.S. citizens, reside in the United States. Applicant’s values are U.S. values. Overall, the evidence leaves me without questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all of these reasons, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns arising from her foreign influence. See SEAD 4, App. A, ¶¶ 2(d)(1) through 2(d)(9). Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.d: For Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. ________________________ ROBERT ROBINSON GALES Administrative Judge