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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [REDACTED] )  ISCR Case No. 15-07130  
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Chris Morin, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HESS, Stephanie C., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case arises under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) and C (Foreign 
Preference). Applicant mitigated the potential security concerns raised by his ties to family 
members in Iraq. Clearance is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (e-QIP) on January 2, 2015. 
On April 14, 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent him a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR), alleging security concerns under Guidelines B and C. The DOD acted under 
Executive Order (Ex. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by DOD on September 1, 2006.  
  
Applicant submitted his Answer to the SOR on June 2, 2016, and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on 
July 15, 2016, and the case was assigned to me on October 26, 2016. On January 23, 
2017, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the 
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hearing was scheduled for July 25, 2017. I convened the hearing as scheduled. 
Government Exhibit (GX) 1 was admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant was 
concerned about some of the information contained in GX 2, a counterintelligence 
screening questionnaire and interview summary and specifically disagreed with some of 
the information that it contained. However the specific information was not relevant to the 
concerns raised in the SOR. I admitted GX 2. Applicant testified and Applicant’s Exhibits 
(AX) A through E were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on 
August 1, 2017. 
 
 The SOR was issued under the AG implemented on September 1, 2006. The DOD 
implemented the amended AG on June 8, 2017, while this decision was pending. This 
decision will be decided based on the amended AG effective June 8, 2017. The outcome 
of this case would have been the same if decided based on the former AG.  
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 At the hearing, Department Counsel moved to withdraw SOR ¶ 2.a, and I granted 
his motion. Since the SOR was issued in August 2016, Applicant’s father passed away. 
On my own motion, I have withdrawn SOR ¶ 1.a. 
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of facts concerning 
Iraq. The relevant facts are discussed below. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
The SOR alleges under Guideline B that Applicant’s, four brothers, four sisters and 
four brothers-in-law are citizens and residents of Iraq. It further alleges that each of 
Applicant’s brothers and one brother-in-law served or is serving in the Iraqi Army, and 
that two of Applicant’s brothers-in-law are employed by the Iraqi government. Applicant 
admits these allegations. Applicant also admits that he sent his family members between 
$40,000 and $50,000 since 2009, and that he will inherit a share of his father’s property 
upon his death. The SOR also alleges that one of Applicant’s brothers works in a 
government-run factory, and that another of his brothers is retired from work in a 
government-run factory. Applicant denies these allegations. Under Guideline C, the SOR 
alleges that Applicant possesses a current Iraqi National ID card. Applicant admits this 
allegation. 
 
Applicant, 40, was born in Iraq, and attended high school and college in Iraq, 
graduating from college with a teaching degree in English. From December 2004 until 
approximately February 2008, Applicant worked with U.S. Forces in Iraq as a local 
linguist. As a result of this work, Applicant was approved for a special immigrant visa to 
immigrate to the United States. He immigrated in March 2008, and in March 2013 became 
a naturalized U.S. citizen. He has been working as a linguist in Iraq for his current 
employer since 2008. He was granted a position of trust in 2008. (GX 1.) 
 
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Applicant testified that none of his brothers worked for a government-run factory, 
and confirmed that his brothers served in the Iraqi army. (Tr. 24-25.) His brothers each 
work in private enterprises. The brothers reside together in the house they inherited from 
their father, valued at between $120,000 and $140,000. (Tr. 55.) Technically, Applicant 
is also part owner of the house will. However, he will not inherit any money, unless his 
brothers sell the house. (Tr. 28-29.) 
 
The $40,000 to $50,000 that Applicant sent his family was for medical expenses 
for both of his parents. In late 2015 or early 2016, Applicant sent an additional $10,000 
or $11,000 in installment payments to help one of his brothers cover the additional 
medical and funeral costs for their father. (Tr. 28; Tr. 54.) Applicant talks with his youngest 
brother every one to two weeks and his other brothers every few weeks. Applicant talks 
to his sisters two to four times a year, if they are at his brothers’ house when he calls. 
Applicant has not in will not disclose to his family members the nature or location of his 
work. (Tr. 45-49.) 
 
Applicant last saw his family members in 2014, prior to working in his current 
position. Although he works in Iraq, he is not in the same city as his family, and it is too 
dangerous and the mission is too secret for his family to come to the city where he works. 
He did not attend his father’s funeral in 2015. (Tr. 48-49.)  
 
 Two of Applicant’s brothers-in-law are working at government-run factories, one 
of whom previously served in the Iraqi army. Applicant does not have any significant 
contact with his brothers-in-law. (GX 2.) 
 
