1 
                                         
 
   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
       DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
    )  ISCR Case No. 16-02528 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance   ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Benjamin Dorsey, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
___________ 
 
Decision 
___________ 
 
HARVEY, Mark, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant used marijuana from 2000 to August 2014. He has not used marijuana 
after August 2014. He did not hold a security clearance when he used marijuana. He does 
not associate with known marijuana users; he avoids locations where marijuana is being 
used; and he promised not to use marijuana in the future. Drug involvement and 
substance abuse, criminal conduct, and personal conduct security concerns are 
mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.      
  
Statement of the Case 
  
On November 24, 2014, Applicant completed and signed his Questionnaire for 
National Security Positions (SF 86) or security clearance application (SCA). Item 3. On 
September 21, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (CAF) issued an SOR to Applicant under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry, February 20, 1960; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), 
January 2, 1992; and the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information, effective on September 1, 2006 (Sept. 1, 2006 AGs). The SOR 
set forth security concerns arising under the drug involvement and substance abuse, 
criminal conduct, and personal conduct guidelines. 
 
 
 
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On October 20, 2016, Applicant provided a response to the SOR, and he did not 
request a hearing. Item 2. On November 3, 2016, Department Counsel completed the 
File of Relevant Material (FORM). On December 6, 2016, Applicant responded to the 
FORM. On October 1, 2017, the case was assigned to me. The case file consists of five 
exhibits. Items 1-4; FORM response. Applicant did not object to any of the Government 
exhibits, and they are admitted into evidence. 
 
While this case was pending a decision, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
issued Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing in Appendix A the National 
Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs), which he made applicable to 
all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified 
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The new AGs supersede the Sept. 1, 
2006 AGs and are effective “for all covered individuals” on or after June 8, 2017. 
Accordingly, I have evaluated Applicant’s security clearance eligibility under the new 
AGs.1 
 
Findings of Fact2 
 
 Applicant’s SOR response admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a. Item 2. He also 
provided extenuating and mitigating information. Applicant’s admissions are accepted as 
findings of fact. Additional findings of fact follow.  
 
Applicant is 32 years old.3 In 2003, he graduated from high school. In 2007, he 
received a bachelor’s degree, and in 2014, he received a Ph.D. He worked for a federal 
contractor from September 2014 to present. He was employed as a graduate teaching 
assistant from 2008 to 2014. In 2013, he married, and he does not have any children. He 
has never served in the military.   
 
Drug Involvement and Substance Abuse, Criminal Conduct, and Personal Conduct  
 
Applicant used marijuana from around 2000 to August 2014 on “more than 100 
instances.” He said his drug use “involve[d] the drug as an enhancement for deep 
conversational dialogue, making music or watching movies.” His most recent marijuana 
use was at a bachelor party in August 2014. Before his marijuana use in August 2014, he 
used marijuana three years earlier in 2011.  
 
                                            
1 Application of the AGs that were in effect as of the issuance of the SOR would not change my 
decision in this case. The new AGs are available at http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/SEAD4 20170608.pdf.  
 
2 Some details were excluded to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific information is available 
in the cited exhibits. 
 
3 Unless stated otherwise, the source of the information in this paragraph and the next two 
paragraphs is Applicant’s November 24, 2014 Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86) or 
security clearance application (SCA). Item 3. 
 
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Applicant’s November 24, 2014 SCA, asked whether he intended to use marijuana 
in the future. He responded that he was “not sure.” He said he did not understand why 
marijuana was classified as an illegal substance. He opined that “marijuana is safer and 
less risky” than using alcohol “to relax or alter one’s mind state.” He continued: 
 
If the drug happens to become legal at the State level, like in Colorado, and 
I happen to find myself living in a state where this is the case then I would 
likely use the substance again periodically as I have in my past; as an 
enhancement for deep thought and focus.[4] . . .  [However, it], is also not in 
my interest to jeopardize my career by engaging in an illegal activity so until 
I find myself in a situation where I can participate in its use legally I will likely 
avoid it entirely. However, I am not able to say with certainty that I will not 
engage, like I did most recently at a bachelor party, with the drug in the 
future because the future is unpredictable and given my past it would be 
untruthful to claim such certainty as I will not use the drug (legally/or 
illegally) in the future. This is the most honest answer I can provide.    
 
At his March 3, 2015 Office of Personnel Management personal subject interview 
(OPM PSI) he confirmed his marijuana use from 2000 to August 2014. Item 4. He said 
that it would not be a problem for him never to use marijuana again to keep his job and 
security clearance. Item 4. 
 
In his SOR response, Applicant said his SCA comments were “not frank and 
potentially too honest,” and he wanted to clarify that he would not engage in any conduct 
that would jeopardize his ability “to help the United States solve critical science and 
technology policy issues.”5 He acknowledged his response on his SCA was “ambiguous,” 
and he has taken action to disassociate himself from personal relationships where 
marijuana could be involved.” He has also limited his access to venues where marijuana 
use may occur. He promised that he would not use marijuana as long as it remained 
illegal in the United States. He volunteered to participate in “further remediation” as 
necessary to alleviate security concerns, and he suggested, if necessary, he could attend 
a program for those who abused illegal drugs.    
                                            
4 Director of National Intelligence Memorandum ES 2014-00674, “Adherence to Federal Laws 
Prohibiting Marijuana Use,” October 25, 2014, indicates: 
 
[C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana 
use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines . . . . An individual’s 
disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains 
adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative 
authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, 
marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine 
if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual’s 
judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and 
regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed 
for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions. 
 
5 The source for the information in this paragraph is Applicant’s October 20, 2016, SOR response. 
Item 2. 
 
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In his FORM response, Applicant reiterated that he would not “bring harm to this 
country by using marijuana.”  
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the Executive 
Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security emphasizing, 
“no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to control 
access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual 
is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The President 
has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicant’s eligibility for 
access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within 
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are 
applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.  
 
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Clearance 
decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a 
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. 
Thus, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that it is based, in whole or 
in part, on any express or implied determination about applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or 
patriotism. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the 
President, Secretary of Defense, and DNI have established for issuing a clearance. 
  
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 
(App. Bd. May 2, 1996). 
 
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Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it 
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” 
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of disproving a 
mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 
(App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, 
on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Drug Involvement and Substance Abuse 
 
AG ¶ 24 articulates the security concern for drug involvement: 
 
The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of 
prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances 
that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner 
inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may 
lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises 
questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” as 
defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in 
this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. 
 
AG ¶ 25 lists three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) any substance misuse (see above definition);  
 
(c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, 
processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of 
drug paraphernalia; and 
 
(g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, 
or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse. 
 
Applicant’s SCA and OPM PSI, establish Applicant possessed and used 
marijuana6 from 2000 to August 2014. He made ambiguous comments about his intent 
to continue marijuana involvement on his SCA and on his OPM PSI. AG ¶¶ 25(a) and 
25(c) are established. In his SOR response and FORM response, after learning marijuana 
                                            
 6 Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V, as referred to in the Controlled Substances Act are contained in 
21 U.S.C. § 812(c). Marijuana is a Schedule (Sch.) I controlled substance. See Drug Enforcement 
Administration listing at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1308/1308 11.htm. See also Gonzales 
v. Raish, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (discussing placement of marijuana on Schedule I). 
 
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use is inconsistent with holding a security clearance, he clearly and convincingly 
committed to discontinue his marijuana use. AG ¶ 25(g) is not established.  
 
AG ¶ 26 details conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt 
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance 
misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and 
has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: 
 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 
 
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and 
 
(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future 
involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security 
eligibility; 
 
(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness 
during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended; and 
 
(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, 
including, but not limited to, rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, 
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional. 
  
The DOHA Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving 
the applicability of mitigating conditions as follows:  
 
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance 
eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of 
a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government 
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the 
applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The 
standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in 
Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access 
to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” 
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b).  
 
ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013).  
  
