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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 17-03624 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Aubrey M. De Angelis Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GLENDON, John Bayard, Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial 
Considerations. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On November 8, 2017, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns 
under Guideline F. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative 
Guidelines (December 10, 2016), for all adjudicative decisions on or after June 8, 2017. 
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on November 22, 2017, and elected to have the case 
decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the 
Government’s written case on January 11, 2018. A complete copy of the file of relevant 
material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file 
 
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objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. 
Applicant received the FORM on March 12, 2018, and he did not object to the 
Government’s evidence, including Item 7,1 submit any additional evidence or otherwise 
respond. The case was assigned to me on June 19, 2018. 
 
Findings of Fact2 
 
 In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted all of the allegations. His admissions 
are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 34-year-old field avionics technician employed by a defense 
contractor since July 2015. He served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force from April 2003 
to December 2013. In 2012 he was reduced from E-5 to E-4 following an Article 15 
adjudication. He claimed that he was discharged from the Air Force in December 2013 
due to a “force reduction.” (FORM Item 7 at 5.) 
 
 Applicant has been married twice. His first marriage ended when his wife moved 
out of the marital home (FORM Item 7 at 13) with their three children, all under the age 
of eight at the time. He was divorced in December 2010. He remarried a year later, and 
he and his second wife have two children, who are presently six and three. The 
combination of his divorce and his loss of income due to his reduction in rank resulted in 
financial distress. (FORM Item 7 at 2.) 
 
 In anticipation of the loss of his military income and his planned move with his 
second wife and the first of their children to another state, Applicant decided in October 
2013 to stop paying his mortgage. Following his move with his new family, Applicant was 
unemployed from January 2014 to July 2015, which further aggravated his financial 
situation. He attended a certification program during the period May 2014 to July 2015. 
He incurred over $13,000 in student loans to pay for the program. (FORM Item 5 at 5.) 
Once he earned his certificate in July 2015, he obtained employment in a third state and 
moved himself and his family, which included a second child at that point, again. During 
the five-year period following his divorce through the end of his unemployment, he was 
unable to pay a number of bills. 
 
 The SOR alleges 12 delinquent debts totaling about $22,000. In addition, the SOR 
alleges Applicant’s 2013 default on his mortgage loan resulting in the bank foreclosing on 
                                                          
1 FORM Item 7 was not authenticated as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.20. Department Counsel informed 
Applicant in her FORM that in his response to the FORM, Applicant could comment upon, make corrections, 
additions deletions and updates as necessary, or alternatively that he could object to Item 7 on the ground 
that it was unauthenticated by a Government witness. Applicant did not respond to the FORM. I conclude 
that he waived any objections to Item 7. Although pro se applicants are not expected to act like lawyers, 
they are expected to take timely and reasonable steps to protect their rights under the Directive. ISCR Case 
No. 12-10810 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 12, 2016). 
 
2 Applicant’s personal information is extracted from his security clearance application (FORM Item 3) unless 
otherwise indicated by a parenthetical citation to the record. 
 
