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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                  
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS                               
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 16-00519 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Aubrey De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
  
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant mitigated potential security concerns related to his three siblings, who 
are resident citizens of Iran, and his former possession and use of an Iranian passport 
to visit there. Based upon a review of the record as a whole, national security eligibility 
for access to classified information is granted. 
 
History of Case 
 
On March 24, 2015, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On June 6, 2016, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The 
action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, 
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines effective within the DoD after 
September 1, 2006.  
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on August 23, 2016 (Answer 1), admitted 
the two Guideline B allegations concerning his siblings and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. On December 22, 2016, Department Counsel issued an 
amendment to the SOR to Applicant, adding an allegation under Guideline C (Foreign 
Preference). Applicant responded to this amendment in writing on December 26, 2016, 
and denied the single Guideline C allegation. (Answer 2). Pursuant to Directive ¶ 
E3.1.17, I granted this SOR amendment after explaining it to Applicant and ensuring 
that he understood it and had sufficient time to respond. 
 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me 
on February 13, 2017. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on May 2, 2017, setting the 
hearing for May 17, 2017. On that date, Department Counsel offered Government 
Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2 into evidence. Applicant testified but offered no documentary 
evidence. I took administrative notice of the facts concerning Iran that are set forth on 
pages 2 through 5 of the Government’s Request for Administrative Notice, which is 
marked Hearing Exhibit (HE) II and included in the record. DOHA received the hearing 
transcript (Tr.) on May 26, 2017.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant is 66 years old. He was born in Iran. He graduated from high school 
and attended one year of college there. He then served his mandatory enlistment in the 
Iranian army as a medic, primarily assisting an obstetric doctor. After completing his 
enlistment he moved to the United States in 1976. He earned an associate’s degree 
from a community college in 1978, and a bachelor’s of science degree in engineering 
from a state university in 1981. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in March 1983, 
and has been employed by a major U.S. aerospace company since 1986. His employer 
asked him to apply for a security clearance to permit his assignment in support of 
defense contracts. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 6-7, 31-32, 56-58.) 
 
 Applicant’s first wife, to whom he was married for more than 16 years, was born 
in the United States. He and his current wife, who is also a U.S. citizen, married in 2003. 
He has two adult children from his first marriage who were born, and have always lived, 
in the United States. They have never visited Iran. He and his wife recently sold the 
home they bought in 2003, and took possession of a new home that they built for their 
retirement years. They own that home free and clear, with no mortgage debt, and all of 
their other financial assets are in the United States. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 55-56, 67-69.)  
  
 Applicant’s parents, who raised seven children, are both deceased. Applicant 
had three older brothers, two older sisters, and one younger sister. His eldest brother 
and his eldest sister, born in 1941 and 1945, are also deceased. His 68-year-old brother 
is also a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also works for a major U.S. aerospace company.   
(GE 1; GE 2; Answer 2; Tr. 61.) 
 
 Applicant’s 74-year-old brother is an Iranian citizen and resident. He is a retired 
banker, who is in ill health. He was medically disqualified from military service, and 
 
 
 
 
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never worked for the Iranian government. His two daughters reside in Canada. 
Applicant speaks with him by telephone several times each year. Applicant’s 70-year-
old sister is a retired teacher whose husband is deceased. She is an Iranian citizen and 
resident, with whom he speaks by telephone every three or four months. His 61-year-
old sister is an Iranian citizen and resident who has never worked outside the home. 
Her husband owns and operates a successful jewelry store. They also have infrequent 
contact by telephone. (Answer 1; GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 61-65.) 
 
 Since becoming a U.S. citizen in 1983, Applicant has made several trips to Iran 
to visit family members after obtaining U.S. State Department advice that it was safe to 
do so. His employer has been informed ahead of each such visit. Iranian law required 
him to obtain and use an Iranian passport for entry and exit from that country. (See HE 
II.) He did so but never used those Iranian passports for any other travel purposes, 
including exiting or entering the United States. His most recently issued Iranian passport 
expired in 2013, and his last visit to Iran was in 2012. (Answer 2; GE 1; Tr. 28-31, 58-
61.) 
 
I have taken administrative notice of facts contained in U.S. Government 
pronouncements concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, as outlined on pages 2 
through 5 of HE II, including the following: Iran is a designated state sponsor of 
terrorism with a history of human rights violations and non-compliance with international 
treaty obligations. Its intelligence and security services view the United States as a 
primary threat, and are active in the surveillance and collection of U.S. personnel, 
assets, and protected information. Threats of government-sponsored human rights 
abuse are high. (HE II.) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility, the administrative 
judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory 
explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s national security eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶¶ 2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of 
variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider 
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
 
 
 
 
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have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an 
“applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, 
extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, 
and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance 
decision.”  
 
A person who applies for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants eligibility 
for access to classified information or assignment in sensitive duties. Decisions include, 
by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or 
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a 
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk 
of compromise of classified information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides, “Any determination under this order adverse to 
an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no 
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 
12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 
information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concerns regarding foreign influence:  
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
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AG ¶ 7 sets out conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. Two of them are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;1 
and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology. 
 
The nature of a nation’s government; its relationship with the United States; and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant is 
vulnerable to foreign government coercion or inducement. Iran is a designated state 
sponsor of terrorism, is overtly hostile to U.S. interests and policies, and is known to 
conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. These facts place a 
significant burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his connections and 
relationships with his brother and two sisters, who are resident citizens of Iran, do not 
create a heightened risk of foreign influence or pose a security risk. Applicant’s 
immediate-family relationships are presumed to be close and loving, and Applicant 
offered no evidence to the contrary about his family. The evidence is sufficient to raise 
potential security concerns under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b).  
 
The Government met its burden of production by raising the above disqualifying 
conditions and shifted the burden to Applicant to prove mitigation. AG ¶ 8 lists six 
conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns. Those with potential 
application in mitigating the security concerns in this case are: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
                                            
1The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, 
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant 
has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence 
and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 
5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
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government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
  
Applicant demonstrated that it is unlikely that he could be placed in a position of 
having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government and those 
of the United States as a consequence of his ongoing family ties in Iran. Except during a 
few personal visits surrounding significant family events or terminal illnesses since he 
immigrated to the United States in 1976, his contact with his brother and two sisters 
comprises only a few telephone calls per year. He has no current plans to visit Iran 
again, and no valid passport that would be required to do so. His siblings in Iran are 
elderly, are retired or unemployed, and have no connection to the Iranian government. 
Compared to Applicant’s deep and longstanding family, financial, and professional ties 
to the United States, his connections and obligations to these siblings is so minimal that 
no significant potential for conflict of interest exists. Accordingly, Applicant established 
compelling mitigation under the conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a), (b), and (c). 
 
Guideline C: Foreign Preference 
 
 The Foreign Preference guideline in effect at the time the SOR was issued 
included potentially disqualifying conditions relating to the exercise of rights or privileges 
of foreign citizenship, and possession or use of a foreign passport. The new Guideline C 
criteria, which came into effect on June 8, 2017, and control this national security 
eligibility determination, explicitly state that the exercise of any right or privilege of 
foreign citizenship (including holding a foreign passport) is not disqualifying without an 
objective showing that it is in conflict with U.S. national interests or the individual 
attempts to conceal such facts. No Guideline C foreign preference security concerns are 
raised or supported by substantial evidence in this case.   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
 
 
 
 
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rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security 
eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The Guideline B security concerns do 
not arise from any questionable conduct by Applicant, but rather circumstances that are 
normal and commendable results of his family situation. Applicant is a mature person, 
who has lived in the United States for more than 41 years, and has been a naturalized 
citizen since 1983. His spouse, former spouse, and two adult children are U.S. citizens. 
All of his financial assets and professional connections are in the United States, and he 
has no plans to visit Iran in the future. There is no evidence or allegation that he has 
ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the United States. He takes his 
loyalty to the United States seriously. His only remaining contacts with Iran, comprising 
infrequent telephonic and very infrequent in-person communications with his three 
elderly siblings who reside there, create minimal, if any, potential for pressure, coercion, 
exploitation or duress.  
 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and 
circumstances in the context of the whole-person, I conclude Applicant fully met his 
significant burden to mitigate the potential foreign influence security concerns. Overall, 
the record evidence leaves me with no questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility 
and suitability for a security clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:  For Applicant 
   
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a 
security clearance. National security eligibility for access to classified information is 
granted. 
                                        
         
 
DAVID M. WHITE 
Administrative Judge