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                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
        DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 15-03397 
) 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Andrew H. Henderson, Esquire, Department Counsel 
 
For Applicant: Pro se1 
 
November 21, 2017 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge: 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on March 20, 2012. (Government Exhibit 1.) On March 18, 2016, the Department of 
Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) 
and C (Foreign Preference). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, 
effective within the Department of Defense after September 1, 2006.2 
                                                 
1 Applicant was represented by counsel for the sole purpose of filing an Answer in this case. 
2 I considered the previous Adjudicative Guidelines, effective September 1, 2006, as well as the new 
Adjudicative Guidelines, effective June 8, 2017. My decision would be the same if the case was considered 
under the previous Adjudicative Guidelines. 
 
 
 
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 Applicant answered the SOR in writing (Answer) on May 23, 2016, and requested 
a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed 
on July 11, 2016. The case was assigned to me on July 19, 2016. The Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on November 3, 2016. I 
convened the hearing as scheduled on February 10, 2017. The Government offered 
Government Exhibits 1 through 6, which were admitted without objection. Applicant 
offered Applicant Exhibits A through D, which were admitted without objection, and 
testified on his own behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on February 
23, 2017.  
  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
Applicant is 46 years old, and married with three children. Applicant is applying for 
a security clearance in connection with his application to work as a linguist for a defense 
contractor. This is his first application for a security clearance. Applicant denied all the 
allegations in the SOR, with explanations. 
 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B – Foreign Influence) 
 
 The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for national 
security eligibility for a security clearance because he has foreign contacts and interests 
that could lead to the exercise of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness on his 
part, or make him vulnerable to pressure or coercion. 
 
Applicant was born in Jerusalem, Israel in 1971. His father was by descent 
Russian, but was born in a part of Palestine, which is now Israel, in 1924. He is now 
deceased. Applicant’s mother is Arab-Christian, and was born in Jerusalem in 1934. A 
Report of Investigation (ROI) was prepared after an interview of Applicant by an 
investigator from the Office of Personnel Management on October 8, 2009. The ROI 
states: 
 
In 1948, Israel was established. At that time, the Subject’s [Applicant’s] 
father and mother both obtained citizenship of Jordan. . . . The Subject was 
not born with citizenship of any country due to the laws of Israel. He was 
granted a residency permit with Israel and his travel documents would 
indicate that he was a resident of Israel, but not a citizen. The Subject never 
held citizenship with any country until sometime in the 1990’s, exact date 
not recalled, when the Subject obtained citizenship with Jordan due to his 
father’s citizenship. (Government Exhibit 2 at 2.) (See Government Exhibits 
1 at Section 10, and 3 at 4-5; Tr. 19, 37-38, 42-45, 64.)   
 
 As stated, at one point Applicant was a dual citizen of the United States and 
Jordan. However, Applicant has never lived in Jordan. Applicant’s family always lived in 
 
 
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Jerusalem, or in Israel. He has no family in Jordan. Applicant renounced his Jordanian 
citizenship in 2009. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 10; Tr. 41-42, 63-64.) 
 
Applicant moved to Russia to obtain education to become a Russian-Orthodox 
priest. He married there. Applicant subsequently moved to the United States in 1992 to 
continue his education and find employment. Applicant eventually became a naturalized 
American citizen in 2005. Applicant’s wife was born in Russia, and is also a naturalized 
American citizen. She remains a citizen of Russia.3 His children are native-born American 
citizens, and are also dual citizens of Russia. (Government Exhibit 1 at Sections 1-4, 9, 
10, 17, and 18; Tr. 57-58, 81-82.) 
 
Applicant’s mother lives in Jerusalem. She is not a citizen of Israel, but has always 
lived in Israeli territory. While she is a citizen of Jordan, she has never lived there. She 
has no connection to any foreign government. (Tr. 63-65, 89.)4  
 
Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Russia. His father-in-law is a 
retired Russian Orthodox priest. His mother-in-law is a homemaker. He communicates 
with them on an occasional basis. They have no connection to the Russian government. 
(Tr. 59.) 
 
Applicant’s sister lives in Israel. Like Applicant, she is a Jordanian citizen. She is 
married to a Russian Orthodox priest, who is also a Russian citizen. She acquired 
Russian citizenship through marriage. They have no connections to the Russian, Israeli 
of Jordanian governments. (Answer at 3; Tr. 80-81.)  
 
Because of his family connections, Applicant has traveled to or through Russia, 
Israel or Jordan several times over the past ten years. He last visited Russia on a 
business trip in 2016. While he is sponsored by a defense contractor for a security 
clearance, Applicant is not currently working for them. In order to make money and feed 
his family, Applicant obtained a job through the Russian Orthodox Church and is currently 
managing a hotel in the Palestinian Authority. (Tr. 34-37, 59-60, 84-85.)  
 
Applicant has no financial interests in Jordan, or any other foreign country. He 
owns a house here in the United States. (Tr. 65.) 
 
Paragraph 2 (Guideline C – Foreign Preference) 
 
 The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for national 
security eligibility because he has acted in a way that indicates a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States. 
 
                                                 
3 In accordance with the evidence, the SOR was corrected to show that Applicant’s wife is not a citizen of 
Israel. (Directive ¶ E3.1.17.) (Tr. 86-88.) 
4 In accordance with the evidence, the SOR was corrected to show that Applicant’s mother is not a citizen 
of Israel, but only resident there. (Directive ¶ E3.1.17.) (Tr. 88-89.) 
 
 
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 Applicant applied for a Jordanian passport in 2008. He used this passport to travel 
to Jordan on a single occasion to visit his gravely ill father. After his father passed away 
he surrendered this passport to his company security office in 2010, after beginning work 
in the defense industry. The passport has since been destroyed. He has no interest or 
desire to obtain another Jordanian passport. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 10; Tr. 40-
41, 67-68.) 
 
 Applicant has a valid and current United States passport issued in 2014. He has 
used this passport for all of his international travel. (Applicant Exhibit D.) 
 
Administrative Notice 
 
 Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of facts concerning 
Russia, Jordan and Israel. He submitted documentation supporting his request, which are 
identified as Government Exhibits 4, 5, and 6. Applicant had no objection and the exhibits 
were admitted. The facts so noticed are set forth below:5 
 
 The Russian Federation (Russia) is a leading state intelligence threat to U.S. 
interests. Russian intelligence services continue to target U.S. and allied personnel with 
access to sensitive computer network information. Russia is taking information warfare to 
a new level, working to fan anti-US and anti-Western sentiment both within Russia and 
globally. Russia has significant human rights problems, including restrictions on civil 
liberties, denial of due process in politically-motivated cases, and widespread corruption. 
Finally, Russia is considered to be at a high risk of local, regional, and international 
terrorism. (Government Exhibit 4.) 
 
  The State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Israel’s prime minister leads the 
executive branch of the government. The United States is Israel’s leading trading partner. 
Israel respects the rights of its citizens; however, there are some concerns about Israel’s 
detention and interrogation of alleged terrorists, and discrimination against Arabs. 
Terrorism is a continuing threat to Israel and American interests in Israel. Since 1948, the 
United States and Israel have developed a close friendship based on common democratic 
values, religious affinities, and security interests. Occasionally, Israeli and American 
interests have diverged. Several U.S. government employees have been prosecuted for 
disclosure of classified information to persons connected to the Israeli government. Israel 
has an active program to gather proprietary information from U.S. companies. 
(Government Exhibit 5.) 
 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) is a constitutional monarchy ruled by 
King Abdullah II bin Hussein. Jordan continues to have significant continuing human 
rights issues, including mistreatment and allegations of torture by security and 
Government officials. Discrimination against Jordanians of Palestinian origin remains 
widespread. The U.S. State Department assesses the threat of terrorism in Jordan as 
                                                 
5 The following statements are based on the Government’s administrative notice request (Government 
Exhibits 4, 5, and 6), except as otherwise indicated. (See Tr. 16-17.) 
 
 
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high. Also of note, on January 30, 2017, the Secretary of Defense met personally with 
King Abdullah II. At the meeting, “The two emphasized the close nature of the U.S.-Jordan 
defense partnership and reiterated their shared commitment to ensuring a stable and 
secure Middle East.” (Government Exhibit 6.)6 
 
Mitigation 
 
 Applicant submitted evidence showing that he is a highly respected and successful 
linguist. Military members who worked with him, as well as co-workers, describe him as 
a disciplined person, with a sense of responsibility and integrity. (Applicant Exhibits B, 
and C.)  
 
 Applicant testified very eloquently about his love for the United States, and how 
much he appreciates being an American citizen. He described how his life in Israel and 
Russia was somewhat like being a fish out of water. He said that he came from a country 
where: 
 
“[T]here are Jews and Muslims and [they are] constantly fighting and 
everybody hates each other and not knowing myself even who I am. And 
trust me, Your Honor, it has been a journey in my life because if somebody 
considers me an Arab over there, and I go to Russia, they considered me 
an Arab. And Arabs consider me a Russian. And the only thing when I came 
to the States, I find out that nobody cares. And I am who I am, and it is what 
it is. (Tr. 22.) 
 
 He further testified that the United States was the only place, “where, you know, I 
felt like a human being. Nobody cares. I mean everybody accepted me with love and open 
doors. My neighbors, my friends, you know.” (Tr. 84.)  
 
 
Policies 
 
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an 
applicant=s suitability for national security eligibility for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in 
evaluating an applicant=s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG & 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge=s 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, Mattis Meets With Jordan’s King, Calls 
South Korean, Italian Counterparts, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1065103/mattis-meets-
with-jordans-king-calls-south-korean-italian-counterparts (Jan. 31, 2017.) 
 
 
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overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG && 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable 
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. 
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, 
the administrative judge may also rely on his or her own common sense, as well as 
knowledge of the law, human nature, and the ways of the world, in making a reasoned 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG & 2(b) 
requires that, AAny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.@ In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere 
speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive & E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive & E3.1.15, AThe applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.@ Section 7 
of Executive Order 10865 provides: AAny determination under this order adverse to an 
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense 
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.@ 
 
A person applying for national security eligibility to access to classified information 
seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and 
confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-
duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals 
to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, 
consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to 
protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of 
legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence) 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG 
¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
 
 
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in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology; and 
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship 
status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
 
  Applicant has family connections to Russia, Israel and Jordan. He has also 
traveled to all three countries. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying 
conditions.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
 
 
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individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
 Applicant has lived in the United States for more than half of his life. His wife is a 
naturalized American citizen, and his children are native-born American citizens. 
Applicant convincingly states that he views himself only as an American citizen, and has 
shown that his loyalties are to the United States. Applicant has extensive personal and 
professional contacts in the United States that far outweigh his relationship to Jordan, 
which was merely one of necessity and convenience for his family. Though he is of 
Russian descent, he was born in Palestine (now Israel) and has limited contact with 
Russia, based solely on his wife’s family. His relationship with Israel is based solely on 
his mother living in Jerusalem and his sister elsewhere in Israel. While born in Israel, he 
has never been a citizen. Based on my analysis of the available information, Applicant 
has overcome the adverse inference arising from his minor familial contacts with Russia, 
Israel and Jordan. Guideline B is found for Applicant. 
 
Paragraph 2 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference)  
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in 
AG ¶ 9: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United 
States. Foreign involvement raises concerns about an individual's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S. 
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By itself; the fact 
that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not disqualifying 
without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at concealment. 
The same is true for a U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or privilege of 
foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain recognition of a 
foreign citizenship. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 10.  
 
(a) applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country; 
 
(b) failure to report, or fully disclose when required, to an appropriate 
security official, the possession of a passport or identity card issued by any 
country other than the United States; 
 
 
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(c) failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the U.S.; 
 
(d) participation in foreign activities, including but not limited to: 
 
(1) assuming or attempting to assume any type of employment, 
position, or political office in a foreign government or military 
organization; and 
 
(2) otherwise acting to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, 
organization, or government in any way that conflicts with U.S. 
national security interests; 
 
(e) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in 
another country in violation of U.S. law; and 
 
(f) an act of expatriation from the United States such as declaration of intent 
to renounce U.S. citizenship, whether through words or actions. 
 
  In 2008 Applicant obtained a Jordanian passport in order to visit his father. He no 
longer has the passport, and he has always been forthcoming to the Government about 
his foreign travels. Applicant’s conduct could arguably be viewed as disqualifying under 
the previous adjudication policy. However, the mere fact he obtained and used a foreign 
passport is not cognizable under any of the current disqualifying conditions. Since none 
of the disqualifying conditions apply to Applicant’s conduct, it is unnecessary to consider 
the mitigating conditions. Guideline C is found for Applicant. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant=s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant=s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG & 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual=s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG & 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security 
eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon 
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.    
 
 
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant has mitigated all the 
security concerns arising from the SOR. He has mitigated the security significance of his 
minimal family connections to Jordan, Israel and Russia. Applicant is a law abiding, 
trustworthy, and responsible American citizen and employee. Applicant has had a 
successful career as a linguist. Overall, the record evidence does not create doubt as to 
Applicant=s present eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. 
 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by & E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.1:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraph 2.a:     For Applicant 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant=s national security 
eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
                                                  
 
 
WILFORD H. ROSS 
Administrative Judge