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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [REDACTED] )  ISCR Case No. 16-03387 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Robert Blazewick, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HESS, Stephanie C., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant’s illegal drug use while holding a security clearance and his intentional 
falsifications during his background investigation remain concerns. Applicant has failed 
to mitigate the Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and the Guideline 
E (Personal Conduct) security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is 
denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (e-QIP) on February 9, 2015. 
On March 3, 2017, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD 
CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under 
Guidelines H and E. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Ex. Or.)10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.  
 
Applicant answered the SOR on March 22, 2017, and requested a decision on the 
record without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case 
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on May 30, 2017. On May 31, 2017, a complete copy of the file of relevant material 
(FORM,) which included Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 8, was sent to Applicant, 
who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, 
or mitigate the Government’s evidence. He received the FORM on June 5, 2017, and his 
Response was received by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) within 
the allotted 30 days and admitted without objection. The case was assigned to me on 
October 1, 2017. 
 
The SOR was issued under the AG implemented on September 1, 2006. The DOD 
implemented the amended AG on June 8, 2017, while this decision was pending. This 
decision will be decided based on the amended AG effective June 8, 2017.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
The SOR alleges under Guideline H that Applicant used cocaine at least twice 
between 2011 and 2013; used marijuana on numerous occasions between 1995 and 
2010; used ecstasy and psilocybin mushrooms in 2002; and, used cocaine and marijuana 
after having been granted a security clearance in 2008. Applicant admits each of these 
allegations. The SOR alleges under Guideline E that Applicant intentionally falsified his 
July 2000 e-QIP by failing to list his use of ecstasy and psilocybin mushrooms; that he 
falsified his February 2015 e-QIP by failing to list his second cocaine use; and, that he 
falsified his November 2015 responses to interrogatories by failing to disclose his ecstasy 
and psilocybin use, and by failing to report a second use of cocaine in 2013. Applicant 
admits each of these allegations. Applicant’s admissions are incorporated in my findings 
of fact. 
 
Applicant is a 36-year-old service technician employed by a defense contractor 
since September 2006. He was first granted a security clearance in October 2008. He 
has worked for his current employer for over 10 years. He and his cohabitant have resided 
together since approximately November 2004, and they have two children, ages nine and 
eight. Applicant graduated high school in 1999, and received a technical certificate in 
2001. (GX 1.) 
 
Applicant has been repeatedly asked about his illegal drug use during background 
investigations beginning in 2008. He has failed to give consistent responses regarding 
his use of illegal drugs. Specifically, Applicant has repeatedly failed to fully disclose the 
nature and extent of his illegal drug use in a candid and forthcoming manner. Applicant 
has given the following conflicting accounts of his use of illegal drugs: 
 
On his first e-QIP in July 2008, he listed his illegal drug use as use of marijuana 
between September 1997 and April 1999, “socially in high school and a few times after.” 
(GX 5.)  
 
During his August 2008 PSI, Applicant stated that during the same timeframe he 
“used marijuana at least 50 times on the weekends.” (GX 6.)  
 
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Applicant interviewed with another government agency, and was given a polygraph 
examination, at some point in 2013. As a result of the information disclosed during the 
polygraph examination about Applicant’s illegal drug use, Applicant was denied access 
to classified information. 
 
During his April 2015 PSI, Applicant stated that he used marijuana one time in the 
last seven years in September 2010. He explained in great detail the circumstances of 
his once-in-his-life February 2013 use of cocaine, and made multiple references 
throughout the interview to this one-time use. Applicant stated that because of his 
disclosure of his one-time use of cocaine and 2013 during his polygraph examination, his 
access to classified information was denied. 
 
In his November 2015 responses to interrogatories, when asked to list all illegal 
drugs he had ever used, Applicant listed that he used  marijuana in the late 1990s socially, 
once in 2010, and cocaine once in 2013. 
 
 In his January 2017 response to interrogatories, Applicant listed that he used 
marijuana from 1995 until 2000 “occasionally.”  He listed a one-time use of angel dust in 
1998, and a one-time use of Ecstasy and hallucinogenic mushrooms in 2002. He also 
listed two uses of cocaine between 2012 and 2013. He elaborated that the first cocaine 
use was while watching National Football League (NFL) playoff games, and the second 
use was approximately one month later, while watching football with the same people.  
 
In his March 2017 Answer, he stated that he used marijuana between 1995 and 
1999 “socially”, and once in 2010. He further stated that he used cocaine twice at the 
beginning of 2013, and not during 2011 or 2012. His description of the circumstances 
under which he used cocaine twice was verbatim to his January 2017 description. 
 
Applicant’s failure to fully and candidly disclose the nature and extent of his illegal 
drug use as required gave rise to the intentional falsification allegations in the SOR under 
Guideline E. In his Answer, Applicant admitted each of the Guideline E allegations, but 
qualified each admission. He stated that he did not list his 2002 Ecstasy and psilocybin 
mushrooms on his 2008 e-QIP because of “the insignificance of use” and because he 
had not thought about the dates of use. He explained that his failure to list his second 
cocaine use on his 2015 e-QIP was because he “did not take the proper time to fill out 
and update [his] e-QIP information.” In response to the allegation that he intentionally 
failed to disclose his use of ecstasy and psilocybin mushrooms, and his second cocaine 
use, on his November 2015 responses to interrogatories, Applicant stated, “I admit, I did 
not respond in the manner I should have.” 
 
Additionally, Applicant has justified his use of illegal drugs while holding a 
clearance, minimized the security significance of such actions, and falsified material facts 
concerning his drug use during all stages of his background investigations.  
 
In his Response, Applicant asserts that, despite his admissions to the Guideline E 
allegations, his conduct was excusable. For example, Applicant cites AG ¶ 17(b): 
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the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was because 
are significantly contribute to by advice of . . . A person with professional 
responsibilities for advising or instructing the individual specifically 
concerning security processes. Upon being made aware of requirement to 
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and 
truthfully. 
 
He then argues the applicability of this mitigating condition by stating: 
 
During my original 2008 interview after disclosing my experience with drugs, 
I cannot recall verbatim what was said but I was made to feel like what 
occurred wasn’t that significant and I probably didn’t need to put in the form 
because it happened in high school. I don’t recall the exact date but I was 
told by an interviewer (female) that I was not required to discuss anything 
which had been discussed with a previous interviewer. I will admit I haven’t 
taken the proper time to update my e-QIP application but since all these 
proceedings have begun, I have cooperated, responded and replied and 
have provided all that has been asked of me fully and truthfully. 
 
In his Response, Applicant also argues that the mitigating conditions set forth in 
AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is minor, so much time has passed, behavior is unlikely to recur 
and does not cast doubt on Applicant’s current security trustworthiness; AG ¶ 17(d): 
Applicant has acknowledged his behavior and participated in counseling or taken other 
positive steps to prevent such future behavior; and, AG ¶ 17(e): Applicant has taken 
positive steps to reduce vulnerability to exportation manipulation or duress, are 
applicable. Applicant states that it is been four years since his last drug use and he has 
gone to counseling; he emphasizes that he “was not arrested . . . suspected of . . . or 
disciplined for” his illegal drug use; and, that he has “done everything that has been asked 
of” him. 
 
In his Answer, Applicant states that his 2010 marijuana use was with a friend, with 
whom he no longer associates, who had just returned from his second or third combat 
deployment. Applicant further states that his two uses of cocaine in 2013 occurred when 
he was experiencing extreme difficulties in his relationship with his cohabitant and he was 
“not himself.” He and his cohabitant have since attended relationship counseling.  
 
Additionally, March 21, 2017, approximately four years after his last admitted use 
of illegal drugs, Applicant voluntarily enrolled in a six-week state-certified alcohol and drug 
treatment program. At intake, Applicant underwent several assessments which, 
according to his discharge report, “indicated a low probability of substance 
abuse/dependence disorder.” During the program, he submitted to a random drug 
screening, which was negative. He successfully completed the program in May 2017, and 
his discharge report recommends no further treatment. Applicant also submitted a 
notarized statement of intent of no future illegal drug use, and acknowledged that any 
such illegal drug use would result in the revocation of his security clearance. Applicant 
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states that he no longer associates with people who use illegal drugs. He emphasizes 
that his illegal drug use happened many years ago, and that he has made mistakes. 
(Response; Answer.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant’s meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or. 
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 
1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).  
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 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if 
they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse  
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24:  
 
The illegal use of controlled substances . . . can raise questions about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may 
lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises 
questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations.  
 
Applicant’s admissions, corroborated by the record evidence, establish the 
following disqualifying conditions under this guideline:  
 
AG ¶ 25(a): any substance misuse; and 
 
AG ¶ 25(f): any illegal drug use while granted access to classified 
information or holding a sensitive position. 
 
The following mitigating conditions may also apply: 
 
AG ¶ 26(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not 
cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment;  
 
AG ¶ 26(b): the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and 
substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this 
problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not 
limited to: 
 
 (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 
 
 (2) changing or avoiding the environment were drugs were used; and 
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(3) providing a signed a statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future 
involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security 
eligibility, and 
 
AG ¶ 26(d): satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, 
including, but not limited to, rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, 
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional. 
 
Illegal involvement with a controlled substance(s) after being granted a security 
clearance raises heightened concerns about a person’s judgment, reliability and 
trustworthiness, and requires a judge to closely scrutinize any claim of reform and 
rehabilitation. See ISCR Case No. 16-02005 at 3 (App. Bd. June 2, 2017) (“an applicant’s 
use of illegal drugs after having completed a security clearance application raises 
substantial questions about his or her judgment, reliability, and willingness to comply with 
laws, rules, and regulations.”) 
 
The Directive does not define “recent,” and there is no “bright-line” definition of 
what constitutes “recent” conduct. ISCR Case No. 03-02374 at 4 (App. Bd. Jan. 26, 2006). 
The Judge is required to evaluate the record evidence as a whole and reach a reasonable 
conclusion as to the recency of an applicant’s conduct. ISCR Case No. 03- 02374 at 4 
(App. Bd. Jan. 26, 2006).  
 
Applicant’s most recent use of cocaine was at some point in 2013. Although it has 
been nearly five years since Applicant’s last use of illegal drugs, time is not the only 
relevant factor when evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 
information. In this instance, Applicant’s repeated failures to be candid and forthcoming 
about his use of illegal drugs underscore concerns about his judgment, reliability, 
willingness to comply with laws rules and regulations, and overall trustworthiness. 
Applicant has held a security clearance since 2008. He used marijuana in 2010 while 
holding a clearance, and justifies his actions by stating that he used marijuana with a 
friend who had recently returned from his second or third combat deployment. He claims 
that he was experiencing stress due to his personal life, which resulted in his acting out 
of character and using cocaine on two separate occasions. While Applicant 
acknowledges his use of illegal drugs, he does not accept responsibility for his actions. 
 
Applicant voluntarily enrolled in a drug and alcohol treatment program on March 
21, 2017, the day before he filed his Answer to the SOR. His intake assessments 
indicated a low probability that he had a substance abuse/dependence disorder. He 
successfully completed the program in May 2017, and no further treatment was 
recommended at that time. However, Applicant had not used any illegal drugs in over four 
years when he self-enrolled in this treatment program, and participation in the program 
was not prescribed. I have considered AG ¶ 26(d), and while it partially applies, it does 
not fully mitigate the concern. None of the other mitigating conditions applies. 
 
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Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15:  
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect 
classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to 
cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security 
investigative or adjudicative processes. The following will normally result in 
an unfavorable national security eligibility determination, security clearance 
action, or cancellation of further processing for national security eligibility: 
 
The following disqualifying conditions apply:  
 
AG ¶ 16(a): deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant 
facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, 
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility 
or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; 
 
AG ¶ 16(b): deliberately providing false or misleading information; or 
concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an 
employer, investigator, security official, competent medical or mental health 
professional involved in making a recommendation relevant to a national 
security eligibility determination, or other official government representative; 
 
The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 17(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances 
that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and 
 
AG ¶ 17(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate 
the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, 
unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to 
recur. 
 
While Applicant argues that his Guideline E conduct is mitigated by time, stating 
that he last used any illegal drugs over four years ago, the concern under this guideline 
is not the illegal drug use, but his lack of candor and honesty. Throughout the multiple 
stages of Applicant’s background investigations, he has failed to be forthcoming about 
the nature and extent of his illegal drug use. Further, he continues to justify his recent 
illegal drug use, minimize the security significance of such actions, and admit that he was 
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intentionally untruthful. None of the mitigating conditions apply to Applicant’s dishonest 
conduct. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
  
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines H and E in my whole-person 
analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but I 
have also considered the following: 
 
 Applicant has worked for his defense-contractor current employer for over 10 
years. While there is no evidence that Applicant has used illegal drugs in the last five 
years, his use while holding a security clearance, in light of his age and experience with 
the security process, combined with his continued justification of his conduct and 
minimization of its security significance leave me with considerable doubts about his 
security worthiness.  
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines H and 
E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant 
has not mitigated the security concerns raised by illegal drug use, including while holding 
a security clearance, and his failure to disclose issues as required. Accordingly, I 
conclude he has not carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to grant her eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
As required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, I make the following 
formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
  
 Paragraph 1, Guideline H (Drug Involvement):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
   
Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.d:    Against Applicant 
  
Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.c:    Against Applicant  
 
Conclusion 
 
I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or 
continue Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
Stephanie C. Hess 
Administrative Judge