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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
            ) ISCR Case No. 17-02959 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se  
 
 
____________ 
Decision 
 
______________ 
 
  
 
KATAUSKAS, Philip J., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant contests the Defense Department’s intent to deny his eligibility for access 
to classified information. Applicant mitigated the security concern raised by his contacts 
to Iraq. Accordingly, this case is decided for Applicant.  
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant completed and submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions 
(SF 86 format) on December 22, 2016. This document is commonly known as a security 
clearance application. On September 29, 2017, after reviewing the application and the 
information gathered during a background investigation, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility sent Applicant a statement of reasons (SOR), 
explaining it was unable to find that it was clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant him eligibility for access to classified information.1 It detailed the factual reasons for 
                                                          
1 This action was taken under Executive Order (E.O.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within 
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended, as well as Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense 
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive). In 
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the action under the security guideline known as Guideline B for foreign influence. 
Applicant answered the SOR on November 29, 2017, and requested a decision based on 
the written record without a hearing.   
 
On February 26, 2018, Department Counsel submitted a file of relevant material  
(FORM).2 The FORM was mailed to Applicant on March 6, 2018. He was given thirty days 
to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s 
evidence. Applicant received the FORM on April 8, 2018. Applicant’s response to the 
FORM was received by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) on May 3, 
2018. The case was assigned to me on June 13, 2018.  
 
Procedural Matters 
 
Included in the FORM were 6 items of evidence, which are marked as Government 
Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4 and are admitted without objection.3 Applicant’s response to 
the FORM included 19 exhibits, which are marked as Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through 
S and are admitted without objection.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
Applicant is 31 years old and was born in Iraq in October 1986. He is a high school 
graduate who has completed some college credits. Applicant has never married and has 
no children.4 From January 2006 until April 2007, he was employed by a defense 
contractor and was attached to a U.S. Special Forces unit in Iraq as a linguist. After his 
stint as a linguist, Applicant worked as a carpenter in Turkey until November 2008. From 
November 2008, he did part-time work as a translator for police stations in Turkey.  
 
After a brief period of unemployment, Applicant came to the United States under 
a refugee assistance program in June 2010, where he worked in retail businesses while 
preparing for the naturalization tests, which he passed. He became a naturalized U.S. 
citizen in June 2015. In April 2016, he successfully completed state correctional officer 
training and worked in that position until December 2016. Since December 2016, he has 
been employed as a linguist by a defense contractor and has been attached to a U.S. 
Special Operations unit in another Middle Eastern country (not Iraq) where U.S. coalition 
forces are fighting terrorists.5 
                                                          
addition, the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), 
effective within the Defense Department on June 8, 2017, apply here. 
 
2 The file of relevant material consists of Department Counsel’s written brief and supporting documents, 
some of which documents are identified as evidentiary exhibits in this decision.  
 
3 Items 1 and 2 are the SOR and Applicant’s Answer, respectively. They are the pleadings in this case and, 
therefore, are not marked as exhibits. An Administrative Notice for Iraq was not listed as an item of 
evidence, but it was attached and is marked as GE 4.   
 
4 GE 1; GE 2.  
 
5 GE 1; GE 2; AE A.  
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Under Guideline B, the SOR alleges that: (1) Applicant’s parents are citizens and 
residents of Iraq; (2) Applicant’s two brothers are citizens and residents of Iraq and that 
one of his brothers is an Iraqi police officer, and (3) Applicant’s two sisters-in-law are 
citizens and residents of Iraq.6 Applicant admitted the allegations with explanations.7  
 
Applicant’s response to the FORM fleshed out the details about his family in Iraq. 
His mother (age 63) is a hair stylist and also takes care of his father (age 72), who has a 
heart condition that forced him to retire as a cab driver. Applicant speaks to his parents 
by phone about every two weeks.  
 
Applicant’s brother (age 39) is a laborer who sells vehicles and manages family 
rental property. His older brother (age 41) is a driver for the Iraqi police, but he is not an 
officer and does not hold any rank. He conducts general driving duties. Applicant speaks 
to his brothers about semi-annually. Applicant does not have frequent contact with his 
sisters-in-law, both of whom are homemakers with no outside employment. Other than 
the brother who drives for the police, none of applicant’s relatives have any current or 
past connections to the Iraqi government or military. Applicant has never disclosed to his 
family his job with a defense contractor or his job locations.8 He has no property interests 
in Iraq.9 
 