 
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AG ¶ 26(a) can mitigate security concerns when drug offenses are not recent. 
There are no “bright line” rules for determining when such conduct is “recent.” The 
determination must be based “on a careful evaluation of the totality of the record within 
the parameters set by the directive.” ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 
2004). If the evidence shows “a significant period of time has passed without any evidence 
of misconduct,” then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time 
demonstrates “changed circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform 
or rehabilitation.”7 
 
Applicant stopped using marijuana in August 2014. In his SOR response, he 
provided a clear resolution not to use marijuana in the future. He recognized the adverse 
impact of drug abuse in connection with access to classified information. He also 
understands that possession of marijuana violates federal law and constitutes criminal 
conduct. I accept Applicant’s statement that he intends to continue to abstain from illegal 
drug possession and use as truthful. AG ¶ 26(a) partially applies to his possession and 
use of illegal drugs.8 AG ¶ 26(a) applies. 
    
AG ¶¶ 26(b), 26(c), and 26(d) are not fully applicable. AG ¶ 26(b) does not apply 
because he did not provide “a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
                                            
7 ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). In ISCR Case No. 04-09239 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Dec. 20, 2006), the Appeal Board reversed the judge’s decision denying a clearance, focusing on the 
absence of drug use for five years prior to the hearing. The Appeal Board determined that the judge 
excessively emphasized the drug use while holding a security clearance, and the 20 plus years of drug use, 
and gave too little weight to lifestyle changes and therapy. For the recency analysis the Appeal Board 
stated: 
  
Compare ISCR Case No. 98-0394 at 4 (App. Bd. June 10, 1999) (although the passage of 
three years since the applicant's last act of misconduct did not, standing alone, compel the 
administrative judge to apply Criminal Conduct Mitigating Condition 1 as a matter of law, 
the Judge erred by failing to give an explanation why the Judge decided not to apply that 
mitigating condition in light of the particular record evidence in the case) with ISCR Case 
No. 01-02860 at 3 (App. Bd. May 7, 2002) (“The administrative judge articulated a rational 
basis for why she had doubts about the sufficiency of Applicant's efforts at alcohol 
rehabilitation.”) (citation format corrections added). 
 
In ISCR Case No. 05-11392 at 1-3 (App. Bd. Dec. 11, 2006) the Appeal Board, affirmed the administrative 
judge’s decision to revoke an applicant’s security clearance after considering the recency analysis of an 
administrative judge stating:  
 
The administrative judge made sustainable findings as to a lengthy and serious history of 
improper or illegal drug use by a 57-year-old Applicant who was familiar with the security 
clearance process. That history included illegal marijuana use two to three times a year 
from 1974 to 2002 [drug use ended four years before hearing].  It also included the illegal 
purchase of marijuana and the use of marijuana while holding a security clearance. 
 
8 In ISCR Case No. 02-08032 at 8 (App. Bd. May 14, 2004), the Appeal Board reversed an 
unfavorable security clearance decision because the administrative judge failed to explain why drug use 
was not mitigated after the passage of more than six years from the previous drug abuse. In ISCR Case 
No. 14-00775 (App. Bd. July 2, 2015), the Appeal Board sustained the revocation of a security clearance 
for an Applicant, who did not hold a security clearance that used marijuana 20 months before the 
administrative judge decided the case. 
 
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involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse 
is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.” Applicant did not abuse drugs after 
being issued a prescription that is lawful under federal law. He did not complete a drug 
counseling or treatment program.  
 
Applicant has not used marijuana since August 2014; he did not hold a security 
clearance when he used marijuana; he does not associate with known marijuana users; 
he avoids locations where marijuana is being used; and he promised not to use marijuana 
in the future. Drug involvement security concerns are mitigated. 
 
Personal Conduct 
 
AG ¶ 15 explains why personal conduct is a security concern stating: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect 
classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to 
cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security 
investigative or adjudicative processes.  
 
AG ¶ 16 describes three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case:  
 
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, 
but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person 
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack 
of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard 
classified or sensitive information; 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information, 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with 
rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual 
may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This 
includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or 
unreliable behavior . . . ; (3) a pattern of . . . rule violations; and 
 
(e) personal conduct . . . that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, 
manipulation, or duress by a foreign intelligence entity or other individual or 
group. Such conduct includes: (1) engaging in activities which, if known, 
could affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing. 
 
 
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SOR ¶ 2.a cross-alleges under the personal conduct guideline the same conduct 
alleged under the drug involvement and substance abuse guideline. All of Applicant’s 
conduct causing a security concern in SOR ¶ 2.a is explicitly covered under Guideline H 
in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b. AG ¶¶ 16(c) and 16(d) do not apply. Applicant’s involvement with 
marijuana affects his professional and community standing. However, this conduct does 
not create a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress because security officials 
are aware of it. Applicant freely and frankly revealed his marijuana possession and use  
on his SCA and discussed it during his OPM PSI. There is no evidence of record, aside 
from Applicant’s admissions, that he has any involvement with illegal drugs. AG ¶ 16(e) 
is not established. Guidelines H and E address identical issues involving judgment, 
trustworthiness, and reliability. The judgment concerns under Guideline E may be 
independently disqualifying from the judgment concerns under Guideline H and further 
assessment of mitigating conditions is required.   
 
AG ¶ 17 lists conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, 
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; 
 
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused 
or significantly contributed to by advice of legal counsel or of a person with 
professional responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual 
specifically concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of the 
requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual 
cooperated fully and truthfully; 
 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is 
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling 
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, 
unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to 
recur; 
 
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability 
to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; 
 
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable 
reliability; and  
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activities was unwitting, 
has ceased, or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply 
with rules and regulations. 
 
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AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d) are established for the reasons stated in the previous drug 
involvement and substance abuse section and under the whole-person concept, infra. 
Personal conduct security concerns are mitigated. 
 
Criminal Conduct  
 
AG ¶ 30 describes the security concern about criminal conduct, “Criminal activity 
creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very 
nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations.” 
 
AG ¶ 31 describes two conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be 
unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in 
combination cast doubt on the individual's judgment, reliability, or 
trustworthiness; and 
 
(b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an 
admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of 
whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. 
 
Applicant used marijuana more than 100 times from 2000 to August 2014.  He 
possessed marijuana before he used it, which is a federal criminal offense. All of 
Applicant’s conduct causing a security concern in SOR ¶ 3.a is explicitly covered under 
Guideline H in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b. AG ¶¶ 31(a) and 31(b) are established. 
 
AG ¶ 32 lists conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it 
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and 
does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
(b) the individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and 
those pressures are no longer present in the person's life; 
 
(c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; 
and 
 
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited 
to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, 
compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher 
education, good employment record, or constructive community 
involvement. 
  
 
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AG ¶¶ 32(a) and 32(d) are established for the reasons stated in the previous drug 
involvement and substance abuse section and under the whole-person concept, infra. The 
criminal conduct security concerns are mitigated.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
     
Under AG ¶ 2(c), “[t]he ultimate determination” of whether to grant a security 
clearance “must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines” and the whole-person concept. My comments under Guidelines H, E, 
and J are incorporated in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) 
were addressed under those guidelines but some warrant additional comment. 
 
Applicant is 32 years old. In 2003, he graduated from high school. In 2007, he 
received a bachelor’s degree, and in 2014, he received a Ph.D. He worked for a federal 
contractor from September 2014 to present. He was employed as a graduate teaching 
assistant from 2008 to 2014. In 2013, he married, and he does not have any children.    
 
Applicant used marijuana on multiple occasions from 2000 to August 2014. From 
2000 to 2011, he used marijuana more than 100 times. In his 2014 SCA and 2015 OPM 
PSI, he made statements about his intention to use marijuana in the future. He asserted 
it was better to use marijuana than to drink alcohol, and he indicated if marijuana use 
were legal, he would resume his marijuana consumption. Once he realized that marijuana 
use was absolutely forbidden for security clearance holders, he clearly and unequivocally 
rejected marijuana use. He frankly and candidly described his history of marijuana use. 
He has not used marijuana since August 2014; he did not hold a security clearance when 
he used marijuana; he does not associate with known marijuana users; he avoids 
locations where marijuana is being used; and he promised not to use marijuana in the 
future. 
 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Egan, Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, 
and the AGs, to the facts and circumstances in the context of the whole person. Drug 
involvement and substance abuse, personal conduct, and criminal conduct security 
 
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concerns are mitigated. It is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to 
grant Applicant security clearance eligibility at this time.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
  
Paragraph 1, Guideline H:     FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline E:     FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 3, Guideline J:     FOR APPLICANT  
 
Subparagraph 3.a:    For Applicant 
  
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the 
interests of national security to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Mark Harvey 
Administrative Judge