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                               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
                DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )       ISCR Case No.: 16-03331 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Adrienne Driskill, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Cathryn Young, Esquire 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated the concerns related to foreign influence raised by siblings who 
are citizens and residents of Egypt. His request for a security clearance is granted. 
 
Statement of Case 
 
On May 4, 2015, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF-86). 
On November 16, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility 
(DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing security concerns 
under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The SOR further informed Applicant that, based 
on information available to the Government, DoD adjudicators could not make the 
preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or 
continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR on December 8, 2016, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to another 
administrative judge on September 26, 2017. It was reassigned to me on October 2, 
 
 
 
 
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2017. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing 
on February 5, 2018, scheduling the hearing for March 12, 2018. The hearing was 
convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibit (GE) 1, which was admitted 
without objection, and Hearing Exhibit (HE) I for Administrative Notice. Applicant 
testified on his own behalf and presented Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through E, which 
were admitted without objection and HE II. The record was left open until March 19, 
2018, but Applicant submitted nothing further.1 DOHA received the transcript of the 
hearing (Tr.) on March 20, 2018. 
 
The SOR was issued under the adjudicative guidelines that came into effect 
within the DoD on September 1, 2006. Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 4, 
National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, implements new adjudicative guidelines, 
effective June 8, 2017. All national security eligibility decisions issued on or after June 
8, 2017, are to be decided using the new National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for 
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a 
Sensitive Position (AG), as implemented by SEAD 4. I considered the previous AG, as 
well as the new AG, in adjudicating Applicant’s national security eligibility. My decision 
would be the same under either set of guidelines, although this decision is issued 
pursuant to the new AG. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 The Government and Applicant both requested I take administrative notice of 
certain facts relating to Egypt. Department Counsel provided a five-page summary of 
the facts, supported by five Government documents pertaining to Egypt, marked as HE I 
and HE II. The documents provide elaboration and context for the summary. I take 
administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are 
limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set 
out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact  
 
 The SOR alleged, and Applicant admitted, that his three sisters and four brothers 
are citizens and residents of Egypt, and that he has provided them approximately 
$50,000 in support. Those admissions are incorporated into the following facts: 
 
 Applicant is 58 years old. He is currently working as a linguist in the Middle East. 
He was married from 1984 to 1992, when he was divorced. His ex-wife is a U.S. citizen. 
He has no children. He was born in Egypt and immigrated to the United States in 
August 1980, at the age of 20. He entered on a student visa. He was naturalized as a 
U.S. citizen in 1991. Before 2009, he worked in the restaurant industry. He has worked 
for his current employer, a government contractor, since 2009 with a break in service 
from November 2011 to August 2012. (GE 1; AE A; AE C; Tr. 16-23, 80, 100.) 
                                                 
1 An email dated August 8, 2018, between myself, Department Counsel, and Applicant’s attorney 
confirmed that no post-hearing exhibits were submitted. That email is marked HE III.  
 
 
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 During his employment with the government contractor, he has been stationed 
overseas. He had deployed to combat zones on multiple occasions. (Tr. 84-86 
 
 Applicant has traveled to Egypt three times, since leaving in 1980. He visited his 
mother in 1991. He returned again in 1992 to attend his mother’s funeral. He visited 
again in 2015 to spend time with his siblings. He stayed with his oldest brother for two 
weeks during his 2015 trip to Egypt. (AE A; Tr. 36-38, 67-68, 88.)  
 
 Applicant had five brothers and three sisters who were citizens and residents of 
Egypt. However, one brother passed away in 2012 and one sister passed away in 
February 2017. Both died after suffering from cardiac arrest. (Tr. 28-32.)  
 
 Applicant’s oldest brother is 75 years old. He worked site manager for a 
construction company, but has been retired for 15 years. He did not serve compulsory 
military service in the Egyptian military. Applicant last spoke to this brother in August 
2017, to wish him well on an Egyptian holiday. Applicant testified that he has no sense 
of loyalty to his brother. His brother does not know of his work for the U.S. government 
or of his employment with a government contractor. (Tr. 32-40.) 
 
 Applicant’s second brother is 70 years old. He is divorced. He worked for the 
same construction company their oldest brother was employed by, but is also retired. 
He served one-year mandatory military service for the Egyptian Army. He visited 
Applicant in the United States in approximately 1985 for six months on a tourist visa. 
Applicant contacts him two or three times a year by phone to inquire about his welfare. 
Applicant testified that he has no sense of loyalty to this brother. His brother does not 
know of his work for the U.S. government or of his employment with a government 
contractor. (Tr. 40-45.) 
 
 Applicant’s third brother is 68 years old. He worked as a deputy chief operating 
officer for a private salt company, but has been retired from that position for eight years. 
He did not serve compulsory military service in the Egyptian military due to vision 
problems. Applicant communicates by phone with this brother four to five times per 
year. This brother does not know of his work for the U.S. government or of his 
employment with a government contractor. (Tr. 46-51.) 
 
 Applicant’s fourth brother is 66 years old. He worked as a shift manager for a 
private steel company, but retired from that position at age 60. He served one-year 
mandatory military service for the Egyptian Army. Applicant communicates with him 
approximately three times each year. This brother does not know of his work for the 
U.S. government or of his employment with a government contractor. (Tr. 52-55.) 
 
 Applicant’s surviving sisters are ages 73 and 62. The oldest sister has always 
been a homemaker. Her husband is deceased. His younger sister worked in a private 
department store, but is retired from that position. He communicates with them three to 
four times per year by phone. (Tr. 55-64.) 
 
 
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 In 2014, Applicant wired a gift of $50,000 to his third brother for the use of all of 
his siblings. He explained that when Applicant was in college in the United States, his 
siblings supported him. As the cost of living rose in Egypt, Applicant decided he wanted 
to repay them for their previous support. His siblings used this one-time gift for food and 
medicine. Economic conditions in Egypt have improved since 2015 and Applicant does 
not foresee the need to send them money again. (Tr. 72-76, 90.) 
 
 Applicant testified that his loyalty is solely to the United States. (Tr. 97-98.) He 
did not serve compulsory military service in Egypt, before immigrating to the United 
States. (Tr. 69.) He has no financial interests in Egypt, having given up his share of his 
parents’ estate to his siblings. (Tr. 69-70.) He documented assets totaling $500,000, 
consisting of savings, mutual funds, and stocks in the United States. (AE B; Tr. 70, 102-
108.) However, he has no private residence in the United States at the current time, as 
he works overseas. (Tr. 102.) His belongings are in a storage facility. (Tr. 102.) 
 
 Applicant has been awarded certificates of appreciation for his exceptional 
services. (AE D.) His manager, who wrote a letter of support on Applicant’s behalf, 
believes Applicant is “a mature, intelligent, self-motivated professional who has been an 
asset to [his] team.” (AE E.) His manager has full confidence in his trustworthiness and 
fidelity. (AE E.)  
 
Egypt 
 
 Relations between the United States and Egypt are grounded in the mutual 
commitment to advance peace, prosperity, and stability in the Middle East. President 
Trump has met with the Egyptian President and discussed opportunities to enhance the 
American-Egyptian partnership on a range of security and economic issues. (HE II.) 
 
 The U.S. Department of State warns U.S, citizens of threats from terrorist 
organizations operating in Egypt, including the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIL). U.S. citizens 
have been kidnapped and murdered by members of that organization. In 2015, the 
Egyptian government launched an effort to combat these terrorist organizations, but 
terrorist organizations succeeded in launching large-scale attacks in Cairo and other 
urban areas. (HE I.) 
 
 Throughout Egypt, political protests occur without warning and sometimes lead to 
violent clashes between police and protesters. Significant human-rights abuses 
including: excessive use of force by security forces; unlawful killings and torture; 
deficiencies in due process; and the suppression of civil liberties have been noted. (HE 
I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern under the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in AG ¶ 
6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Two are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology. 
 
  Applicant has close connections to his siblings, who are all citizens and residents 
of Egypt. He contacts them each multiple times per year. Further, there is an articulated 
heightened risk associated with having ties to family members in Egypt, due to the 
activities of terrorist organizations and insurgents operating within its borders. The 
evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
 
 
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longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest. 
 
 Applicant’s emotional bonds to his siblings in Egypt have decreased since he 
immigrated to the United States over 30-years ago. He communicates with them only 
three to four times per year. While he sent them the significant gift of $50,000 in 2015, it 
was a one-time gift and was meant to repay them for their previous generosity. He 
demonstrated sufficient relationships with the United States, which outweigh any risks 
associated with his siblings in Egypt. He is credited with his service in areas of conflict 
and having assets totaling $500,000 in the United States. AG ¶ 8(b) provides mitigation. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility 
for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept. Applicant 
served honorably as a linguist since 2009. His personal property and investments are all 
located in the United States. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating 
conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without doubts as to Applicant’s suitability for a 
security clearance. He met his burden to mitigate the security concerns arising under 
the guideline for Foreign Influence. 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:        FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility 
and a security clearance. National security eligibility is granted. 
 
                                                   
 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge