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      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
     DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 17-04151 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Tara Karoian, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant has mitigated foreign influence concerns raised by his grandmother, who is a 
citizen of and resident in Iran; as well as the concerns raised by his mother, who is a 
dual citizen of the United States and Iran and travels to Iran to care for Applicant’s 
grandmother. His request for a security clearance is granted. 
Statement of Case 
On September 26, 2016, Applicant submitted a security clearance application 
(SF 86). On March 5, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DoD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing security 
concerns under Guideline B for foreign influence. The SOR further informed Applicant 
that, based on information available to the Government, DoD adjudicators could not 
make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest 
to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. 
01/15/2019
 
 
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 Applicant answered the SOR on April 5, 2018, and April 17, 2018 (Answer), and 
requested that his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record 
without a hearing. (Item 1.) On September 7, 2018, Department Counsel submitted the 
Government’s written case. A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM), 
containing six Items, was received by him on September 12, 2018. The FORM notified 
Applicant that he had an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, 
extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. On October 10, 
2018, he submitted an 11-page response to the FORM (Reply). He did not object to any 
of the Items. On January 8, 2019, the case was assigned to me. Items 1 through 6 and 
the Reply are admitted into evidence, without objection.  
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 The Government and Applicant both requested I take administrative notice of 
certain facts relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). Department Counsel provided 
a seven-page summary of the facts, supported by 16 Government documents pertaining 
to Iran, marked as Item 6. The documents provide elaboration and context for the 
summary. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government 
reports. They are limited to matters of general knowledge and not subject to reasonable 
dispute. They are set out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact  
 
 Applicant denied SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b. The facts are as follows: 
 
 Applicant is 27 years old. He is unmarried, and has a minor child. Applicant was 
born in Iran and immigrated to the United States in 2006, at the age of 15. He graduated 
from a U.S. high school. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in October 2011. He 
earned a bachelor’s degree in 2016 from a U.S. university. He has not visited Iran since 
2007. He does not hold an Iranian passport and has “no loyalty or care for the 
government of Iran nor do[es he] have any interest in the country of Iran.” (Answer; Item 
3; Item 4.) 
 
 Applicant’s brother, uncles, aunts, cousins, and his mother are all naturalized 
citizens of the United States. Applicant’s daughter is a natural born citizen of the United 
States. (Answer; Item 4.) Applicant has no contact with his father or stepsisters, who are 
citizens and residents of Iran, since 2007. Applicant indicated that “all of my family 
members including myself are strongly opposed to the Islamic government of Iran.” 
(Reply.)  
 
 Applicant’s mother is a dual citizen of the United States and Iran. She immigrated 
to the United States with Applicant in 2006 and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 
2012. His mother travels to Iran annually to assist her ailing mother. Most recently, she 
resided in Iran for about a year between 2016 and 2017, and then returned to the 
United States. After his grandmother’s impending passing, Applicant’s mother will 
 
 
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remain wholly in the United States. Applicant has little contact with his mother when she 
is in Iran. He does not discuss the details of his job with her even when she is in the 
United States. (Item 4; Reply.) 
 
 Applicant’s maternal grandfather is deceased. Applicant’s maternal grandmother 
remains a citizen and resident of Iran. She is 92 years old and was a homemaker. She 
previously held legal permanent resident status in the United States, but has not been 
able to travel to the United States due to her health. She is in failing health and cannot 
travel to the United States due to her condition. Applicant communicates with her a few 
times each year. (Item 4; Item 5; Reply.)  
 
 None of Applicant’s family members have ever been employed by a foreign 
government or military. He has no foreign assets. Applicant’s only foreign travel in the 
past ten years was for a vacation in Mexico. (Item 5.)  
 
 Applicant is considered an “exemplary contributor as an engineer and innovator” 
by his manager. He is considered to be among the best and brightest in his line of work 
and is a valuable asset to his employer. (Reply.) 
 
Iran 
 
 Iran is an authoritarian state in which a theocratic religious scholar, the Supreme 
Leader, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts, a popularly elected 86-member 
body of clerics. Iran has been considered to be a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the 
United States since 1984. Iran provides financial aid, advanced weapons and tactics, 
and directions to militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East. Citizens of Iran 
are currently barred from entry into the United States, with certain exceptions. The 
United States has imposed sanctions on Iran for its nuclear-related activities.  
 
 The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran and warns U.S. 
citizens not to travel to Iran due to risks of arbitrary detention and imprisonment. Human 
rights concerns include: illegal detention in unofficial holding facilities; torture and 
coerced confessions; and detention and harassment of journalists, lawyers, writers, 
bloggers, dissidents, and others whose actions are deemed unacceptable. There is a 
lack of due process and individuals have limited forms of redress against official abuse. 
Visitors may be placed under surveillance and may be searched without knowledge or 
consent.  
 
 Iran has targeted the United States and leverages cyber espionage, propaganda, 
and attacks to support its security priorities. Iran has been identified by the U.S. Director 
of National Intelligence as one of the greatest cyber threats to the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious 
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the 
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology. 
 
  Applicant’s grandmother is a citizen and resident of Iran. His mother is a dual 
U.S. and Iranian citizen and travels to Iran frequently. There is an articulated heightened 
risk associated with having relationships with family members in or tied to Iran, due to 
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its attempted nuclear proliferation, its cyber threat, and 
the persistent human rights abuses present there. The evidence is sufficient to raise 
these disqualifying conditions.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
 
 
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longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest. 
 
 Applicant’s emotional bonds to his relatives in Iran have decreased since he left 
Iran at the age of 15 and moved to the United States. His bonds with his immediate and 
extended family in the United States have strengthened his ties here. He attended high 
school in the United States. He earned a bachelor’s degree at a U.S. university. He has 
adapted to the American way of life and plans to remain in the United States. His 
daughter is solely an American citizen. His ties to his 92-year-old grandmother are 
diminished. He contacts her infrequently. She is ill and once she has passed, 
Applicant’s mother will not return to Iran. Applicant has little contact with his mother 
when she is in Iran. Further even when she is in the United States, he does not discuss 
his work with her. He demonstrated sufficient relationships with the United States, which 
outweigh any risks associated with his mother or grandmother. AG ¶ 8(b) provides 
mitigation. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility 
for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept. Applicant’s 
personal property and investments are located in the United States. He has adopted the 
American way of life and considers himself a true American with full loyalty only to the 
United States. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light 
of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me without doubt as to Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance. 
He met his burden to mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for 
foreign influence. 
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:        FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility 
and a security clearance. National security eligibility is granted. 
 
                                                   
 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge