1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS In the matter of: ) ) ) ISCR Case No. 16-01991 ) Applicant for Security Clearance ) Appearances For Government: Nicholas Temple, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: Pro se ______________ Decision ______________ RICCIARDELLO, Carol G., Administrative Judge: Applicant refuted the security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence, but failed to mitigate the security concerns under Guideline F, financial considerations. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. Statement of the Case On August 20, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence, and Guideline F, financial considerations. The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. On June 8, 2017, new AG were implemented and are effective for decisions issued after that date.1 1 I considered the previous AG, effective September 1, 2006, as well as the new AG, effective June 8, 2017. My decision would be the same if the case was considered under the previous AG. 2 Applicant answered the SOR on September 9, 2016, and on August 30, 2017, she elected to have her case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Applicant received the Government’s file of relevant material (FORM) on October 23, 2017. She was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of receipt of the FORM. The Government’s evidence is identified as Items 2 through 6. Applicant did not respond to the FORM, and she did not object to the Government’s evidence. It is admitted into evidence. The case was assigned to me on March 2, 2018. Findings of Fact Applicant denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a. She admitted the allegations in ¶¶ 2.a through 2.l. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits submitted, I make the following findings of fact. Applicant is 47 years old. She married in 1995 and divorced in 2001. She remarried in 2006. She and her husband separated in 2015. She does not know his whereabouts. She has four children, ages 21, 16, 12, and 5 years old. She has been employed by a federal contractor since 2004. She has held a security clearance since 2007.2 The SOR alleges 12 past due and delinquent debts totaling approximately $26,559, one of which is a judgment. The debts are corroborated by Applicant’s admissions and credit reports from November 2016, May 2016, and November 2015. Applicant stated in her November 2015 security clearance application (SCA) that she was on workers compensation for 15 months and was unable to pay all of her bills. In her answer to the SOR, she said that in March 2012 she fell at work and her life changed. Her employer was afraid to keep her employed because she had seizures after her fall. She is attempting to take care of her financial issues without filing bankruptcy. She said she is a single mother with four children. Applicant did not provide additional amplifying information about her actions to resolve her debts, her current finances, budget, child support, or if she has received financial counseling.3 The SOR alleged that Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Nigeria. In Applicant’s response to the SOR she stated that her mother is a citizen of the United States and is willing to give up her Nigerian passport.4 Policies When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations 2 Item 3. 3 Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 4 Item 2. 3 for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Directive ¶ E3.1.15 states an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.” A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). 4 Analysis Guideline F: Financial Considerations The security concern relating to the guideline for financial considerations is set out in AG & 18: Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive gambling mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern insofar as it may result from criminal activity, including espionage. AG ¶ 19 provides conditions that could raise security concerns. The following are potentially applicable: (a) inability to satisfy debts; (b) unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do so; and (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations. Applicant has unresolved delinquent debts from at least 2015 that she is unwilling or unable to pay. The above disqualifying conditions apply. The guideline also includes conditions that could mitigate security concerns arising from financial difficulties. The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 are potentially applicable: (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person=s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, 5 clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; (c) the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; and (d) the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. Applicant admitted all of the delinquent debts alleged in the SOR. She did not provide evidence of any actions to resolve the debts. She did not provide amplifying information about her finances or her ability to pay her debts. She did not provide information about whether she is working full time. She is a single mother with four children. She was injured on the job in 2012 and received workers compensation. It is unknown what her current financial situation is, and whether she can pay her delinquent debts. The evidence supports a conclusion that her financial problems were beyond her control, but without additional information, I am unable to conclude she acted reasonably. AG ¶ 20(b) partially applies. Applicant’s financial problems are recent and ongoing. AG ¶ 20(a) does not apply. There is no evidence that she has received financial counseling and there are not clear indications her problems are being resolved or are under control. There is no evidence that she has made a good-faith effort to resolve her debts. AG ¶¶ 20(c) and 20(d) do not apply. Guideline B, Foreign Influence AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence: Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they resulted in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is it associated with a risk of terrorism. AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. I have considered all of them and the following are potentially applicable: 6 (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. Applicant’s mother is a citizen of the United States. There is insufficient evidence to conclude her citizenship raises a heightened risk or security concern. None of the disqualifying conditions apply. I find in Applicant’s favor under this guideline. Whole-Person Concept Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d): (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is a 41-year-old mother, who is struggling financially due to an injury she incurred in 2012, being off work, and receiving workers compensation for a period. She failed to provide sufficient evidence to determine that her financial problems and delinquent debts are being addressed. The record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under 7 Guideline F, financial considerations. The foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B were refuted. Formal Findings Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant Paragraph 2, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT Subparagraphs 2.a-2.l: Against Applicant Conclusion In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. _____________________________ Carol G. Ricciardello Administrative Judge