Just before Applicant graduated from high school in about 2004, Iraq was liberated 
(May 2003). Applicant signed up as an interpreter for U.S. forces in January 2006. During 
his more than one year as an interpreter for U.S. Special Forces (until April 2007), 
Applicant received numerous death threats from terrorists, threats that his command 
believed to be credible. Applicant left the country so as not to jeopardize his life or the 
lives of the soldiers he supported. His long-term plan, however, was to come to the United 
States, ultimately become a U.S. citizen, and return to serve as an interpreter. Applicant 
accomplished those goals. He came to the United States in June 2010, under a refugee 
assistance program. Applicant became naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2015 and returned 
to the battlefield as an interpreter for coalition forces in December 2016, where he serves 
currently (at least as of May 3, 2018, the date of his response to the FORM).10  
 
In his response to the FORM, Applicant submitted seven character letters from 
soldiers who served with him during his deployment in Iraq (January 2006-April 2007) or 
                                                          
 
6 SOR ⁋⁋ 1.a-1.e.   
 
7 Answer, pp. 2-3.  
 
8 AE A, pp. 1-2.  
 
9 GE 1.  
 
10 Answer, pp. 1-2; GE 2; AE A. In taking his current employment with a defense contractor, Applicant 
surrendered his Iraqi passport. AE C.  
 
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during his current deployment (2017-2018).11 The following are pertinent excerpts from 
those letters.  
 
A retired Army Staff Sergeant served with Applicant in 2006-2007 and wrote the 
following: Other interpreters “said [Applicant] was the best, even though his English was 
lacking.” He was “trustworthy . . . and didn’t complain.” Applicant “became the 
Commander’s go-to interpreter . . . for important situations.” At one point during a mission, 
“[Applicant] was in full uniform including ski mask [to hide his identity from locals] but the 
[local] he was speaking to . . . clearly said his name.” “This was reported to . . . leadership.” 
Applicant was “offered a transfer, but he would not abandon his platoon . . . .”12  
 
An officer who was Applicant’s Platoon Leader wrote in 2007: “[Applicant] always 
maintained his composure and professionalism even after his platoon was attacked with 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), RPGs, and Small Arms Fire on numerous 
occasions . . . The Soldiers in [his] Platoon trust him with their lives . . . .”13 
 
Applicant’s Commanding Officer during his current deployment wrote: “[Applicant] 
performed exceptionally well as both a linguist and member of our team . . . As the 
Headquarters linguist, he was often called upon in the middle of the night to translate 
messages . . . He always did this cheerfully . . . .”14 
 
Applicant’s Team Sergeant during his current deployment wrote: “[Applicant] 
regularly placed himself in danger in order to accomplish his mission . . . His efforts and 
talents were crucial to the accomplishment of the mission . . .  .”15 
 
Another one of Applicant’s Commanding Officers during his current deployment 
wrote: “[Applicant] performed exceptionally well as a team member despite operating in 
an austere environment . . . Through his dedication, competence, and selflessness, 
[Applicant] became a trusted advisor and friend.”16 
 
An officer in Applicant’s unit during his current deployment wrote: “[Applicant] 
never shied away from the danger, but deliberately placed himself in harm’s way to enable 
our Soldiers to communicate . . . .”17 
 
                                                          
11 AE B, D, E-I.  
 
12 AE B.  
 
13 AE D.  
 
14 AE E.  
 
15 AE F.  
 
16 AE G.  
 
17 AE H.  
 
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Another officer in Applicant’s unit during his current deployment wrote: “[Applicant] 
often speaks of his love for the United States . . . He considers himself an American first, 
above all else . . . I have no doubts in his commitment and loyalty to the United States.”18 
 
When Applicant entered the United States in June 2010, he lived with a family of 
one of the soldiers he served with in Iraq. The following is from the mother of that soldier: 
“I first met [Applicant] in 2010 as he stepped off a plane, arriving . . . from Turkey. My son 
worked closely with [Applicant] in Iraq . . . [Applicant] moved in with our family and quickly 
became a son I could rely upon . . . I saw him organize his plan for becoming a U.S. 
citizen. I saw him study each day to continually raise the level of his understanding of 
English. He landed a job, and soon worked his way up to management . . . I know 
[Applicant] to be honest, dependable, and hard-working.”19 
 
In his answer to the SOR and in his response to the FORM, Applicant averred that 
he would never compromise national security, not even in circumstances where his family 
faced threats by terrorists. He would report the incident to his commanding officer.20 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts concerning Iraq: Iraq faces many 
challenges fueled by sectarian and ethnic divisions. Numerous terrorist groups and 
elements hostile to the United States remain active in Iraq. Iraqi forces, with the 
assistance of the United States, have seen successes recently and most of the territory 
previously held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL) has been retaken. Threats of 
kidnapping and violence are high, and the Department of State warns U.S. citizens that 
all but essential travel to Iraq should be avoided. Although the government of lraq has 
made significant progress in its campaign to retake occupied territory from ISIL, there 
remains a security vacuum in parts of Iraq.  
 
The State Department warns that anti-U.S. sectarian militias may also threaten 
U.S. citizens and western companies throughout Iraq. Kidnappings and attacks by means 
of improvised explosive devices occur frequently in many areas of the country, including 
Baghdad. Methods of attack have included explosively formed penetrators, magnetic 
IEDs placed on vehicles, human and vehicle-borne IEDs, mines placed on or concealed 
near roads, mortars and rockets, and shootings using various direct fire weapons. Such 
attacks often take place in public venues such as cafes and markets. 
The U.S. government considers the potential personal security threats to U.S. 
government personnel in Iraq to be serious enough to require them to live and work under 
strict security guidelines. All U.S. Government employees under the authority of the U.S. 
Chief of Mission must follow strict safety and security procedures when traveling outside 
the Embassy and Consulates.  
                                                          
18 AE I.  
 
19 AE J.  
 
20 Answer, p. 3; AE A, p. 6.   
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In its annual human rights report, the U.S. Department of State reported that ISIL 
committed the overwhelming number of serious human rights abuses, including attacks 
against civilians, especially Shia but also Sunnis who opposed ISIL, members of other 
religious and ethnic minorities, women, and children. ISIL members committed acts of 
violence on a·mass scale, including killing by suicide bombings, improvised explosive 
devices, execution-style shootings, public beheadings, and other forms of executions. 
Sectarian hostility, widespread corruption, and lack of transparency at all levels of 
government and society weakened the Iraqi government's authority and worsened 
effective human rights protections.21 
Law and Policies 
 
 It is well-established law that no one has a right to a security clearance.22 As noted 
by the Supreme Court in Department of the Navy v. Egan, “the clearly consistent standard 
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of 
denials.”23 Under Egan, Executive Order 10865, and the Directive, any doubt about 
whether an applicant should be allowed access to classified information will be resolved 
in favor of protecting national security.  
 
 A favorable clearance decision establishes eligibility of an applicant to be granted 
a security clearance for access to confidential, secret, or top-secret information.24 An 
unfavorable clearance decision (1) denies any application, (2) revokes any existing 
security clearance, and (3) prevents access to classified information at any level.25 
 
 There is no presumption in favor of granting, renewing, or continuing eligibility for 
access to classified information.26 The Government has the burden of presenting 
evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that have been controverted.27 An 
applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to refute, explain, extenuate, or mitigate 
facts that have been admitted or proven.28 In addition, an applicant has the ultimate 
burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision.29 
                                                          
21 GE 4.  
 
22 Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (“it should be obvious that no one has a ‘right’ to 
a security clearance”); Duane v. Department of Defense, 275 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 2002) (no right to a 
security clearance).  
 
23 484 U.S. at 531. 
 
24 Directive, ¶ 3.2. 
 
25 Directive, ¶ 3.2. 
 
26 ISCR Case No. 02-18663 (App. Bd. Mar. 23, 2004). 
 
27 Directive, ¶ E3.1.14. 
 
28 Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15. 
 
29 Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.  
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 In Egan, the Supreme Court stated that the burden of proof is less than a 
preponderance of evidence.30 The Appeal Board has followed the Court’s reasoning, and 
a judge’s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard.31 
 
     Discussion 
  
Guideline B - Foreign Influence  
 
 The foreign influence security concern is explained at AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism.32 
 
 An individual is not automatically disqualified from holding a security clearance 
because they have connections and contacts in a foreign country. Instead, in assessing 
an individual’s potential vulnerability to foreign influence, an administrative judge must 
take into account the foreign government involved; the intelligence-gathering history of 
that government; the country’s human rights record; and other pertinent factors.33  
 
 The United States and Iraq are allies in the war against ISIL and other terrorists 
and insurgents. The serious security threat posed by these terrorists and other elements 
hostile to the United States must be taken into account in assessing the security concerns 
raised by Applicant’s family members in Iraq. Applicant’s relationship to his foreign 
relatives, coupled with the facts administratively noticed, raise a heightened security 
concern.  
 
                                                          
 
30 Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
 
31 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002) (citations omitted).  
 
32 ISCR Case No. 09-07565 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul. 12, 2012) (“As the Supreme Court stated in Egan, a 
clearance adjudication may be based not only upon conduct but also upon circumstances unrelated to 
conduct, such as the foreign residence of an applicant’s close relatives.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 
33 ISCR Case No. 05-03250 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr. 6, 2007) (setting forth factors an administrative judge must 
consider in foreign influence cases).  
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 In assessing the security concern raised by Applicant’s foreign contacts and 
interests, I have considered the following disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 7, and 
mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8:   
 
AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen 
of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation 
to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology;  
 
AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country 
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed 
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;  
 
AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s 
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or 
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
 
AG ¶ 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
 An individual with family members and other connections in a foreign country faces 
a high, but not insurmountable, hurdle in mitigating security concerns raised by such 
foreign ties. An applicant is not required “to sever all ties with a foreign country before he 
or she can be granted access to classified information.”34 What factor or combination of 
factors will mitigate security concerns raised by an applicant with family members in a 
foreign country is not easily identifiable or quantifiable.35  
 
In the present case, Applicant’s parents, two brothers, and two sisters-in-law are 
admittedly citizens and residents of Iraq. Facts admitted by an applicant in an answer to 
                                                          
34 ISCR Case No. 07-13739 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 12, 2008). 
 
35 ISCR Case No. 11-12202 at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 23, 2014). 
 
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a SOR require no further proof by the Government.36  Therefore, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) apply. 
The next inquiry is whether the security concern is mitigated. 
 
Applicant signed up as an interpreter for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq in January 
2006, when he was 20 years old. He was attached to a U.S. Special Forces unit of the 
U.S. Army. Applicant served in that capacity for over a year. During that time, he earned 
the respect of the soldiers he served. Applicant was described as exceptionally 
professional and trustworthy. He was the subject of credible death threats but declined a 
transfer so as not to abandon his platoon. Applicant maintained his professionalism and 
composure even in the face of hostile fire. He placed himself in harm’s way so his soldiers 
could continue to communicate. His loyalty to the U.S. troops has been manifestly shown, 
even before Applicant became a United States citizen.  
 
After finishing his tour in Iraq as a linguist, Applicant made his way to the United 
States in 2010 under a refugee assistance program. He found employment, studied to 
become a United States citizen, and was embraced by his sponsor family like a son. 
Applicant was described by that family as honest, dependable, and hard-working. He 
became a U.S. citizen in June 2015.  
 
By December 2016, Applicant had returned to the Middle East as an Army linguist. 
He is still serving there as of May 2018. Character letters from soldiers he is currently 
serving with echo the same esteem as soldiers expressed about Applicant’s first tour. For 
present purposes, perhaps none sums it up as aptly as an officer in Applicant’s current 
unit: “[Applicant] considers himself an American first, above all else . . . I have no doubts 
in his commitment to the United States.” 
 
Applicant has plainly chosen to make his allegiance to the United States, not Iraq. 
He has proven his loyalty in dangerous and high risk circumstance, by credible 
declarations of soldiers who served with him in Iraq and in his current deployment. The 
Appeal Board has recognized that in a case such as this, an Applicant’s credibility is 
enhanced by that kind of service.37 Applicant has no property interests in Iraq. He has 
never told family members that he works for a defense contractor or where his job 
locations are. AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (b) apply.  
 
Applicant talks by phone to his parents about twice a month, usually to check on 
his father’s medical condition. He speaks to his two brothers about twice yearly. He does 
not have frequent communications with his two sisters-in-law. Applicant’s eldest brother 
works for the Iraqi police force but is not an officer and holds no rank; he does general 
                                                          
36 ISCR Case No. 94-1159 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 4, 1995) (“any admissions [applicant] made to the SOR 
allegations . . . relieve Department Counsel of its burden of proof”); ISCR Case No. 94-0569 at 4 and n.1 
(App. Bd. Mar. 30, 1995) (“[a]n applicant’s admissions, whether testimonial or written, can provide a legal 
basis for an Administrative Judge’s findings”). 
 
37 See ISCR Case No. 07-00034 at 2 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008); ISCR Case No. 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. 
Nov. 14, 2006). 
 
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driving duties. Other than that brother, Applicant’s family members have no current or 
past connections to the Iraqi government or the military.  AG ¶ 8(c) applies.   
 
  The evidence on Applicant’s family ties to Iraq does not raise doubts about his 
reliability, trustworthiness, good judgment, and ability to protect classified information. In 
reaching this conclusion, I weighed the evidence as a whole and considered if the 
favorable evidence outweighed the unfavorable evidence or vice versa. I also gave due 
consideration to the whole-person concept.38 Accordingly, I conclude that Applicant has 
met his ultimate burden of persuasion to show that it is clearly consistent with the national 
interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 As required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, I make the following 
formal findings on the SOR allegations: 
 
  Paragraph 1, Guideline B:     For Applicant  
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e:                   For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of the record as a whole, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant Applicant access to classified information. 
  
 
 
Philip J. Katauskas 
Administrative Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 AG ¶¶ 2(d)(1)-(9) and 2(f)(1)-(6).