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Applicant’s former residence and an unpaid state tax lien in the amount of $771 filed in 
2014. The evidence concerning these debts is summarized below. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.a: October 2013 default on mortgage loan and April 2016 
foreclosure. In his answer to the SOR, Applicant blamed his default on a number of 
circumstances, specifically his upcoming separation from the Air Force in January 2014, 
his lack of finances needed to make necessary repairs, his relocation with his new family 
to another state, and his unemployment after his military discharge. (FORM Item 3 at 1.) 
In the Report of Investigation summarizing Applicant’s Personal Subject Interview 
conducted on July 18, 2017 (PSI), he also blamed his reduction in rank and income, which 
occurred in July 2012, his divorce from his first wife, and his obligation to pay for the 
support of his three children from his first marriage. (FORM Item 7 at 2.) He decided to 
default on his monthly mortgage payments of $1,050 and to save the money for his 
relocation. (FORM Item 7 at 2.) The record evidence is unclear why Applicant did not try 
to sell or rent his home before defaulting on the mortgage loan. He did state that the 
house was old and needed repairs. (FORM Item 7 at 2).The record is also unclear 
whether the foreclosure auction paid off the outstanding loan balance of $99,430 or 
whether there was a deficiency. No deficiency debt appears on either of the two credit 
reports in the record. (FORM Items 5 and 6.) Applicant’s comments in the PSI, however, 
suggest that he believed there may have been a deficiency. (FORM Item 7 at 10 and 13.) 
He acknowledged in his interview that his decision to default on the mortgage “was a 
mistake and irresponsible of him.” (FORM Item 7 at 2.) 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.b: unsecured loan charged off for $3,025. Applicant took out this loan 
in September 2012 in the amount of $4,945 to pay for the expenses related to his divorce 
and to provide spousal and child support. (FORM Item 5 at 4 and Item 3 at 1.) He 
defaulted on the loan when he separated from the Air Force and lost his income, and the 
loan was subsequently charged off. (FORM Item 3 at 1 and Item 5 at 4.) The purpose of 
the loan was to pay for furniture to replace what his ex-wife took as part of their divorce. 
(FORM Item 7 at 12.) Applicant has submitted no evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.c: telecommunications account in collection with a balance of 
$1,208. Applicant opened this account with a cellphone service provider in July 2017 
while working for his current employer, after he signed his SCA and in the same month 
as his PSI. (FORM Item 6 at 2 and Item 7 at 1.) Applicant defaulted on his payments 
shortly thereafter and the account was referred to collections with a balance as alleged in 
the SOR. (FORM Item 6, dated October 18, 2017, at 2.) Applicant claimed in his 
November 22, 2017 answer to the SOR that the day before he submitted his answer, he 
made an agreement with the creditor to pay off the debt with three monthly payments, 
however, he submitted no evidence to substantiate his claim. (FORM Item 3 at 1.) 
 
 SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 1.g: credit card accounts charged off for $425 and $4,796. 
Applicant opened these accounts in May 2008 and November 2006, respectively, while 
married to his first wife. He defaulted on paying the accounts in April 2012 and November 
2010, after his separation and divorce but before his discharge from the Air Force. (FORM 
Item 5 at 4.) In his PSI, Applicant did not recall the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.d, but he did 
 
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recall using the other credit card to purchase furniture. (FORM Item 7 at 15 and 11.) The 
creditors charged off both delinquent accounts. (FORM Item 5 at 4.) He has submitted no 
evidence of actions to resolve these debts. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.e: 2014 state tax lien for $771. A state tax lien in the amount of $771 
was filed against Applicant in September 2014. (FORM Item 5 at 3.) In his answer to the 
SOR, Applicant admitted the allegation, but disputed this debt. He claimed that the state 
of his residence while in the Air Force mistakenly taxed his military income when this 
income was only taxable in another state, which was his home of record for tax purposes. 
(FORM Item 3 at 1 and Item 7 at 10.) In his July 2017 PSI, he stated that the tax authorities 
gave him directions to address the problem, but he never followed through. (FORM Item 
7 at 10.) In his November 2017 answer to the SOR, he claimed that “I attempted to 
reconcile this error by refiling in 2014, but I never heard back from the State Treasury 
department.” (FORM Item 3 at 1.) Applicant provided no evidence to support his dispute 
and claimed resolution of this tax debt. The tax lien, however, does not appear in the most 
recent Equifax credit report in the record. (FORM Item 6 at 4.) Applicant believes that the 
state “self-identified the error and corrected the records.” (FORM Item 3 at 1.) 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.f: auto loan charged off for $8,176. This loan was taken out in October 
2007. Applicant defaulted in early 2011. (FORM Item 5 at 3.) Applicant stated that the 
vehicle was repossessed by the lender because he could no longer afford the payments 
following his divorce in 2010. (FORM Item 3 at 1.) In his PSI, Applicant provided more 
details. He stated that he gave his car to his ex-wife who was employed and supposed to 
pay the loan, but she failed to do so. (FORM Item 7 at 11.) Applicant failed to pay the 
deficiency after the repossession, and the creditor charged off the account. (FORM Item 
5 at 3.) He has submitted no evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.h: auto loan account charged off for $2,115. Applicant opened this 
loan account for $12,285 in March 2010 and defaulted on the monthly payments in 
December 2010. (FORM Item 5 at 4.) He stated in his answer to the SOR that the auto 
was repossessed. (FORM Item 3 at 1.) In his PSI, he stated that the loan was for his ex-
wife’s car and that he co-signed the note. His ex-wife was supposed to pay the loan, but 
she failed to do so. The car was subsequently surrendered to the bank, and the balance 
owed was charged off. (FORM Item 7 at 10 and Item 5 at 4.) He has submitted no 
evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.i: telecommunications account in collection with a balance of 
$1,028. This cellphone debt is owed to a different carrier than the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 
1.c. (FORM Item 5 at 10.) The account became delinquent and the debt was referred for 
collection in December 2013, before Applicant’s discharge from the Air Force. (FORM 
Item 5 at 10.) In his answer to the SOR, Applicant stated that he could no longer afford 
the service and stopped paying. (FORM Item 3 at 1.) He has submitted no evidence of 
actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.j: bank debt account in collection for $433. This delinquent debt was 
referred for collection in November 2012, more than a year before Applicant’s military 
 
