1 
        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
)
) ISCR Case No. 17-01673 
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Gatha Manns, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Phoenix S. Ayotte, Esq. 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
GARCIA, Candace Le’i, Administrative Judge: 
Applicant mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. Eligibility for access 
to classified information is granted.  
Statement of the Case 
On June 28, 2017, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline B (foreign 
influence). The action was taken under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines 
(AG) implemented by DOD on June 8, 2017. 
Applicant responded to the SOR on July 28, 2017, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on November 2, 2017. 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on 
April 25, 2018, scheduling the hearing for June 7, 2018.  
01/09/2019
 
2 
 
I convened the hearing as scheduled. The Government’s exhibit list, discovery 
letter, and administrative notice request, as well as Applicant’s exhibit list and 
memorandum were appended to the record as Hearing Exhibits (HE) I, II, III, IV, and V, 
respectively. Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 were admitted in evidence without 
objection. Applicant testified, called one witness, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits 
(AE) A through F, which I admitted in evidence without objection. At Applicant’s request, 
I kept the record open until June 21, 2018. Applicant did not submit additional 
documentation by that date. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on June 15, 
2018.1 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
Applicant admitted all of the SOR allegations. She is a 41-year-old, native-born 
U.S. citizen and resident. She obtained bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 1999 and 
2003, respectively. She is married. She has three minor children; all are native-born 
U.S. citizens. She and her husband have owned their home in the United States since 
July 2004.2        
 
  Applicant has worked for her current employer, a DOD contractor, since late 
2017. She worked for previous DOD contractors since 2004. She has held a security 
clearance since approximately 2008.3 
 
Applicant’s husband is 44 years old. He was born in Pakistan. He immigrated to 
the United States on a student visa in 2001, at age 24. He and his family in Pakistan are 
religious minorities, and he sought to escape the turmoil in Pakistan. He does not intend 
to return to Pakistan to live.4 
 
Applicant met her husband online in 2003; she married him later that year. At the 
time, he was in the United States in transition from a student to a work visa, and she 
was working full time and pursuing her master’s degree. He became a naturalized U.S. 
citizen in 2009 and he holds a U.S. passport. His Pakistani passport expired in 2009, he 
has not since renewed it, and he has no intentions of doing so in the future.5 
 
Applicant’s mother-in-law died in 2011. Her father-in-law, brother-in-law, and one 
sister-in-law are citizens and residents of Pakistan, and her second sister-in-law is a 
Pakistani citizen residing in Canada. Both Applicant and her husband testified that none 
of the family in Pakistan is affiliated with the Pakistani government or military. 
                                                          
1 Tr. at 10-18, 64, 89-90. 
 
2 Applicant’s response to the SOR; Tr. at 18-35, 48, 64-79; AE A. 
 
3 Tr. at 7-8, 65-79; GE 1, 2; AE B. 
 
4 Tr. at 20-89; GE 1, 2, 3. 
 
5 Tr. at 20-89; GE 1, 2, 3. 
 
3 
 
Applicant’s father-in-law is 75 years old. He lives in a rental property in an affluent 
neighborhood that is protected by a guard. He works for a private company.6  
 
Applicant communicates with her father-in-law telephonically once every two to 
three months. She described her husband’s relationship with his father as a close one. 
Her husband talks to his father two to three times weekly. Applicant and her husband 
visited and stayed with her father-in-law in Pakistan for three weeks in 2006. They did a 
few tourist activities but primarily stayed close to her father-in-law’s neighborhood. Her 
father-in-law kept their passports in a locked safe and made sure they were with his 
driver-bodyguard anytime they left his neighborhood. Applicant has not since returned 
to Pakistan and she does not intend to in the future, primarily because she received her 
security clearance but also because her father-in-law advised against it given the 
political climate there.7  
 
Applicant’s husband and children have since traveled to Pakistan. They travel to 
Pakistan every year to visit his father. They travel on their U.S. passports. As of the date 
of the hearing, Applicant’s husband last traveled there in April 2017. He has no intention 
of visiting Pakistan once his father, sister, and sister’s children no longer live there. For 
two weeks each in 2016 and 2017, Applicant’s father-in-law visited and stayed with 
Applicant and her family in the United States. He was scheduled to revisit them in June 
2018. Through the sponsorship of Applicant’s husband, Applicant’s father-in-law 
obtained a green card in 2016. He intends to move to the United States and live with 
Applicant and her husband once her sister-in-law is approved to immigrate to Canada, 
as further discussed below.8 
  
Applicant’s one sister-in-law is a Pakistani citizen residing in Pakistan.  She is 41 
years old. She is widowed, as her husband died in 2011, and she has two children. She 
is a teacher in a private elementary school. Applicant’s husband sends his sister $200 
monthly, and he talks to her and her children two to three times weekly to biweekly. 
Applicant communicates with this sister-in-law telephonically twice yearly, primarily 
during the holidays, in which they discuss their children or the health of Applicant’s 
father-in-law. Aside from meeting this sister-in-law’s eldest child once, in 2006, 
Applicant does not have any contact with this sister-in-law’s children. As of the hearing 
date, this sister-in-law was in the process of trying to immigrate to Canada. Applicant 
expected that this sister-in-law would be approved to immigrate to Canada by the end of 
2019.9  
 
Applicant’s brother-in-law is 37 years old. Applicant met her brother-in-law when 
she visited Pakistan in 2006. Since then, their sole contact was electronically once or 
twice between 2007 and 2008. Applicant testified that her husband’s family fell out of 
                                                          
6 Tr. at 20-89; GE 1, 2, 3; AE F. 
 
7 Tr. at 20-89; GE 2, 3. 
 
8 Tr. at 20-89; GE 3. 
 
9 Tr. at 20-64, 71-89; GE 3. 
 
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touch with her brother-in-law. Applicant’s husband testified that his father talks to his 
brother once in a while. He also testified that he had not seen or heard from his brother 
since around 2010, stating that “we have no connection.” He testified that his brother is 
married to a Pakistani and they have one minor child. He also testified that he was 
unaware what his brother did for a living and whether he intended to remain in 
Pakistan.10 
 
Applicant’s other sister-in-law is 38 years old. She is married and she has two 
minor children. This sister-in-law and her husband are Pakistani citizens residing in 
Canada. This sister-in-law immigrated to Canada in 2016, and she is in the process of 
becoming a Canadian citizen. She works in office administration, and her husband is 
attempting to start his own business. Since Applicant’s sister-in-law moved to Canada, 
they talk to each other telephonically or electronically once every two to three months, 
primarily about their children. Prior to that, when Applicant’s sister-in-law resided in 
Pakistan, they communicated minimally. Applicant’s sister-in-law visited Applicant and 
her family in the United States when she received her Canadian permanent residency 
and again in 2017. Applicant has never met or communicated with her sister-in-law’s 
husband.11 
 
Applicant’s assets in the United States, to include their home, total approximately 
$400,000, which does not include her children’s savings accounts that are held by her 
parents. Applicant’s husband received money from his father three times: (1) his father 
paid for the costs associated with his move to the United States; (2) his father gave him 
money when he immigrated to the United States; and (3) when his father sold the family 
home in Pakistan in 2015, the proceeds of the sale were divided among Applicant’s 
husband and his three siblings, and Applicant’s husband’s portion was $40,000. 
Applicant’s husband put the $40,000 in a bank account in his name in Pakistan, and 
gave his father a power of attorney over the account in the event his father would need 
the money. If Applicant’s father-in-law does not need the money before he moves to the 
United States, Applicant’s husband intends to transfer the money to the United States. 
Aside from the money he sends to his sister-in-law in Pakistan, Applicant’s husband 
also sends $1,000 monthly to a charity in Pakistan that is run by his cousin, which 
supports orphan children in schools. Neither Applicant nor her husband have any other 
foreign financial interests.12 
 
Applicant testified that her husband is aware that she holds a security clearance, 
but her foreign family members are not. She testified that neither he nor her foreign 
family members are aware about the specific nature of her work, as she does not 
discuss it with anyone. He is aware that her work is affiliated with the DOD. She testified 
that she has always been compliant with annual security training requirements, and she 
reported her 2006 trip to Pakistan in accordance with such requirements. Both she and 
her husband testified that they would report to the proper authorities any attempts by 
                                                          
10 Tr. at 20-89; GE 3. 
 
11 Tr. at 20-64, 71-89; GE 3. 
 
12 Tr. at 20-89; GE 1, 2, 3. 
 
5 
 
anyone to obtain information about her or the nature of her work. She indicated that she 
is loyal and bears a sense of allegiance and obligation only to the United States, and 
she would resolve any conflict in favor of the United States.13 
 
Applicant’s parents are native-born U.S. citizens. They are retired farmers, and 
her mother is also a retired registered nurse. Her father served in the U.S. military for 
two years. Applicant and her family are heavily involved in their community. Her children 
participate in Girl Scouts, and dance and swim lessons. A number of character 
references, to include members in her community, described her as honest and 
trustworthy. Her direct supervisor noted that she is the consummate professional, and 
that he had no reason to question her loyalty, integrity, or commitment to the United 
States.14 
 
Pakistan  
 
The U.S. State Department warns U.S. citizens against all non-essential travel to 
Pakistan. Travel by U.S. Government personnel within Pakistan is restricted. Terrorist 
groups continue to pose a danger to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan, and evidence 
suggests that some victims of terrorist activity were targeted because they are 
Americans. Although al-Qaida in Pakistan has been degraded, its global leadership 
continued to operate from remote locations in the region that the group has historically 
exploited for safe haven. Pakistan did not take substantial action against the Afghan 
Taliban or Haqqani Network, or substantially limit their ability to threaten U.S. interests 
in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also not taken sufficient action against other externally-
focused groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in 2016, which 
continued to operate, train, organize, and fundraise in Pakistan.  
 
 The U.S. State Department’s 2016 Human Rights Report for Pakistan indicates 
that the most serious human rights problems in Pakistan were the following: (1) 
extrajudicial and targeted killings; (2) disappearances; (3) torture; (4) lack of rule of law; 
(5) gender inequality; and (6) sectarian violence. Other human rights problems included 
arbitrary detention, governmental infringement on citizens’ privacy rights, a weak 
criminal justice system, and a lack of judicial independence. There were government 
restrictions on freedom of assembly and limits on freedom of movement. Government 
practices and certain laws limited freedom of religion, particularly for religious minorities. 
Corruption within the government and police, as well as discrimination against women 
and girls remained serious problems. Societal discrimination against national, ethnic, 
and racial minorities persisted, as did discrimination based on caste, sexual orientation, 
and gender identity. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Tr. at 20-35, 67-89; GE 3; AE D. 
 
14 Tr. at 35, 65-68; AE C, E. 
 
6 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Section 7 of Exec. Or. 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms 
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also Exec. Or. 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6:       
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. The following are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; and 
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, 
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s 
family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an 
authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the 
government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the 
United States. In considering the nature of the government, an administrative judge 
must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. See generally ISCR 
Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing decision to grant 
clearance where administrative judge did not consider terrorist activity in area where 
family members resided). 
 
8 
 
AG ¶ 7(a) requires substantial evidence of a “heightened risk.” The 
“heightened risk” required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively 
low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in 
having a family member living under a foreign government.  
 
Applicant’s father-in-law, one sister-in-law, and brother-in-law are Pakistani 
citizens residing in Pakistan. Applicant met her brother-in-law once in 2006 in Pakistan 
and she last communicated with him in 2008. Applicant’s husband last communicated 
with his brother in 2010, and he does not have a relationship with his brother. However, 
both Applicant and her husband maintain close contact with Applicant’s father-in-law 
and sister-in-law in Pakistan, and Applicant’s father-in-law maintains contact with 
Applicant’s brother-in-law. As such, AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) apply to SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 
1.b, and 1.c.  
 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following is 
potentially applicable: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which  
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Pakistan. Accordingly, AG ¶ 
8(a) is not established for the reasons set out in the above discussion of AG ¶¶ 7(a), 
7(b), and 7(e).   
 
While Applicant only visited her in-laws in Pakistan in 2006, her father-in-law has 
visited her and her family in the United States as recently as 2016 and 2017. In 
addition, her husband and their children have visited her father-in-law and sister-in-law 
in Pakistan at least once yearly since 2006. Applicant and her husband also maintain 
regular contact with her father-in-law and sister-in-law. AG ¶ 8(c) is not established for 
SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b. As discussed above, however, Applicant only met her brother-in-
law once in 2006 and she last communicated with him in 2008. Applicant’s husband last 
communicated with his brother in 2010, and he does not have a relationship with his 
brother. As such, AG ¶ 8(c) is established for SOR ¶ 1.c. 
 
9 
 
Applicant is a native-born U.S. citizen. She has lived in the United States her 
entire life. She obtained her education in the United States. She has worked for 
various DOD contractors since 2004. Her assets in the United States total 
approximately $400,000. While her husband has $40,000 in a bank account in 
Pakistan, and sends money to his sister as well as a charity owned by his cousin in 
Pakistan, they do not have any other foreign financial interests or any expectation of 
inheriting any such interests. He plans on transferring the $40,000 to the United States 
once his father moves to the United States, and his sister is in the process of moving 
to Canada. AG ¶ 8(b) is established. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person 
analysis. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under this 
guidelines, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I 
conclude Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence security concerns. Accordingly, I 
conclude she has carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to grant her eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:     FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.c:     For Applicant 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
________________________ 
Candace Le’i Garcia 
Administrative Judge