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       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
   DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 16-04043 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Andre M. Gregorian, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
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CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
Based on a review of the case file and pleadings, I conclude that Applicant 
mitigated security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is granted. 
Statement of the Case 
On November 24, 2015, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain a security clearance for his employment with 
a defense contractor. (Item 2) Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator from 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on September 1, 2016. (Item 3). After 
reviewing the OPM investigation, the Department of Defense (DOD) could not make the 
affirmative findings required to issue a security clearance. On April 7, 2017, DOD issued 
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign 
influence under Guideline B. (Item 1) The action was taken under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on September 1, 2006.  
 
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Applicant answered the SOR on May 22, 2017. He admitted the four allegations 
under Guideline B. The allegations detailed concerns based on his family members who 
are residents and citizens of South Korea. He elected to have the matter decided on the 
written record. (Item 1) Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case 
on June 28, 2017. (Item 5) Applicant received a complete file of relevant material 
(FORM) on July 5, 2017, and was provided the opportunity to file objections and to 
submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying conditions. He did not 
provide any additional information in response to the FORM. I was assigned the case 
on December 12, 2017.  
 
While this case was pending a decision, the Director of National Intelligence 
issued Security Executive Agent Directive 4, establishing National Security Adjudicative 
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for access to Classified Information or Eligibility to 
Hold a Sensitive Position (AGs) which he made applicable to all covered individuals 
who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility 
to hold a sensitive position. The new AGs supersede the September 1, 2006 AGs, and 
are effective “for all covered individuals” on or after June 8, 2017. Accordingly, I have 
evaluated Applicant’s security clearance eligibility under the new AGs. 
 
Procedural issues 
 
 Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of relevant facts 
concerning South Korea. The request and supporting documents are attached to the 
FORM as Item 4. Applicant did not object to the request or the facts. I took 
administrative notice as requested. The facts concerning South Korea are set out below 
in my decision.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 I thoroughly reviewed the case file and the pleadings. I make the following 
findings of fact. Applicant was born in South Korea in 1967. He came to the United 
States as a 13-year-old minor with his family in September 1980, and became a United 
States citizen on his own application in September 1987, at age 18. He received most of 
his high school education in the United States. He received his bachelor’s degree from 
a United States college in May 1991 and a master’s degree from a United States 
university in December 1996. He has been a deputy director for a defense contractor 
since 1992. Applicant married a South Korean national in December 1994. She has 
renounced her South Korean citizenship, and is now a U.S. citizen. They have two 
children who were born in the United States and are U.S. citizens. (Item 2, e-QIP, dated 
December 24, 2015; Item 3, PSI, dated September 2, 2016) 
 
 Applicant’s family, consisting of his mother, father, brother, sister, and him, 
immigrated to the United States in September 1980. All family members became 
citizens of the United States. Applicant’s parents and sister reside in the United States. 
 
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His sister lives with his parents. His parents are retired factory workers. They have 
never had, and do not have now, any association with a foreign government.  
 
 Applicant’s brother is a U.S. citizen and resides in South Korea as an employee 
of a United States corporation. Applicant sees his brother once or twice a year in the 
United States or South Korea, and he talks to his brother by phone about four times a 
year. Applicant’s brother travels on a United States passport. His brother’s wife is a 
South Korean citizen and resident. She is not employed.  
 
 Applicant’s in-laws are residents and citizens of South Korea. His in-laws are 
divorced. He has not had any contact with his father-in-law in many years. His mother-
in-law is retired. He talks to her about twice a year and sees her when he visits South 
Korea.  
 
 Applicant has contact with friends, business associates, and acquaintances in 
South Korea. He sees them whenever he visits South Korea; or they visit the United 
States. Most are professionals and employed by South Korean or United States 
businesses. Applicant has contact with a cousin and his wife who are residents and 
citizens of South Korea. He sees them a few times a year when he is in South Korea on 
business, and he talks to them by phone once or twice a year. Applicant and his family 
visited South Korea in 2010 and 2012. He met with friends and family members for 
dinner on his visit. (Item 3, PSI, dated September 1, 2016)  
 
 I have taken administrative notice that South Korea is a stable, democratic 
republic. The United States and South Korea have been close allies since 1950, and 
have fought communism together on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam. The United 
States, since 1950 and currently, has thousands of U.S. military personnel stationed in 
South Korea, and frequently conducts joint military operations with South Korea. About 
2.3 million Koreans live in the United States. The United States has promised over the 
next few years to provide $11 billion in force enhancements in Korea. South Korea is 
the United States’ seventh largest trading partner. The recently signed free-trade 
agreement between the United States and South Korea will generate billions of dollars 
in additional economic growth and job creation in both countries. 
 
 The South Korean government generally respects the human rights of its 
citizens. Criminals violate the human rights of some South Korean citizens. South Korea 
has some political prisoners, and rules regarding arrest and detention are vague. 
 
 South Korea does not recognize dual citizenship. There have been 
circumstances where U.S. citizens with connections in South Korea were drafted into 
the South Korean army. 
 In recent years, the United States and South Korea have differed in their 
diplomatic approaches to North Korea. The United States position is more assertive in 
its attempts to curtail North Korea’s development of advanced military technology, such 
as ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. South Korea has emphasized steps towards 
unification of North and South Korea. 
 
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 Industrial espionage includes seeking commercial secrets. South Korea has a 
history of collecting protected U.S. information. In 2000, South Korea was listed as one 
of the seven most active countries engaged in foreign economic collection and industrial 
espionage against the United States. In 1997, a U.S. company was fined for unlicensed 
exports to South Korea and that same year a civilian employee of the U.S. Navy passed 
classified documents to the South Korean Naval Attaché to the United States. On 
multiple occasions, South Korea has been the unauthorized recipient of sensitive 
technology, in violation of U.S. export control laws.  
 
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
 
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classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
Analysis 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, 
and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided 
allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in 
which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, 
organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interest or otherwise made 
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or 
interests is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associate 
with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
 Because of the economic collection and industrial espionage in South Korea, 
Applicant’s family members in South Korea are a security concern, raising the following 
Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions under AG ¶ 7: 
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information. 
 
 The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Appellant’s contacts and relationships 
must be examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. “Heightened” is a relative 
term denoting increased risk compared to some normally existing risk that can be 
inherent anytime there are foreign contacts and relationships. The totality of an 
applicant’s ties to a foreign country as well as to each individual family member must be 
considered. The foreign influence security concern is not limited to countries hostile to 
the United States. The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and 
safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not 
authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or 
country has interests inimical to those of the United States. Even friendly nations can 
have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as 
 
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important to their vital interests or national security. Friendly nations have engaged in 
espionage against the United States, especially in economic, scientific, and technical 
fields. The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant is at 
risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress. 
 
 Applicant has contact with family members and friends who are residents and 
citizens of South Korea. South Korea is one of the countries most actively engaged in 
foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the United States. There 
have been a number of criminal prosecutions against people with South Korean 
connections and interests for engaging in collection activities against the U.S. South 
Korea has been the unauthorized recipient of technology controlled under U.S. export 
control laws. There have been numerous recent criminal cases concerning export 
enforcement related to proprietary defense information, economic espionage, theft of 
trade secrets, embargo-related criminal prosecutions involving both private companies 
and individuals in South Korea. Because of the economic collection and industrial 
espionage, the U.S. restricts export of sensitive dual-use technologies to South Korea, 
and industrial espionage relating to South Korea remains a high-profile concern. The 
economic collection and industrial espionage concerning South Korea and Applicant’s 
relatives and friends who are residents and citizens of South Korea places a heightened 
risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion on Applicant.  
 
 I considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under AG ¶ 8: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation.  
 
 There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for or 
obligation to immediate family members. Applicant has limited contact with his family 
members in South Korea except for occasional phone contact with his brother and 
mother-in-law. He sees other friends and relatives when he occasionally visits South 
 
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Korea. This level of contact is not casual or infrequent, and indicates that Applicant’s 
sense of loyalty to the family members is high rather than minimal.  
 
 Applicant’s ties and sense of loyalty to the United States are extensive. He came 
to the United States with his family as a teenager, and he completed his high school, 
college, and professional education in the United States. His entire immediate family are 
U.S. citizens. He became a U.S. citizen by his own efforts as soon as he could, and he 
has been a U.S. citizen longer then he has not been a U.S. citizen. He travels on a U.S. 
passport, and considers himself a U.S. citizen.  
 
 Applicant’s family members and friends in South Korea can place him in a 
position to have to choose between the interest of the friends and relatives and the 
interests of the United States. His brother, who resides in South Korea, is a U.S. citizen 
employed by a U.S. company. He has limited phone contact with his mother–in-law and 
no contact with his father-in-law. He has limited contact with other relatives in South 
Korea. His connection to and loyalty to the United States is so deep and longstanding 
that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of United States 
interests. Accordingly, Applicant has met his heavy burden to show that his 
relationships with his friends and relatives in South Korea family members are not a 
security concern. I conclude Appellant has mitigated security concerns for foreign 
influence.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
access to sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon 
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The whole-person concept requires 
consideration of all available information about Applicant to reach a determination 
concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. I considered that 
Applicant immigrated to the U.S. as a teenager, became a U.S. citizen on his own as 
 
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soon as he could, and completed his education in the U.S. Applicant, for all intents and 
purposes, is a U.S. citizen as if he had been born in the U.S.  
 
The presence of Applicant’s friends and family members in South Korea creates 
a heightened risk of foreign influence leading to the potential for vulnerability, pressure, 
or coercion on Applicant. However, Applicant’s close connection to the U.S. increases 
the probability that Applicant will recognize, resist, and report any attempts by a foreign 
person or entity to coerce or exploit him. These facts leave me without questions and 
doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to classified information. 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. For all these 
reasons, I conclude Applicant has mitigated foreign influence concerns based on his 
family members in South Korea. Access to classified information is granted. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.d:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge