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opportunity to submit additional supporting documentation.  Applicant submitted one 
Post-Hearing Exhibit, referred to as Applicant’s Post-Hearing Exhibit A, which was 
admitted without objection.  DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on August 
15, 2018. 
 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 The Government requested I take administrative notice of certain facts relating to 
Taiwan, which formally calls itself the Republic of China (China). Department Counsel 
provided a six page summary of the facts, supported by five Government documents 
pertaining to China.  (Government Exhibit 3.)  The documents provide elaboration and 
context for the summary.  Applicant had no objection.  I take administrative notice of the 
facts included in the U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters of general 
knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted each of the allegations in the SOR.  After a thorough and 
careful review of the pleadings, and exhibits, I make the following findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is 32 years old and is married.  He has two Associate degrees and has 
almost completed a Bachelor’s of science degree.  He holds the position of Cyber 
Security Analyst with a defense contractor.  Applicant has never held a security 
clearance before.  He began working for his current employer in 2014.         
 
 Applicant is a native born American citizen.  His father immigrated from Mexico 
and Applicant is estranged from him but Applicant’s mother told him that his father is an 
American citizen.  All of Applicant’s family and close friends are U.S. citizens.  Applicant 
met his wife in February 2014 where she worked at a retail store in the U.S.  They were 
married in April 2016.  She obtained a green card in 2017.  She is a Taiwanese citizen 
who is permanently residing in the United States.  (Tr. p. 27.) She currently works at an 
airport for the duty free company as a supervisor.    She plans to become a naturalized 
citizen when she is eligible in February 2020.  (Tr. p. 28.)  She also plans to renounce 
her Taiwanese citizenship and become only an American citizen.  Applicant states that 
his wife has many friends in the U.S., as she is involved in the beauty industry and has 
produced and hosted a related television show.  She won the break-out fashionista 
taste award in 2012 for her work in the beauty industry.  Applicant states that she has 
immersed herself into the American culture and is very happy here.     
 
 Applicant’s wife had a bank account in Taiwan with approximately $31,656.  In 
May 2018, Applicant’s wife traveled to Taiwan to close the bank account and eliminate 
future inheritance from her father.  The bank funds were transferred to a bank in the 
United States.  (Applicant’s Post-Hearing Exhibit A.)  Applicant’s spouse maintains the 
government required health insurance system in Taiwan.  As soon as his wife becomes 
a naturalized U.S. citizen, she intends to cancel this medical insurance, as she has 
 
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never used it.  (Tr. p. 58.)  She has no other financial interests or property in Taiwan.  
(Tr. p. 36.)   
 
 Applicant’s father-in-law is a citizen and resident of Taiwan.  He is in his early 
60’s, and is an invested member of a wood veneer company.  He has no associations 
with the Taiwanese government.  He is fairly well established and receives no benefits 
from the Taiwanese government.  He has never visited the U.S., and only speaks 
Mandarin.  (Tr. p. 42.)  Applicant’s only contact with him is casual and through his wife. 
He was recently diagnosed with cancer so contact with him through his wife may be 
more regular.  He does not know any particulars about the Applicant’s job or the 
security clearance process.   Applicant’s most recently traveled to Taiwan in May 2018 
to visit his father-in-law.  (Tr. p. 47.)  Applicant stated that during his visit he did not 
witness any suspicious behavior by anyone trying to obtain sensitive, private or 
classified information.  (Tr. p. 47.)  Applicant’s mother passed away in January 2017.  
 
 Applicant understands his reporting requirements regarding foreign travel, that he 
must receive approval for all foreign travel and report it to his security officer.  Applicant 
also disclosed his foreign travel, his wife’s foreign bank account and her Taiwanese 
medical insurance on this security clearance application.  (Government Exhibit 1 and Tr. 
p. 50.)  He states that he cannot be influenced by any of his wife’s family in any way to 
act contrary to the best interests of the United States.  (Tr. p. 51.)  He considers himself 
a loyal and patriotic U.S. citizen.   
 
