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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Name Redacted]  )  ISCR Case No. 15-06240 
  )    
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Robert Blazewick, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esq. 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOGAN, Erin C., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. Eligibility for access 
to classified information is granted.  
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On October 25, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (foreign 
influence). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by 
the DOD on September 1, 2006.  On June 8, 2017, the Security Executive Agent 
Directive 4 (SEAD 4) implemented new AGs which superceded the September 1, 2006 
AGs.  My conclusions would be the same under either AG.  
 
Applicant responded to the SOR on December 1, 2016. He requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. The case was originally assigned to another 
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administrative judge on March 7, 2017. It was assigned to me on May 22, 2017. The 
hearing was originally scheduled for September 20, 2017. On September 6, 2017, the 
hearing was continued until December 12, 2018. I convened the hearing as scheduled. 
Government Exhibits (Gov) 1-2 and Administrative Notice (Admin Not) I were admitted 
without objection. Applicant testified, called two character witnesses, and presented 
Applicant’s A – V, which were admitted into evidence without objection. I received the 
hearing transcript (Tr.) on December 20, 2017. 
  
Findings of Fact 
 
 The SOR alleges security concerns based on Applicant’s contacts with a cousin, 
who is a citizen of and resident of Russia. It also alleged that Applicant was a co-signer 
and had active power of attorney on multiple accounts in the U.S. belonging to his 
cousin. It was alleged that multiple transactions totaling approximately $1,146,319 were 
conducted involving these accounts since 2001. Applicant admits the allegations, but 
does not recall making multiple transactions totaling $1,146,319 since 2001. After a 
thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following findings 
of fact: 
 
 Applicant is 48 years old. He was born in Ukraine. At the time, Ukraine was part 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In May 1992, Applicant and his 
family (his parents, sister, brother-in-law and their two children) moved to the United 
States. The U.S. government granted Applicant and his family refugee status because 
they were Jewish and Russia is known to mistreat its Jewish citizens. He became a 
U.S. citizen on August 11, 2008. Before immigrating to the U.S., Applicant served two 
years in the Soviet Army, a compulsory service required of all Russian citizens, from 
June 1987 to May 1989. When Applicant immigrated to the United States, he began 
taking English as a second language courses. After that, he enrolled in college. 
Applicant received a bachelor and master’s degree from a U.S. university. Applicant has 
worked for his current employer, a DoD contractor since March 2014. He held an SCI 
security clearance from 2004 to 2008.  He successfully passed a counter-intelligence 
polygraph in 2005.  His access was discontinued because there was no need for him to 
have a security clearance. He never had any security violations when he had access to 
SCI. His company now has a need for him to have a security clearance. (Tr.29-32, 35-
36, 40-41; Gov 1; Gov 2 at 3-4, 12-15; Answer to SOR, AE A; AE D – AE F) 
 
 Applicant met his wife in 2000. They married in 2003. His wife is a naturalized 
U.S. citizen. She was born in Moldova. She became a U.S. citizen in 1999. She works 
full-time as a teacher. They have three children, two sons, ages 11 and 8, and a 
daughter age 7.  All were born in the United States.  Their daughter has rare genetic 
disorder and has special needs.  Applicant is grateful for the medical and educational 
services that his daughter receives in the U.S. She would not receive similar treatment 
in Ukraine. His sons attend local schools and are active in many sports and school 
activities. Applicant’s parents, his in-laws, his sister and her family are U.S. citizens. 
They all live in the same metropolitan area where Applicant lives. The last time 
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Applicant visited Ukraine and Russia was in 1999. (Tr. 27-28, 44, 58; AE A; AE H; AE I; 
AE J; AE P)   
  
 Applicant’s cousin, age 61, is a citizen of and resides in Russia. His cousin owns 
an oil and gas company. His cousin’s family would visit Applicant’s family when they 
resided in Ukraine. They have kept in contact.  Applicant’s contact with his cousin 
ranged from two to three times a month, to once every few months. Upon receiving the 
SOR, Applicant has reduced contact with his cousin. Since Applicant moved to the U.S., 
his cousin has traveled to the U.S. on at least five occasions to visit Applicant as well as 
his parents, and sister. His cousin’s last visit occurred in 2010 when he and his 
daughter came to the U.S. to look at colleges.  His daughter decided to attend college in 
London. She is looking into PhD programs in the U.S.. (Tr. 36-37, 51-56; Response to 
SOR)  
 
 Applicant’s cousin does not trust the Russian government. He is concerned that 
the Russian government might take his money. There have been issues in the past 
where corrupt bank employees stole money from depositor’s accounts and have not 
been prosecuted. Applicant’s cousin opened a couple bank accounts in the U.S. and 
asked Applicant to have power of attorney (POA) over the accounts so he can access 
the money without traveling to the U.S. Applicant agreed to act as POA because he 
believes his cousin is an honest and legitimate businessman and his cousin is not 
involved in Russian politics.  (Tr. 32, 41; Answer to the SOR; Gov 2)  
 
  As POA, Applicant primarily receives the bank statements and gives them to his 
cousin when he comes to visit. At one point, Applicant transferred $40,000 to his cousin 
from one of the accounts so his cousin could purchase butter in Poland, to sell for a 
profit in Russia.  Applicant’s cousin closed the account, but has another account which 
Applicant serves as POA. During a background investigation interview in October 2014, 
the investigator asked Applicant about a $139,000 cash withdrawal from his cousin’s 
account between November 2003 and May 2004. Applicant was unaware of the 
withdrawal. He was also asked about the wiring of $499,000 to Latvia. Applicant had no 
knowledge of this transfer. His cousin is wealthy, but he does not know the extent of his 
cousin’s holdings. Applicant mentioned in the 1990s he purchased and shipped a car for 
his cousin using $45,000 from his cousin’s bank account. Applicant’s cousin has 
withdrawn most of the money out of the accounts, but left the accounts open in case he 
needed to use them in the future. (Tr. 34, 60; Gov 2 at 7-8: Response to SOR)  
 
 Applicant does not receive any benefits from being POA. His cousin’s daughter 
also has access to the bank accounts. Applicant believes his cousin can now transfer 
funds and make withdrawals from Russia. Applicant cannot be blackmailed about these 
accounts. Applicant states he has not been involved in any illegal or deceptive financial 
acts, such as money laundering, check or bank fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement, or 
structuring or altering deposits to avoid financial reporting requirements. (Tr. 34; Gov 2 
at 8) 
 
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 During the hearing, Applicant testified that once he learned it was a problem, he 
decided to withdraw acting as Applicant’s POA. He cannot be removed as POA until his 
cousin removes him from the account the next time he is in the U.S.  His cousin 
anticipates visiting the U.S. within the next six months and will revoke the POA.  
Applicant also disclosed that his cousin financed the purchase of Applicant’s house. 
Applicant is attempting to refinance the house with a U.S. mortgage company. (Tr. 33-
35, 45, 64; AE T, AE U)  
  
 Applicant owns two homes, his residence and the home where his parents live. 
All of his investments are located in the U.S..  He would not invest his money in Russia 
because of the government’s level of corruption and disregard for people’s property. He 
has no assets located overseas. He and his wife have U.S. passports. Applicant has 
worked and supported himself his whole life. He and his wife both have professional 
jobs, but live in a small house and within their means. Applicant’s house is worth 
$250,000. He has approximately $10,000 in his checking account and $70,000 in his 
savings account. His 401(k) has approximately $480,000.  His wife’s account has 
approximately $200,000.   (Tr. 38-39; Response to SOR; AE M; AE N; AE S; AE V) 
 
Whole-Person Factors 
 
 Two of Applicant’s co-workers testified during the hearing. Witness A attended 
graduate school with Applicant. They worked together early in their careers. Applicant 
went to work for another company. Applicant’s company purchased Witness A’s 
company so they now work for the same company. He states Applicant is trustworthy 
and hardworking. Applicant cares for a daughter with severe disabilities.  He would trust 
Applicant with a security clearance. (Tr. 13-18) 
 
 Witness B works with Applicant. He has worked on the same projects with 
Applicant the last three or four years. Applicant does well on the job. He gets his work 
done and is always willing to help other people. He is aware of the concerns raised by 
Applicant having relatives who still live in Ukraine. He has no reservations about 
Applicant getting a security clearance. (Tr. 20-25) 
 
 Applicant also submitted several written letters of reference. Mr. C has worked in 
the defense industry and has held a security clearance for 11 years. He regularly 
receives Insider Threat training. He has no concern about Applicant’s loyalty or 
reliability. He met Applicant three years ago when they were assigned to the same 
project. They continue to regularly consult with each other on various technical 
problems.  Mr. C. is a student of history and grew up during the Cold War. He states 
Applicant has a strong allegiance to the United States. Applicant does not have a strong 
attachment to the Ukraine or the Soviet Union because of growing up Jewish in an anti-
semitic culture. Applicant told him that he witnessed high levels of inefficiency, 
nationalism, and corruption.  Applicant appreciates the U.S. because it has allowed him 
to have the opportunity to excel. He earned his bachelor’s and master’s in the U.S.. He 
has worked in the U.S. for over 20 years and is well-respected in the office. He provides 
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a good quality of life for his three U.S.-born children. He recommends Applicant for a 
security clearance.  (AE K) 
 
 Mr. D has been Applicant’s friend for over 15 years. He describes Applicant as “a 
loving husband, devoted and caring father, hardworking career-oriented professional.”  
Applicant is the type of friend who is always willing to help no matter what burdens it 
might impose. Mr. E has lived across the street from Applicant for over six years. 
Applicant is a man who cares deeply for his family and is always willing to help a 
neighbor. Applicant and his family live modestly and do not live above their means. He 
is always thinking of what would be best to care for his special needs daughter. Mr. E 
says Applicant is honorable, is trustworthy, and a great family man. Several other 
friends and neighbors have written letters highly praising Applicant’s character. (AE K)  
 
 Applicant is an active member of his synagogue and routinely donates blood to 
the Red Cross. (Tr. 26; AE Q; AE R)   
 
Administrative Notice 
 
 I have taken administrative notice of the following facts concerning Russia which 
were provided in Administrative Notice Document I:  
 
 Russia is one of the top two most aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive 
U.S. economic information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace. Russian 
intelligence services target U.S. personnel with access to sensitive computer network 
information, seeking proprietary, sensitive, and classified information in a broad range of 
subject areas. One recent growing trend is the targeted recruitment of Russian 
immigrants with advanced technical skills who work for leading U.S. companies by 
Russian intelligence services. 
  
 Russia’s foreign policy objectives clash with those of the United States, 
particularly Russia’s occupation of territories within the sovereign nations of Georgia 
and the Ukraine. Russia’s human rights record is poor. Russia’s most significant human 
rights problems include restrictions on the ability to choose one’s government and 
freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and the media; internet freedom; 
political prosecutions and administration of justice; and government discrimination 
against racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. The judiciary is subject to 
manipulation by political authorities. Abuses include attacks on journalists, physical 
abuse by law enforcement officers, harsh prison conditions, arbitrary detention, 
politically motivated imprisonment, electronic surveillance without judicial permission, 
and widespread corruption in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The 
Russian government failed to take adequate steps to prosecute or punish most officials 
who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity.  
 
 
 
 
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Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows:  
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests, or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
“The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding 
[sensitive]information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to 
have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has 
interests inimical to those of the United States.”1 The nature of a nation’s government, 
its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are relevant in 
assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to 
government coercion. “An applicant with family members living in a country hostile to 
the U.S. has a very heavy burden to show that they are not a means through which the 
applicant can be subjected to coercion or exploitation.”2 
 
 Two disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant to this case: 
 
AG 7(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen 
of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
and 
 
AG 7(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s 
obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and 
the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by 
providing that information or technology. 
 
                                                          
1 ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
 
2 ISCR Case No. 11-12659 at 3 (May 30, 2013). See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-09986 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 
15, 2011). 
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The mere possession of close family ties with a family member living in Russia is 
not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if an applicant has a 
close relationship with even one relative living in a foreign country, this factor alone is 
sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the 
compromise of classified information.  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family 
members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, 
the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United 
States, or the foreign country is associated with a risk of terrorism. The relationship of 
Russia with the United States places a significant, but not insurmountable burden of 
persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationship with his cousin living in 
Russia does not pose a security risk.  
 
While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives from Russia seek or have 
sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant, or his relatives 
living in Russia, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. Department 
Counsel produced substantial evidence to raise the issue of potential foreign influence.  
 
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) apply because of Applicant’s relationship with his cousin 
who is a citizen and resides in Russia. Applicant communicates with his cousin on a 
regular basis every other month. It used to be more often. Applicant and his cousin have 
a close, personal relationship. His cousin would not have designated Applicant as POA 
on his bank accounts if he did not trust him. Applicant has not attempted to rebut this 
presumption. Given Russia’s aggressive intelligence approach toward the United 
States, Applicant’s relationships with his relatives living in that country are sufficient to 
create “a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion.”  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns. 
Two apply to Applicant’s case:  
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country 
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
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relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and  
 
AG ¶ 8(a) partially applies. Applicant’s cousin does not hold a government 
position and does not have affiliations with the Russian government. It is unlikely that 
Applicant would be placed in a position of having to choose between his cousin’s 
interests and those of the United States. I made my conclusions based on the evidence 
in the record and not on speculation about his cousin’s motives. All of Applicant’s 
immediate family, his wife, children, parents, and in-laws are citizens of and reside in 
the United States. Applicant’s primary interests are his immediate family members.  
 
AG ¶ 8(b) applies. Applicant has established “deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” He has resided in this country for over 25 years. 
When he first arrived, he attended classes to learn the English language. He attended 
undergraduate and graduate school in the U.S. He became a citizen in August 2008. He 
has built a successful career in the United States. He and his wife, also a naturalized 
U.S. citizen, married here and are raising their three children in the United States. He 
owns two homes and all of his assets are here.  Applicant credits the United States with 
the opportunity to succeed.  He would not have had as much opportunity if he stayed in 
Ukraine because of the society’s anti-Semitic policies.  
 
Most important, Applicant is grateful to the U.S. for the services and opportunities 
provided to his special needs daughter and his two sons. Applicant is not a fan of his 
home country or of Russia based on the level of corruption in both countries as well as 
their mistreatment of members of the Jewish faith. The evidence supports that Applicant 
has longstanding loyalties toward the United States and would resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the United States. Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security 
concerns associated with his contacts with his cousin, a citizen and resident of Russia.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation+; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
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 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the 
potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under 
Guideline B and the factors in AG ¶ 2(c) in this whole-person analysis.  
 
Applicant is well-regarded by his co-workers, neighbors, and friends. While he 
agreed to serve as POA to help out his cousin, he did not profit from this relationship.   
Once he learned that acting as POA on his cousin’s bank accounts created a potential 
security concern, he took steps to be removed as his cousin’s POA.  The people he 
primarily cares for are his family and parents, all of whom are citizens of and reside in 
the United States. He appreciates the opportunities that living in the United States has 
granted him. He is an American success story. I am confident that Applicant’s 
longstanding ties in the United States would result in him resolving any conflict in favor 
of the United States. Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
  Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a.:    For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is  
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
________________________ 
Erin C. Hogan 
Administrative Judge