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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                  
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS                               
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 17-03749 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Tara R. Karoian, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
 
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Decision 
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DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant mitigated the foreign preference security concerns related to his use of 
a foreign passport. He did not mitigate the foreign influence security concerns arising from 
his family connections in Turkey. Based upon a review of the record as a whole, national 
security eligibility for access to classified information is denied.  
 
History of Case 
 
On March 21, 2016, Applicant submitted an electronic questionnaire for 
investigations processing (e-QIP). On November 15, 2017, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) detailing security concerns under Guidelines C (Foreign Preference) and B 
(Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines effective 
within the DOD on June 8, 2017.  
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant answered the SOR on December 22, 2017, and requested his case be 
decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a hearing. (Item 2) On 
April 24, 2018, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case. A 
complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM), containing six Items, was mailed 
to Applicant and received by him on May 14, 2018. The FORM notified Applicant that he 
had an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or 
mitigation within 30 days of receipt of the FORM.  
 
 Applicant did not submit material in refutation or file objections to the Department’s 
evidence.  Items 1 through 5 are admitted into evidence. On July 30, 2018, the Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals assigned the case to me. 
 
I took administrative notice of the facts concerning Turkey that are set forth in the 
Government’s Request for Administrative Notice, which is marked as Item 6 and included 
in the record.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted all allegations in the SOR. Those admissions are incorporated 
into the following findings of fact:  
 
 Applicant was born in Turkey in 1983. He immigrated to the United States in 1998, 
at age 15, and lived with his parents, who previously immigrated here from Turkey.  He 
graduated from high school in 2007 and became a U.S. citizen in 2008. He subsequently 
worked for his father’s business and owned two restaurants in the United States. (Item 3, 
Item 4)    
 
 In 2011, Applicant married his wife in Turkey. She is a citizen and resident of 
Turkey. After their marriage, he brought his wife to the United States. She had difficulty 
adjusting to life in the United States, and they returned to Turkey in 2012. In 2013, his 
daughter was born in Turkey. She is a dual citizen of Turkey and the United States. 
Applicant subsequently returned to the United States without his wife or daughter. He and 
his wife divorced in 2015 through the Turkish court.1  
 
 Upon his divorce, the Turkish court ordered Applicant to pay $500 a month for 
alimony and child support. In order to facilitate those payments, Applicant opened a bank 
account in Turkey. He maintains about $500 in it. Applicant travels to Turkey every six 
months to see his daughter. (Item 2)  
 
                                            
1 Appellant’s Answer, e-QIP, and Counterintelligence-Focused Security Screening Questionnaire contain 
inconsistences regarding the following dates: the date of Applicant’s marriage in Turkey; the date 
he and his wife returned to the United States after their marriage; the date on which they went 
back to Turkey after the marriage; and the length of time he remained in Turkey with his wife and 
child before he returned to the United States alone. 
 
 
 
 
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 After moving back to Turkey in 2012, Applicant provided consulting services to a 
relative’s restaurant business in Turkey until 2017. While working there, he paid into the 
Turkish social security agency and a health insurance plan. Appellant remained on his 
relative’s payroll after he returned to the United States for a year or two, although he 
provided minimal services. Applicant wanted to continue contributing into social security 
and an insurance health plan for his wife and daughter in Turkey. (Item 2)  
 
 Applicant has retained Turkish citizenship since becoming a U.S. citizen in 2008. 
He renewed his Turkish passport in 2013, and it will expire in 2019. He said that each 
time he enters or exits “Turkey or the United States . . . I hand both of my passports to 
the officials to be on the safe side.” (Item 2) He traveled to Turkey 16 times subsequent 
to becoming a U.S. citizen. He used his Turkish passport to avoid travel fees in and out 
of Turkey. (Item 2, Item 3) During a May 2017 interview, he said he relinquished his 
Turkish passport to his employer. (Item 5)  In his November 2017 Answer he said he 
would relinquish his Turkish citizenship and passport, if it prevents him from obtaining a 
security clearance. (Item 2)  
 
 Applicant’s parents were born in Turkey. They are dual citizens of Turkey and the 
United States. They resided in the United States from at least 1998 until 2017, when they 
returned to Turkey to retire. There is no information regarding how often Applicant is in 
contact with them. (Item 2, Item 4) Applicant has two siblings who were born in Turkey. 
Both his sister and brother are U.S. citizens and residents. (Item 3)  
 
 Applicant’s maternal grandparents are citizens and residents of Turkey. (Item 2) 
His uncle is a citizen and resident of Turkey. He was conscripted into military service and 
served until he retired. Applicant has annual contact with these relatives. The last time he 
had contact with his uncle was in-person in 2017. (Item 3, Item 4) 
       
Turkey 
 
 I take administrative notice of the following facts: Turkey is a constitutional republic 
with a multiparty parliamentary system. The president’s powers are not precisely defined 
and his influence depends on his personality and political weight. Its citizens and 
foreigners have been targeted by domestic and transnational terrorist groups for many 
years. There have been terrorist bombings in the past five years resulting in deaths. The 
targets have been religious, government, political, tourist, and business locations 
throughout the country. In addition, leftist and Islamic terrorist groups have targeted U.S. 
and Western interests. The potential for future terrorist attacks remains high. Its judiciary 
is declared to be independent, but is in need of reform. There are significant human rights 
abuses with respect to detainees and personal freedoms. The U.S. State Department 
warns citizens to reconsider travel to Turkey due to the presence of terrorism. (Item 1) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility, the administrative judge 
must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory 
 
 
 
 
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explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s national security eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶¶ 2(b) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of 
variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider 
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere 
speculation or conjecture. 
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant 
is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who applies for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants eligibility 
for access to classified information or assignment in sensitive duties. Decisions include, 
by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or 
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a 
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk 
of compromise of classified information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides, “Any determination under this order adverse to 
an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense 
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, 
Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive 
information).   
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concerns regarding foreign influence:  
 
 
 
 
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Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism.  
 
AG ¶ 7 sets out conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case. Three are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;2  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual’s 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology; and 
 
(f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, 
or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the 
individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal 
conflict of interest. 
 
Although Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliamentary system, 
it engages in human rights violations and there is a substantial risk of injury due to the 
activities of terrorists. U.S. citizens are warned about traveling there. These facts place a 
significant burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his ongoing 
connections and relationships with family members, who are resident citizens of Turkey, 
do not create a heightened risk of foreign influence or pose a security risk. Applicant 
offered insufficient evidence to the contrary with respect to those relationships. Applicant 
owns a bank account in Turkey that generally has a $500 balance in it. From 
                                            
2The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, 
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant 
has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and 
could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
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approximately 2012 to 2017, Applicant provided professional services to a relative in 
Turkey. The evidence is sufficient to raise security concerns under AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 
7(f) shifting the burden to Applicant to prove mitigation.  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns. 
Those with potential application in mitigating the security concerns in this case are: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest;  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely that he could be placed in a position 
of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government, and those 
of the United States as a consequence of ongoing and long-term relationships with his 
daughter, parents, grandparents, and uncle, who are citizens and residents of Turkey. In 
fact, he has frequently traveled to Turkey since becoming a U.S. citizen in 2008. After the 
birth of his daughter in 2013, he visits her every six months, further indicating his close 
and ongoing connections to his family. He also maintains some contact with his uncle, a 
retired member of the Turkish military. There is insufficient evidence demonstrating that 
Applicant has deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, such 
that if any conflict of interest arose involving his family members in Turkey, especially his 
daughter, Applicant could be expected to resolve it in favor of U.S. interests. Accordingly, 
Applicant failed to establish mitigation with respect to those relationships under AG ¶¶ 
8(a), (b), or (c). 
 
 Applicant maintains a small amount of money in a bank account in order to facilitate 
child support and alimony payments. As of 2017, he no longer contributes into the Turkish 
government’s benefit programs through his relative’s business. He established mitigation 
under AG ¶ 8(f) as to the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.d and 2.e. 
 
 
 
 
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Guideline C: Foreign Preference 
 
AG ¶ 9 sets out the foreign preference security concerns: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United 
States. Foreign involvement raises concerns about an individual's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S. 
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By itself; the fact 
that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not disqualifying 
without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at concealment. 
The same is true for a U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or privilege of 
foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain recognition of a 
foreign citizenship. 
 
AG ¶ 10 lists the conditions that could raise a security concern under this guideline. 
One may be disqualifying in this case:  
 
(c) failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the U.S. 
 
 Since becoming a U.S. citizen in 2008, Applicant presented both his Turkish and 
U.S. passports to officials when exiting and entering the United States and Turkey. In May 
2017, he relinquished his Turkish passport to his employer. There is insufficient evidence 
to establish the above disqualifying condition. This guideline is found in Applicant’s favor. 
A discussion of mitigating conditions is not necessary. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct 
and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
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According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security 
eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant has been a naturalized U.S. 
citizen since 2008 and maintains strong connections to Turkey. There is no evidence or 
allegation that he has ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the United 
States. However, his ongoing relationships with close relatives, especially his young 
daughter, who are resident citizens of Turkey, create significant and ongoing potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress.  
 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all other facts and 
circumstances in the context of the whole-person, I conclude Applicant did not meet his 
burden to mitigate the foreign influence security concerns raised by the facts of this case. 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with substantial questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:       For Applicant 
   
Paragraph 2, Guideline B:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a to 2.c:       Against Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 2.d and 2.e:      For Applicant 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for 
access to classified information. National security eligibility is denied. 
                                        
________________ 
 
 
 
 
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SHARI DAM 
Administrative Judge