KEYWORD: Guideline G; Guideline J
DIGEST: The Directive does not prescribe a defined period of abstinence or good behavior for
alcohol offenses. Rather, each case must be evaluated upon its own merits. In the case before us,
several years elapsed between Applicant’s second DUI in 2010 and his most recent. Given that
much less time elapsed between the latest one and the close of the record, and given that
Applicant remains on probation, we find no reason to disturb the challenged conclusion. Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASENO: 16-01390.a1
DATE: 09/15/2017
DATE: September 15, 2017
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 16-01390
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On July
6, 2016, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision–security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) and Guideline J
(Criminal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended)
(Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On July 13, 2017, after the hearing, Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Shari Dam denied Applicant’s request for a
security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Consistent with the following, we affirm. 
The Judge’s Findings of Fact
Applicant served in the U.S. military from 1998 to 2007, rising to the grade of E-5.  He held
a clearance while in the Navy and has held one for most of the time since he was discharged. 
Applicant has a master’s degree.  Applicant began consuming alcohol when he was in the Navy. 
While attending college, his consumption decreased to three or four times a year.  Applicant has had
three arrests for DUI, each of which resulted in conviction.  The first two occurred in 2010 and the
last in 2015.  Following the second DUI in 2010, Applicant was required to complete a 30-hour
online alcohol education course.  As a result of the 2015 incident Applicant attended a DUI Risk
Reduction Program and a Victim Impact Panel.  He also completed a clinical substance abuse
evaluation.  The clinician did not give Applicant a diagnosis nor recommend substance abuse
treatment.  Applicant stopped drinking after each of the two incidents in 2010 but subsequently
resumed.  He currently drinks beer two or three times a month and occasionally consumes whiskey. 
He has had no further incidents since 2015.  
The Judge’s Analysis
The Judge stated that Applicant has a record of abusing alcohol from 2010 through 2015. 
She concluded that enough time has not passed since the third incident to establish mitigation.  She
concluded that Applicant has not demonstrated a pattern of responsible alcohol consumption.  She
stated that Applicant’s good work record does not outweigh evidence that, as of the close of the
record, Applicant was still on probation.  In the whole-person analysis, the Judge characterized
Applicant as “credible, intelligent, and educated.”  Decision at 8.  She noted that he has held a
clearance for many years and that he candidly admitted his DUIs.  On the other hand she cited to
evidence that Applicant remains on probation until mid-2018.  
Discussion
Applicant challenges the Judge’s conclusion that his last offense is too recent to establish
mitigation.  The Directive does not prescribe a defined period of abstinence or good behavior for
alcohol offenses.  Rather, each case must be evaluated upon its own merits.  Directive, Encl. 2, App.
A ¶ 2(b).  In the case before us, several years elapsed between Applicant’s second DUI in 2010 and
his most recent.  Given that much less time elapsed between the latest one and the close of the
record, and given that Applicant remains on probation, we find no reason to disturb the challenged
conclusion.
Applicant argues that the Judge erred in finding that he drinks beer three times a month and
occasionally drinks whiskey.  He states that this is a maximum amount of alcohol consumption and
that he often drinks less or not at all.  We agree with Applicant that in his testimony and his
interrogatory answers he stated that he does not necessarily drink this much each month.  Tr. at 48;
Government Exhibit 2, Answers to Interrogatories, at 6.  However, given the totality of the evidence,
we conclude that even if the Judge had qualified her finding as Applicant urges on appeal she would
still have issued an adverse decision.  To the extent that the Judge erred in this finding, it was
harmless.  The Judge’s material findings of security concern are sustainable.
Applicant contends that the Judge did not properly apply the whole-person concept.  He
notes that the Judge described him as credible but nonetheless rendered an adverse decision. 
Applicant contends, in effect, that the Judge’s analysis is not consistent.  He argues that the whole-
person factors cited in the Directive, if properly applied, would put him in a favorable light.  On the
first point, it is not inconsistent for a Judge to conclude that an applicant is credible but nevertheless
has failed to meet his or her burden of persuasion.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 14-01669 at 3-4 (App.
Bd. Jan. 29, 2015).  Applicant argues, in effect, that the Judge extended insufficient weight to the
favorable evidence in the record.  However, an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
record is not enough to show that the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 15-08842 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2017). 
We conclude that the Judge’s whole-person analysis is sustainable, in that she took into account all
aspects of the record evidence which bore upon Applicant’s reliability.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No.
04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
The Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the
decision.  The decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  See also Directive, Encl. 2, App. A ¶ 2(b):  “Any
doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in
favor of the national security.”
Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Ra’anan             
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy                
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board