1 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
 
 
 
In the matter of:  ) 
  ) 
            [REDACTED]  ) ISCR Case No. 17-00592 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance  ) 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government:  Andre M. Gregorian, Esq., Department Counsel  
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
Decision 
 
 
HESS, Stephanie C., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant’s spouse is a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan), her parents and 
sister are citizens and residents of Taiwan, and her father is a retired Taiwanese 
government employee. Foreign influence security concerns are not mitigated. Access to 
classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (e-QIP) on October 1, 2015. 
On March 28, 2017, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent him a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR), alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The DOD acted under Executive 
Order (Ex. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 
1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.  
   
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Applicant answered the SOR on April 22, 2017, and requested a decision on the 
record without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case 
on May 20, 2017. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM), which included 
Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 3, was sent to Applicant on May 18, 2017. He was 
given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate 
the Government’s evidence. He received the FORM on May 22, 2016, and his Response 
was received by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) within the allotted 
30 days. The case was assigned to me on October 1, 2017. 
 
The SOR was issued under the AG implemented on September 1, 2006. The DOD 
implemented the amended AG on June 8, 2017, while this decision was pending. This 
decision will be based on the amended AG effective June 8, 2017.  
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of facts concerning 
Taiwan. The relevant facts are discussed below. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
The SOR alleges that Applicant’s spouse is a citizen of Taiwan; that his parents-
in-law and sister-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan; and that his father-in-law is 
employed by the Taiwanese consulate. Applicant admits each of the allegations, 
however, he states that his father-in-law is now retired. Applicant’s admissions are 
incorporated in my findings of fact. 
 
Applicant is a 43-year-old information firmware engineer, currently employed by 
federal contractor since June 2005. He received his bachelor’s degree in May 2005. He 
is married, and he and his wife have a daughter born in 2016. He has held a security 
clearance since December 2005. (GX 1; Response.)   
 
Applicant and his wife initially met through an online dating website in January 
2011. They communicated every three days by email, met in person in February 2011 in 
Applicant’s state of residence, and began cohabitating in June 2011. Applicant first 
reported his contact with a foreign national, in compliance with the security requirements 
of his employer, in February 2011. In January 2015, Applicant and his then-girlfriend 
traveled to Taiwan to meet her family. Applicant and his wife married in March 2016. 
Applicant loves and supports his wife. (GX 2.) Applicant properly reported his marriage to 
his employer.  
 
Applicant’s father-in-law worked for the Taiwanese consulate in customs until he 
retired in June 2015. Neither Applicant’s mother-in-law nor sister-in-law have been 
employed by the Taiwanese government. Applicant believes that his wife came to the 
United States at some point in 2007, on an O-1A visa, specializing in music. She attended 
a school of music, and worked full time at a performance venue. While awaiting 
permanent residence status, she returned to Taiwan in 2012. While living in Taiwan, she 
worked as a translator, including working for the local city government. Applicant is 
uncertain whether his wife has any contacts with other Taiwanese government officials 
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besides her former employer. She maintained a bank account in Taiwan while living there, 
and Applicant is uncertain if she currently maintains that account. She returned to the 
United States in 2014 as a permanent resident. In August 2016, Applicant’s wife was 
employed as a church musical director, and Applicant financially supported her. There is 
no record evidence pertaining to applicant’s wife’s current employment or income status. 
 
Applicant’s wife is aware that Applicant’s employment has stringent security 
requirements, but does not believe his wife is aware of the level of his security clearance. 
She has not exhibited particular interest in learning about Applicant’s job. (GX 2.) While 
visiting his in-laws in 2015, Applicant told them where he worked and what his position 
was. During his visit, Applicant did not experience any reportable contact with any 
government entity. On his e-QIP, Applicant reported monthly telephonic contact with his 
in-laws, with whom he has a personal relationship. He reported annual contact with his 
sister-in-law, also defining their relationship as personal. There is no record evidence 
concerning Applicant’s wife’s contacts with her family in Taiwan.   
 
Applicant is a U.S. citizen by birth, and has long-standing ties to the United States. 
He has worked for his current employer for more than 12 years. He and his wife and 
young daughter live in the home he purchased in 2007. Applicant asserts that he would 
“unconditionally resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the US interest.” He 
characterizes himself as someone who “adheres strictly to the rule of law,” has sound 
judgment, and through his employment “has contributed to strengthening the defense of 
the U.S.” (Response.)   
 
Taiwan and the United States maintain a robust unofficial relationship, with the 
shared goal of maintaining Taiwan’s defensive capability, primarily against the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). However, the United States does not support an independent 
Taiwan. In 1979, the United States switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, 
acknowledging the PRC’s position that there is “one China,” which includes Taiwan.  
 
The United States is Taiwan’s second largest trading partner, after the PRC. The 
PRC and Taiwan are “aggressive and capable” collectors of U.S. economic and 
proprietary information, for economic, military, and technological advantage. There have 
been multiple cases involving the illegal export, or attempted illegal export of U.S.-
restricted, dual-use technology to Taiwan. The PRC seeks to acquire intelligence through 
exploitation of its citizens or persons with family ties to the PRC. The PRC maintains 
intelligence operations in Taiwan through a bureau utilizing PRC nationals with 
Taiwanese connections. Taiwan has a known history of being involved in criminal 
espionage and export control cases against the United States. 
 
As of 2013, companies in Taiwan employed more than 12,000 workers in the United 
States. The United States and Taiwan now have approximately 150 sister cities, and 
travel for business and pleasure from Taiwan to the United States has increased 
dramatically since 2012. In June 2015, U.S. and Taiwanese organizations established a 
platform for expanding cooperation on global and regional issues such as public health, 
economic development, energy, women’s rights and disaster relief. The United States 
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and Taiwan both sponsor study abroad programs, and encourage opportunities for young 
professionals and scholars to collaborate on research and exchange best practices on a 
broad range of topics. 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant’s meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or. 
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 
1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).  
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 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if 
they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The concern is set forth in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 7  
 
AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen 
of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation 
to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; and 
 
AG ¶ 7(e): shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
 
 
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AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(e) require evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” 
required to raise this disqualifying condition is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” 
denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under 
a foreign government or owning property in a foreign country. The mere possession 
of ties with family in Taiwan is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. 
However, if an applicant or his spouse has such a relationship, this factor alone is 
sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the 
compromise of classified information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). The totality of 
Applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be 
considered. 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those 
of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United 
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.” 
ISCR Case No. 00-0317, (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its 
human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family 
members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or 
the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United 
States. The relationship of Taiwan with the United States places a high burden of 
persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his and his spouse’s relationships with her 
family in Taiwan, as well as her father’s position as a retired government employee, do 
not pose a security risk.  
 
Applicant and his wife have a close relationship and they are recent parents. 
Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Taiwan and a permanent resident of the United States. 
Applicant has monthly contact with his in-laws who are citizens and residents of Taiwan, 
and considers his relationships with them to be personal. He has annual contact and a 
personal relationship with his sister-in-law, also a citizen and resident of Taiwan. 
Applicant’s father-in-law is a retired Taiwanese government employee. The record 
evidence is silent as to what, if any, benefits Applicant’s father-in-law receives from the 
Taiwanese government, what level his position was while employed by the government, 
and whether he has ongoing contact and relationships with government employees or 
entities. Applicant’s wife’s contacts with her family are also unknown, but the record 
evidence indicates that she has ties of affection for her family members. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, their 
immediate family members. See generally ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 
94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002).  
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Applicant’s and his spouse’s relationships with her family in Taiwan and Applicant’s 
father-in-law’s status as a retired Taiwanese government employee are sufficient to 
create “a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion.” Further, these relationships create a potential conflict of interest for Applicant 
between his obligation to protect sensitive information and his desire to help his wife or 
her family members. AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) apply. 
 
The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable:  
 
AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country 
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed 
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States;  
 
AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s 
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the 
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep 
and longstanding relationships and 
loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve 
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; 
 
AG ¶ 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
 
AG ¶ 8(d): the individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from 
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country. 
 
Given Applicant’s close relationship with his wife and her family members in Taiwan, 
as well as Applicant’s father-in-law’s status as a retired Taiwanese government 
employee, and the nature of the Taiwanese government, it is possible that Applicant could 
be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of his wife and his wife’s 
family members and the interests of the United States. While Applicant asserts that he 
would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States, this assertion, while 
undoubtedly sincere, is also hypothetical. To his credit, Applicant properly reported to his 
employer his actual meeting of his wife in February 2011, his travel to Taiwan, and his 
marriage to his wife in March 2016. He also listed his contacts with his parents-in-law and 
sister-in-law, as well as his father-in-law’s employment with the Taiwanese government, 
on his 2015 e-QIP.  However, there is no evidence that Applicant has been subjected to 
any attempted exploitation or coercion by, or as a result of his affection for, his wife or her 
Taiwanese family members. Application of Guideline B is not a comment on an applicant’s 
patriotism but merely an acknowledgment that people may act in unpredictable ways 
when faced with choices that could be important to a loved one, such as a family member.  
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ISCR Case No. 08-10025 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 3, 2009). Although Applicant has significant 
and long-standing relationships and loyalties in the United States, the foreign influence 
security concerns remain.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. 
Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but I have also 
considered the following: 
 
 Applicant has worked for a defense contractor for over 12 years, and has held a 
security clearance since December 2005. He has owned his home since 2007, and he 
and his wife have started a family. He is a dedicated employee, who properly complied 
with security requirements by reporting his foreign contacts and foreign travel. However, 
Applicant’s foreign contacts, combined with the lack of information about his father-in-
law’s ongoing government contacts, create security concerns. 
  
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and 
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has 
not mitigated the security concerns raised by his and his wife’s contacts with her family in 
Taiwan. Accordingly, I conclude he has failed to carry his burden of showing that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant his eligibility for access to classified 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
As required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, I make the following 
formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.d:    Against Applicant 
  
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information 
is denied. 
 
 
 
 
Stephanie C. Hess 
Administrative Judge