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                               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
                DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )       ISCR Case No. 17-02863 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Adrienne Driskill, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Cathryn Young, Esq. 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
 
Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated foreign influence concerns raised by his spouse, parents, 
brothers, and half-brothers who are citizens (or dual citizens) of Iraq, as well as his 
grandmother, mother-in-law, co-worker, aunts, cousin, and friend, who are citizens and 
residents of Iraq. His request for a security clearance is granted. 
 
Statement of Case 
 
On October 30, 2016, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 
86). On September 26, 2017, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing security 
concerns under Guideline B for foreign influence. The SOR further informed Applicant 
that, based on information available to the Government, DoD adjudicators could not 
make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest 
to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Applicant answered the SOR on November 21, 2017, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on February 22, 2018. 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on 
February 22, 2018, scheduling the hearing for March 16, 2018. The hearing was 
convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibit (GE) 1 through 3, which were 
admitted without objection, and Hearing Exhibit (HE) I for Administrative Notice. 
Applicant testified on his own behalf and presented Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through F, 
which were admitted without objection, and HE II. DOHA received the transcript of the 
hearing (Tr.) on March 27, 2018. 
 
The SOR was issued under the adjudicative guidelines that came into effect 
within the DoD on September 1, 2006. Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 4, 
National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, implements new adjudicative guidelines, 
effective June 8, 2017. All national security eligibility decisions issued on or after June 
8, 2017, are to be decided using the new National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for 
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a 
Sensitive Position (AG), as implemented by SEAD 4. I considered the previous AG, as 
well as the new AG, in adjudicating Applicant’s national security eligibility. My decision 
would be the same under either set of guidelines, although this decision is issued 
pursuant to the new AG. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 The Government and Applicant both requested I take administrative notice of 
certain facts relating to Iraq. Department Counsel provided a nine-page summary of the 
facts, supported by nine Government documents pertaining to Iraq, marked as HE I. 
Applicant presented a four-page summary of facts pertaining to Iraq and Sweden, with 
three attachments marked HE II. The documents provide elaboration and context for the 
summary. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government 
reports. They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable 
dispute. They are set out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact  
 
 The SOR alleged, and Applicant admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 
1.h, 1.j, and 1.k. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.i, and 1.l. Those admissions are 
incorporated into the following facts: 
 
 Applicant is 40 years old. He was born in the Kurdish region of Iraq. He was 
married to his first wife from 1996 to 2007, when they divorced. He married his second 
wife in 2008 in Iraq. They have two minor daughters. (GE 1; Tr. 17-20.)  
 
 Applicant immigrated to the United States in 1997. He became a U.S. citizen in 
May 2007. He worked as a linguist in Iraq from 2005 to 2011. While working there, he 
met and married his current wife. He did not require a security clearance during that 
 
 
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employment. He chose not to return to the United States to live in 2011. Instead, he 
remained in Iraq until 2016, with his wife and newborn children until his wife acquired a 
visa to immigrate to the United States. His children acquired U.S. citizenship through 
registration of their birth abroad. He has never held an Iraqi passport. He currently 
works for a private company, where he is a team lead. He seeks a security clearance in 
connection with a job offer to be a linguist in the Middle East. (AE B; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 20-
26, 88, 95.) 
 
 Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Iraq and resides with Applicant in the United 
States. As noted above, Applicant met her while deployed overseas as a linguist. She 
immigrated to the United States in January 2016. She intends to become a naturalized 
U.S. citizen, when she is eligible. She holds a job at a U.S. factory, has friends here, 
and has a bank account in her hometown. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 29-34.) 
 
 Applicant’s father is a citizen of Iraq, who resides in Sweden. He initially 
immigrated to the United States in 1997 with Applicant, Applicant’s mother, and 
Applicant’s siblings. However, once he realized he could not legally have two wives in 
the United States, he left Applicant’s family and moved to Sweden with his second wife 
and Applicant’s half-brothers. He worked as a caretaker in Sweden, but is now retired 
from that job. Applicant communicates with his father approximately once per month via 
Facebook Messenger. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 34-41.) 
 
 Applicant’s mother is a citizen of Iraq, residing in the United States. She is 64 
years old. She has not returned to Iraq since departing in 1996. She resides with one of 
Applicant’s brothers in the same hometown where Applicant and his wife reside. She is 
employed in a factory for the past 18 years. She owns a manufactured home and has 
retirement savings in a 401(K) account. Applicant sees his mother every day, as they 
commute to work together. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 41-48.) 
 
 Applicant has three brothers. They all reside in the United States, in the same 
city. Two brothers are naturalized U.S. citizens. His other brother is legally in the United 
States on political-asylum status, despite immigration to the United States in 1996. That 
brother works on and off in construction. Applicant is close to his brothers and maintains 
frequent contact with all of them. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 48-63.) 
 
 Applicant’s grandmother is a citizen and resident of Iraq. She is a 75-year-old 
homemaker. She resides with Applicant’s aunts. He communicates with his 
grandmother and aunts on a monthly basis by Facebook messenger. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 
63-67.) 
 
 Applicant’s mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Iraq. She is a 58-year-old 
homemaker. She calls once every two weeks to visit with Applicant’s children, but they 
do not speak Kurdish and have difficulties understanding their grandmother. (GE 2; GE 
3; Tr. 67-69.) 
 
 
 
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 Applicant has five half-brothers, who reside in Sweden and are dual citizens of 
Sweden and Iraq. Applicant is estranged from four of his five half-brothers. He last 
spoke to the fifth half-brother approximately one and a half years ago. They are not 
close. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 69-71.) 
 
 Applicant’s five aunts and a cousin are citizens and residents of Iraq. His aunts 
are in their 40s. Two work as nurses, one is a doctor’s assistant, one is a teacher, and 
one works for a taxation authority. All are technically employed by the Kurdish regional 
government. Applicant contacts his aunts at least once per month via Facebook 
messenger. Applicant’s cousin works in a private real estate company. He employed 
Applicant in Iraq from 2011 to 2016. Applicant speaks to his cousin infrequently, with 
their last physical contact being in 2016. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 73, 76-85.) 
 
 While Applicant worked for his cousin in Iraq in 2011, he met a co-worker or 
“partner,” with whom he developed a friendship. Applicant speaks with this friend once a 
month. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 73-75, 85-86.) 
 
 Of all of Applicant’s listed relatives, only one of Applicant’s brothers is aware that 
Applicant has applied for a security clearance. That brother is also going through the 
application process to become a linguist for U.S. forces and is applying for a security 
clearance too. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 17-91.) 
 
 Applicant testified that he has no financial accounts in Iraq. However, he 
admitted that he has $10,000 in cash that his grandmother is holding for him in Iraq. 
Those funds were from the proceeds of the sale of his home in Iraq. He purchased that 
home in April 2011 and sold it in January 2016, in anticipation of returning to the United 
States. He has retirement savings in the United States totaling $6,287. He has 
additional U.S. bank accounts totaling over $50,000. (GE 2; AE D; Tr. 91.) 
 
 Applicant presented nine highly favorable reference letters. The first letter, 
provided by a member of the Special Forces detachment for whom Applicant acted as a 
linguist, noted that Applicant was “dependable and trustworthy” and that he “trusted him 
with [his] life while conducting military operations in northern Iraq.” (AE E at 1.) A retired 
infantry colonel, for whom Applicant also provided translation services, also reflected 
that Applicant is “an engaging, honest, and hardworking individual, and he proved loyal 
to the United States.” (AE E at 2.) The other letters reflect Applicant was a trustworthy 
and valuable member of their teams. (AE E.) He also has been awarded five certificates 
of appreciation for his services as a linguist. (AE F.) 
 
Iraq 
 
 In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, 
pursuant to that constitution, elected a 275-member Council of Representatives, making 
a successful transition to a constitutional government. The U.S mission in Iraq remains 
 
 
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dedicated to building a strategic partnership. Iraq is now a key partner for the U.S. and 
is a voice for democracy in the Middle East. (HE II.) 
 
 The U.S. Department of State warns U.S, citizens of threats from domestic 
terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), Muqtada al Sadr Peace Brigades, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hizhallah. 
Foreign fighters for militia and terrorist organizations are involved in ongoing conflict in 
Iraq. Terrorist groups continue to exploit ungoverned territory and ongoing conflict to 
expand their reach, and to direct and inspire attacks around the world. (HE I.) 
 
 Political violence in the form of protests occur throughout Iraq. Civil unrest is 
pervasive. Throughout Iraq, sectarian hostility, widespread corruption, and the lack of 
transparency at all levels of government and society weaken the government’s authority 
and worsened human rights protections. Significant human-rights abuses including: 
excessive use of force by security forces; unlawful killings and torture; deficiencies in 
due process; and the suppression of civil liberties have been noted. (HE I.) 
 
Sweden 
 
 Sweden was one of the first nations to recognize U.S. independence in 1783. 
The United States and Sweden have maintained a strong bilateral friendship since then, 
based on shared values and mutual interests. Sweden is committed to democracy, 
human rights, gender equality, and international development. It has a good record on 
respect for human rights. (HE II.) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
 
 
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have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
 
 
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The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; 
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
 
  Applicant has close connections to his grandmother, mother-in-law, and co-
worker, aunts, cousin, and friend, who are all citizens and residents of Iraq, as well as 
spouse, parents, brothers, and half-brothers, who are citizens or dual citizens of Iraq. 
His contacts with his foreign family members range from daily to monthly. There is an 
articulated heightened risk associated with having ties to family members in Iraq, due to 
the activities of terrorist organizations and insurgents operating within its borders. There 
is no demonstrated heightened risk related to Sweden. The evidence is sufficient to 
raise these disqualifying conditions.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest. 
 
 Applicant’s emotional bonds to his relatives in Iraq have decreased since he left 
Iraq two years ago and moved with his wife and children to the same U.S. community in 
which his mother and siblings reside. His bonds with his immediate and extended family 
in the United States have strengthened since his return. He and his family have adapted 
to the American way of life and plan to remain in the United States. The majority of his 
assets are located in the United States. He and his wife are connected to their local 
community through work and friends. Applicant has honorably served the United States 
as a linguist in the past. He demonstrated sufficient relationships with the United States, 
 
 
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which outweigh any risks associated with his siblings in Iraq. He is credited with his 
service in areas of conflict and having assets in the United States. AG ¶ 8(b) provides 
mitigation. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility 
for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept. Applicant 
served honorably as a linguist from 2005 to 2011. Those that served with him place a 
great deal of trust in him. His personal property and investments are located in the 
United States. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light 
of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me without doubt as to Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance. 
He met his burden to mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for 
foreign influence. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:        FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.l:  For Applicant 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility 
and a security clearance. National security eligibility is granted. 
 
                                                   
 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge