KEYWORD: Guideline E; Guideline F
DIGEST: A falsification, even in the face of an applicant’s denial of such conduct, can be
established through circumstantial evidence.  Additionally, we are required to give deference to a
Judge’s credibility determinations.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.  From our review of the record, the
Judge’s material findings about the falsification allegation are supported by substantial record
evidence. Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 17-01047.a1
DATE: 12/10/2018
DATE: December 10, 2018
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 17-01047
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Ryan C. Nerney, Esq.
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On May
24, 2017, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and Guideline E
(Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended)
(Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On September 27, 2018, after the hearing, Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason denied Applicant’s
request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  The Judge’s favorable findings under Guideline F were not
raised as an issue on appeal.  Consistent with the following, we affirm.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact  
Applicant has held a security clearance since 2010.   The SOR alleged that she falsified her
October 2015 security clearance application (SCA) by failing to disclose two delinquent debts.  In
2009, she filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a discharge of over $92,000 in unsecured debts
the following year.  She disclosed that bankruptcy in her 2015 SCA, but did not disclose a charged-
off debt for about $13,000 and a collection account for about $2,800. 
The collection account was the result of a landlord imposing a charge in 2013 for Applicant
breaking an apartment lease.  In a 2014 background interview, she stated that she was not aware of
that charge until a collection agency had contacted her a couple of months earlier.  She made two
small payments toward that debt.  In September 2015, the landlord filed a collection action against
her.  She claimed she did not know about the collection action when she filled out the SCA about
a month later.  She settled the debt in July 2016.
The charged-off account is an automobile debt that became delinquent in 2014 and was
charged off in March 2015.  In 2013, Applicant attempted to sell the car.  The buyer made a payment
to the auto company.  Initially the company reported the payment cleared but later reported it was
returned for insufficient funds.  She filed a report with the police.  In 2015, the car was recovered
and Applicant was informed the car would be sold at auction and she would be responsible for any
deficiency.  In her 2016 background interview, she stated the car was sold and she owed a deficiency
of about $13,000.  She considered the matter resolved and decided not to make any more payments
for a car she no longer possessed.  
Applicant’s program manager and a coworker attested to her dependability and reliability.
She also presented character evidence that she is an active member in her church.  
The Judge’s Analysis
Applicant claimed the omission of the two debts from her October 2015 SCA was
unintentional because she was only thinking about the bankruptcy when she filled out that
application.  The Judge concluded that Applicant knew of the existence of both delinquent debts
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when she filled out her SCA.  The Judge stated that her oversight explanation was not credible
because of the size of the charged-off auto debt and her interactions with the auto company,
insurance company, and police in late 2012 and 2013 regarding that debt.  While Applicant may not
have known the rental collection debt was sold to a collection company, she knew she owed money
for breaking the lease in 2013.  This falsification continues to cast doubt on her trustworthiness and
judgment.   
Discussion
Applicant contends that her omission of the delinquent debts on her SCA was unintentional
and, in making that argument, points out that she disclosed in that document her previous bankruptcy
and discussed the omissions during a background interview.  We note that Applicant has not
challenged any of the Judge’s specific findings of fact pertaining to the falsification allegation.  A
falsification, even in the face of an applicant’s denial of such conduct, can be established through
circumstantial evidence.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 00-0044 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 22, 2000). 
Additionally, we are required to give deference to a Judge’s credibility determinations.  Directive
¶ E3.1.32.1.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 16-01077 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 25, 2018).  From our review
of the record, the Judge’s material findings about the falsification allegation are supported by
substantial record evidence.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 17-02145 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 10, 2018). 
Applicant failed to establish that the Judge erred in concluding that she falsified her SCA. 
Applicant also contends that the Judge did not consider or properly weigh all relevant
evidence.  For example, she argues the Judge did not consider evidence regarding her honesty and
integrity or the steps she has take to prevent such omissions in the future.  Her arguments, however, 
are neither enough to rebut the presumption that the Judge considered all of the record evidence nor
sufficient to show that the Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 15-01717 at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2017).   We further
conclude the Judge considered the totality of the evidence in compliance with the whole-person
analysis requirements.  See Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2. 
The Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the
decision.  The decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  See also Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b):  “Any doubt
concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor 
of the national security.”
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Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Ra’anan             
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Charles C. Hale                
Charles C. Hale
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy                  
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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