DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-02910 ) ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Robert J. Kilmartin, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge: On November 1, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), implemented in September 2006. 1 Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested an administrative determination. Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) In this case, the SOR was issued under Adjudicative Guidelines effective within the Defense Department 1 on September 1, 2006. Revised Adjudicative Guidelines were issued on December 10, 2016, and became effective on June 8, 2017. My decision and Formal Findings under the revised Guideline F would not be different under the 2006 Guidelines. 1 dated December 30, 2016. Applicant received the FORM on January 13, 2017. He did2 not submit a response to the FORM. The case was assigned to me on October 1, 2017. Based on a review of the case file, submissions, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Findings of Fact In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in the SOR under Guideline F, but he provided no explanations. (Item1) He listed his financial issues in his 2015 security clearance application. (SCA) (Item 2) Applicant is 37 years old. He is married with one child. He graduated from high school in 1998. He served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1998 until 2006, obtaining an honorable discharge. He was deployed to Afghanistan from 2006 to 2007. He obtained his undergraduate degree in 2014. Applicant has held a security clearance since 1998. Since 2015, he has worked as a defense contractor. Before his current position, he worked as a contractor from 2008 to 2015. He completed his security clearance application (SCA) in 2015. (Item 3) The SOR alleged ten delinquent debts, which include a medical account, collection accounts and charged-off accounts. The debts total approximately $20,790. He reported no unemployment as a reason for the indebtedness. He disclosed financial issues on his SCA and noted that he was arranging payment plans. (Item 2) During his April 2016 investigative interview, Applicant confirmed each delinquent account that appeared on the SOR from 1.a through 1.j. The only explanation that he provided for several accounts was the fact that his wife was not working, but he did not specify the period of time. (GX 3) During the course of the interview, Applicant noted that he would pay his accounts, as they were an oversight on his part. He stated that he would contact the creditors and set up payment plans to resolve the accounts. His plan was to have the accounts paid in full by the end of 2017. There were non-SOR accounts that Applicant acknowledged that he lost track of or believed he had paid. (GX 3) A 2016 credit report confirmed his SOR delinquent accounts were in collection. It also showed other accounts as “pays as agreed.” Applicant did not submit any documentation to support his claim that he had paid any accounts, or was in a payment plan to show good-faith efforts that he was addressing the financial issues. From the lack of documentation, he is given no credit for any mitigation. He did not submit a response to the FORM. There is no information in the record to confirm that the SOR debts were tied to circumstances beyond his control . The Government submitted four items for the record. 2 2 Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(a), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The burden of proof is something less than a3 preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant. 4 5 A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance6 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995). 3 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988). 4 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). 5 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 6 information), and EO 10865 § 7. 3 determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Any reasonable doubt7 about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such information. The decision to deny an individual a8 security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance. Analysis Guideline F, Financial Considerations The security concern for financial considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18: Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgement, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individuals’ reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concerns such as excessive gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at a greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern insofar as it may result from criminal activity, including espionage. The Government provided credible evidence that Applicant has delinquent debt which is unresolved. Consequently, Financial Considerations Disqualifying Conditions (FC DC) AG ¶ 19(a), and (c) apply. With such conditions raised, it is left to Applicant to overcome the case against him and mitigate security concerns. Financial Considerations Mitigating Condition (FC MC) AG ¶ 20(a) (the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply. Applicant provided no information that would allow any other MCs to fully apply. There is an explanation from Applicant concerning the delinquent debt that would be paid by the end of 2017, but he produced no documentation to confirm his assertion. He has not shown any good-faith efforts that he has been addressing his financial issues. From the lack of documentation, he is given no credit for any mitigation. He did not respond to the FORM. None of the other mitigating conditions apply in this case. ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995). 7 Id. 8 4 Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors. Applicant is 37 years old. He is married and has one child. He served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, receiving an honorable discharge. He was deployed abroad. He has held a security clearance since 1998. He has worked steadily since leaving the military. He has worked for his current employer since 2015. He has no history of criminal activity, alcohol abuse, or drug involvement. Applicant has unresolved delinquent debts. He did not report any circumstances that were beyond his control for accumulating the delinquent debts. He noted in one case that his wife was not working, but gave no details. He agreed that he would resolve his delinquent debts and arrange payment plans. He produced no documentation or explanations in response to the FORM. He has not met his burden of proof in this case under the financial considerations guideline. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline F : AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 1.a-1.j: Against Applicant 5 Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied. NOREEN A. LYNCH Administrative Judge 6