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discharge and loss of income. (FORM Item 5 at 10.) In his PSI, Applicant could not recall 
the name of the original creditor or the reason for incurring this debt. (FORM Item 7 at 11-
12.) He has submitted no evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.k: utility account in collection for $358. This debt became delinquent 
and was referred for collection in March 2014, shortly after Applicant’s discharge from the 
Air Force and his relocation to a new state. (FORM Item 5 at 10.) In his PSI, Applicant 
stated that he originally did not agree with this bill, but once he learned how the utility 
company’s billing system worked, he concluded that he owed the bill and would pay it. 
(FORM Item 7 at 14-15.) In his answer to the SOR, he stated that he was not working 
during the period January 1, 2014 through July 15, 2015, so he could not afford to pay 
the utility bill. He has submitted no evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.l: cable account in collection for $270. The SOR alleges that this 
delinquent account is owed to a cable company and was referred for collection in 
November 2015. (FORM Item 5 at 10.) In his answer to the SOR, Applicant stated that 
he could no longer afford the service and discontinued it. (FORM Item 5 at 10.) In his PSI, 
he referred to a debt to a different cable company and stated that he stopped making 
payments two months before he moved in January 2014, following his military discharge. 
(FORM Item 7 at 13.) The Government’s credit report substantiates the SOR allegation. 
(FORM Item 5 at 10.) Applicant has submitted no evidence of actions to resolve this debt. 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.m: insurance account in collection for $136. Although Applicant 
admitted this allegation in his answer to the SOR, he actually disputes this debt. (FORM 
Item 3 at 2.) He claims that he asked the insurance company for a quote and never agreed 
to purchase the insurance. He claims further that he tried to cancel the insurance. (FORM 
Item 7 at 12.) Applicant never paid this debt, and it was referred for collection. (FORM 
Item 5 at 10.) Applicant provided no documentary evidence to substantiate that he 
actually disputed this debt with the creditor. 
 
  SOR ¶ 1.n: medical account in collection for $56. Applicant claimed in his 
answer to the SOR that he paid this debt in 2016. (FORM Item 3 at 2.) The Government’s 
evidence confirms that this debt has been paid. (FORM Item 6 at 2.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
 
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of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge 
applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense 
decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information 
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 
§ 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant 
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have 
established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 
(App. Bd. Apr.20, 2016). 
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if 
they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline F (Financial Considerations) 
 
The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:  
 
Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial 
obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to 
protect classified or sensitive information. . . . An individual who is financially 
overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise 
questionable acts to generate funds. . . .  
 
 This concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly 
compromise classified information to raise money. It encompasses concerns about a 
person’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting classified 
information. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, 
unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information. See ISCR 
Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). 
 
 Applicant’s admissions and the documentary evidence in the FORM establish the 
following potentially disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability to 
satisfy debts”); AG ¶ 19(b) (“unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do 
so”); and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). 
 
 The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not 
cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely 
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, 
clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the 
individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;  
 
AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to 
repay creditors or otherwise resolve debts; 
 
AG ¶ 20(e): the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy 
of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides 
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides 
evidence of actions to resolve the issue; [and] 
 
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¶ 20(g): the individual has made arrangements with the appropriate tax 
authorities to file or pay the amount owed and is in compliance with those 
arrangements. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(a) is partially established. For the most part, Applicant’s debts arose 
during the period from his divorce in 2010 through July 2015, when he began working for 
his current employer. The circumstances under which he incurred these debts may not 
recur, but it cannot be said that such circumstances are unlikely to recur since he could 
suffer a loss of his job or marriage in the future. After July 2015, Applicant did not act 
responsibly by failing to pay the debts he previously incurred. This failure casts doubt on 
his current reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment. Applicant has not provided 
sufficient evidence to mitigate or explain his past conduct so as to overcome the doubt 
raised by his consistent failure to act responsibly since 2010. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(b) is partially established. Applicant’s divorce and discharge from the Air 
Force were circumstances beyond his control. The fact that he had three children to help 
support after his divorce certainly created financial stress. There is a serious question, 
however, whether he acted responsibly under the circumstances. With five children and 
at least a wife, and possibly an ex-wife to support, Applicant chose not to work for 18 
months while he obtained a certificate.  Without that income, he was unable to pay the 
debts he accumulated following his divorce and the loss of his military income. When he 
became employed, he never looked back at his outstanding debts and presented no 
evidence that he intended to address them. Under these circumstances, Applicant has 
not acted responsibly. 
  
 AG ¶ 20(d) is not established with respect to Applicant’s mortgage loan or any of 
his other debts, with the exception of the small debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.n, which he paid. 
With respect to the more recent delinquent debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.c, Applicant claims 
that he made an agreement with that creditor to pay this debt in three monthly 
installments, but provided no evidence to support his claim or to prove that he actually 
made the payments. With respect to his mortgage loan, Applicant made the strategic 
decision that it was in his best interest to default on this loan and pass on the financial 
burden of his old, run-down house to his lender. (FORM Item 5 at 3.) Such strategic 
defaults do not constitute good-faith efforts to resolve a financial obligation, here 
Applicant’s largest debt. See ISCR Case No. 15-048851 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Apr. 28, 2017). 
Applicant’s failure to address the possible post-foreclosure deficiency on his mortgage 
loan or any of the other debts alleged in the SOR also renders AG ¶ 20(d) inapplicable.  
 
 AG ¶ 20(e) is partially established with respect to the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.e 
and 1.n, which Applicant disputes. The circumstances surrounding these two debts 
support Applicant’s claims that he has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of 
these two debts. AG ¶ 20(e) is not fully established, however, because Applicant failed to 
provide “documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute[.]” 
 
 AG 20 (g) is not applicable because Applicant has established that he was not 
obligated to pay the income taxes that were the subject of the tax lien levied against him. 
 
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Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances and applying the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d).3  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis 
and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were 
addressed above, but other factors warrant additional comment. I have considered 
Applicant’s age at the time of his divorce and his ten years of military service. I have also 
considered the emotional distress he experienced following his divorce and the financial 
pressures the divorce created. I have given some weight to his recognition of his past 
“foolishness” and his determination to “move on.” (FORM Item 3 at 2.) On the other hand, 
Applicant’s refusal to address the debts he incurred in the past after he became employed 
as a defense contractor raises serious doubts about his trustworthiness, reliability and 
judgment. Also, the fact that he incurred a new delinquent debt in 2017 just a few months 
after he opened the account (SOR ¶ 1.c) raises further doubts about whether Applicant’s 
past financial irresponsibility is truly behind him.  
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline F, and 
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has 
not mitigated the security concerns raised by his past actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The factors are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) 
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for 
the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of 
continuation or recurrence.  
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
Paragraph 1.  Guideline F:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.e:  For Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.f-1.m: Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraph 1.n:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the 
United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance 
is denied. 
 
 
 
 
John Bayard Glendon 
Administrative Judge