Applicant possesses a duplicate copy of a government-issued document that is 
proof of his birth as an Iraqi citizen. The original was filed in Baghdad when Applicant was 
born. This is the document that was referred to as an Iraqi ID card in the SOR. Applicant 
did not exercise his rights or privileges as an Iraqi citizen to receive this document. He 
does not possess a current Iraqi passport and he declared his willingness to renounce 
his Iraqi citizenship in writing in January 2017. (Tr. 39-41; AX A.) SOR ¶ 2.b is resolved. 
 
Applicant purchased a house in the United States in 2016. He owns his vehicle 
outright, which he purchased used. He has two checking accounts, a savings account, 
and a 401(k). He is registered to vote in the United States. (Tr. 58-62.) Applicant’s 
allegiance is to the United States. He views Iraq as the country of his birth, but the United 
States as his home. (GX 2.) 
 
Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014 
parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair elections 
and led to the peaceful transition of power. However, severe human rights problems were 
widespread. Sectarian hostility, widespread corruption, and lack of transparency at all 
levels of government and society weakened the government’s authority and worsened 
effective human rights protections.  
 
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Iraq witnessed increased terrorist activity in 2015, primarily due to the actions of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Although the government of Iraq made 
significant progress in its efforts to retake occupied territory from ISIL, there remains a 
security vacuum in parts of Iraq. The U.S. State Department warns that U.S. citizens in 
Iraq remaining at high risk for kidnapping and terrorist violence and to avoid all travel to 
Iraq. The ability of the U.S. Embassy to provide consular services to U.S. Citizens outside 
Baghdad is extremely limited given the security environment. The U.S. State Department 
also warns the anti-U.S. sectarian militias may threaten U.S. citizens and western 
companies throughout Iraq.  
 
The U.S. Government requires its personnel in Iraq to live and work under strict 
security guidelines. Kidnappings and attacks by means of improvised explosive devices 
(IED) occur frequently in many areas. IED attacks often take place in public venues. 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant’s meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or. 
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
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Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 
1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).  
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if 
they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The concern is set forth in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable: AG ¶ 7  
 
AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen 
of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
and 
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AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation 
to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology. 
 
AG ¶ 7(a) requires evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required 
to raise this disqualifying condition is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes 
a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a 
foreign government or owning property in a foreign country. The mere possession of 
ties with family in Iraq is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, 
if an applicant has such a relationship, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential 
for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified 
information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR 
Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). The totality of Applicant’s family ties to a 
foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered. 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those 
of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United 
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.” 
ISCR Case No. 00-0317, (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its 
human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family 
members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or 
there is a known threat of terrorism within the country. The relationship of Iraq with the 
United States places a high burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his 
relationships with his family in Iraq do not pose a security risk.  
 
The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable:  
 
AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country 
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed 
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States; and 
 
AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s 
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the 
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group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep 
and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest. 
 
 Applicant’s contacts with his family members in Iraq are frequent and are not 
casual. However, Applicant has taken steps to protect himself and his family members 
from any potential conflict of interest by strictly following U.S. government security 
guidelines, and has not seen his family members since 2014. Further, Applicant has not 
and will not disclose to his family members the nature or location of his work. Applicant 
provided financial assistance to his family members solely for the extraordinary costs of 
medical care and funeral expenses for his parents, and he does not provide routine 
support for his family members. Upon his father’s death, Applicant became part owner of 
the house where his brothers reside, however, this property interest does not warrant 
security concerns. AG ¶ 8(a) it is partially applicable. 
 
 Applicant’s work as a translator with U.S. Forces earned him a special immigrant 
visa, and Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2013. Applicant has established 
substantial ties with the United States, including purchasing a house and a car, and 
registering to vote, and has declared his willingness to renounce his Iraqi citizenship. 
Through his ongoing commitment to U.S. Forces and their missions in Iraq, Applicant has 
demonstrated that his loyalties lie with the United States. Accordingly, Applicant can be 
expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. AG 8(b) 
applies.  
 
 The SOR also alleged a concern under Guideline C. However, after fully reviewing 
that Guideline, I find that the record evidence does not support application of any of the 
disqualifying conditions. SOR ¶ 2.b is resolved in Applicant’s favor.   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
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(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
  
 I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. 
Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but I have also 
considered the following: 
 
 Applicant’s ongoing efforts and dedication in support of the U.S. mission in Iraq 
are commendable. He is a U.S. citizen, a homeowner, and a registered voter. Applicant 
has expressed his willingness to renounce his Iraqi citizenship. These actions 
demonstrate his loyalty and ties to the United States.  
  
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and 
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has 
mitigated the security concerns raised by his contacts with his family in Iraq. Accordingly, 
I conclude he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to grant his eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence):  FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 1.a through 1.g:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C (Foreign Preference): FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 2.b:     For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s 
eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
Stephanie C. Hess 
Administrative Judge