 A letter from the Applicant’s supervisor dated August 1, 2018, indicates that 
Applicant is among the top performers of 20 personnel who work in the department.  He 
is honest and forthright and highly recommended for a security clearance.  (Applicant’s 
Exhibit E.) 
 
 Letters of recommendation from coworkers of the Applicant dated February 
2018, states that he is an enthusiastic, hardworking, quick learner.  He is a team player 
who multi-tasks effectively, and is able to handle a high volume workload.  He is 
considered an asset and has their highest recommendation for a security clearance.  
(Applicant’s Exhibit D.) 
 
 Performance evaluations of the Applicant for 2017 reflect that he meets 
expectations in every category.  (Applicant’s Exhibit F.) 
 
 I have taken administrative notice of the following facts about Taiwan, officially 
known as the Republic of China.  Its neighbor to the west is the People’s Republic of 
China, recognized as the sole legal government of China, which considers Taiwan to be 
part of the One China policy.  China is one of the world’s most active and persistent 
perpetrators of economic espionage, and it is predicted that their attempts to collect 
U.S. intelligence will continue at a high level and will represent a persistent, if not 
growing threat to U.S. economic security.  China’s intelligence services, as well as 
private companies and other entities, frequently seek to exploit Chinese citizens, or 
person with family ties to China, who can use their insider access to corporate networks 
to steal secrets using removable media and devices or e-mail.  China is using its cyber 
 
4 
 
capabilities to support intelligence collection against the U.S. national, diplomatic, 
economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense 
program. China very likely uses its intelligence services and employees or other illicit 
approaches that violate U.S. laws and export controls to obtain key national security 
and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials 
unobtainable through other means.  In 2015, numerous computer systems around the 
world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, continued to be targeted for 
intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to China’s Government and 
military. These and past intrusions were focused on accessing networks and exfiltrating 
information. China uses state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to increase 
the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, 
development, and acquisition.  
 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 A person who applies for access to classified information seeks to enter into a 
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
 
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grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall 
be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the 
loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B - Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Four are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology;  
 
 
6 
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(f)  substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could 
subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation or personal conflict of interest. 
 
           Applicant’s foreign family member includes his father-in-law who is a citizen and 
resident of Taiwan, part of China. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying 
conditions. 
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
  
 Having considered the fact that Taiwan and China present a heightened risk to 
the national security of the U.S., the nature of the relationships with Applicant’s family 
there do not pose a security risk.  Applicant has only limited and casual contact with his 
extended family in Taiwan/China.  Applicant is an American citizen.  He resides with his 
spouse, who is from Taiwan, but she too is ingrained into the American culture, and 
simply awaiting to be eligible to become a citizen.  There is nothing in the record to 
show that these foreign contacts pose a heightened risk of foreign influence.  Full 
mitigation under AG ¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c), has been established. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under 
Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
There is compelling evidence showing that Applicant’s wife’s family in Taiwan do 
not pose a heightened risk of foreign influence.  It is noted that Taiwan, as part of China, 
continues to act as one of the most active, aggressive and capable collectors of 
intelligence targeting the U.S.  However, there is sufficient information in this record to 
prove that Applicant’s casual connections with his father-in-law in Taiwan do not pose a 
security risk. Everything the Applicant has was given to him by the U.S., including his 
job and his education.  Applicant acknowledges that he has much to loose if he were to 
allow Taiwan or anyone related to that country to influence his decision making.  
Applicant and his wife have made the U.S. their permanent home, they are encouraged 
by his wife’s father to pursue the American dream, and they have no intention of ever 
returning to Taiwan to retire.  Applicant’s wife plans to become a naturalized citizen as 
soon as she is eligible and she will renounce her Taiwanese citizenship.  Applicant’s 
relationship with Taiwan does not subject him to foreign influence that could cause him 
to make decisions that are against the national interests.     
   
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Influence security concern.    
 
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:    For Applicant 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility 
for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
 
Darlene Lokey Anderson 
Administrative Judge