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        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE        
 DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS          
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-00041 
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Allison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge: 
Applicant mitigated the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns. 
National security eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
History of Case 
On January 26, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security 
concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse).  
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on February 27, 2018 (Answer), and 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to another administrative judge on August 3, 2018, 
and reassigned it me on October 3, 2018. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on October 
18, 2018, setting the hearing for November 7, 2018. Department Counsel offered 
Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4 into evidence. All exhibits were admitted without 
objection. Applicant testified but did not offer any exhibits. DOHA received the hearing 
transcript (Tr.) on November 16, 2018. The record remained open until December 14, 
2018, to give Applicant an opportunity to provide exhibits. He timely submitted six 
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documents that I marked as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through F. Department Counsel 
did not object to them, and they are admitted into evidence. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in ¶¶ 1.a through 1.e. 
He denied the allegation in ¶ 1.f. His admissions are incorporated into these findings. 
 
 Applicant is 27 years old and recently engaged. After graduating from high school 
in 2009, he enlisted in the U.S. Army. He served on active duty for four years and in the 
Army Reserve for one year, until 2014, when he was honorably discharged as an E-4. 
While serving, he deployed to the Middle East from July 2012 to April 2013. He received 
a Purple Heart, a Good Conduct Medal, and an Army Commendation Medal during his 
service. He was granted a Top Secret security clearance in 2009 after entering the Army. 
After leaving the Army, he attended college fulltime from 2013 to 2014. (Tr. 15-18, 21, 23)  
 
 After college, Applicant worked in private industry. In May 2015, he started his 
current position with a defense contractor. His performance evaluations have been good 
and resulted in merit pay increases. His fiancé is aware of this proceeding and the 
underlying security concerns. (Tr. 18-20) 
 
 In April 2015, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA). In it, he 
disclosed that he had used marijuana and cocaine. (GE 2) During an investigative 
interview in October 2016, he discussed more fully his illegal drug use. While testifying 
he stated that he used marijuana less than five times prior to joining the Army in 2009. 
While on active duty, he used marijuana once in September 2012 after he was injured 
and lost two friends in combat. (Tr. 21-23; GE 4)  
 
 After leaving military service, Applicant started working as an electrician for a 
private company for about 18 months. Between November 2014 and January 2015, he 
used marijuana about 15 times and then stopped. (Tr. 22) 
 
 Applicant used cocaine for the first time in May 2012 while he was in Italy and prior 
to deployment. He was with other soldiers at the time. He then used cocaine between five 
and ten times while deployed to the Middle East. He was a machine gunner and ingested 
it to stay awake during long combat missions. He obtained the drugs from a local citizen. 
(Tr. 25-26) 
 
 While in the Middle East, Applicant also purchased and used anabolic steroids for 
one month. He has not used any other illegal substances and has no intention to use 
them in the future. (Tr. 30, 43) 
 
 Applicant denied that he used cocaine after submitting his April 2015 SCA, 
although he stated that he had during his interview. He said that he was confused about 
dates of his usage, but was certain that he did not use illegal substances months before 
starting his current job in April 2015. (Tr. 29-29) 
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant has changed his life since leaving military service. He is engaged and 
purchased a home. He no longer associates with people who use drugs. He spends time 
with his family and is involved in community outreach programs. He has never tested 
positive for drugs. (Tr. 30-31) 
 
 Applicant explained that he also used cocaine to help medicate his post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) that he began suffering during service. After returning to the 
United States from his deployment, he saw a therapist once in 2013. In 2014, he started 
attending a group for veterans who have PTSD that met on his college campus. He went 
to the group weekly for two months. He stopped when he left college. In February 2016, 
he started seeing a psychiatrist who prescribed an antidepressant for PTSD. He took the 
medication for about eight months and then stopped. In October 2017, he saw his primary 
care physician who recommended that he resume taking an antidepressant, which he 
has been doing. He also stays in contact with a person he met at the group therapy 
meetings for support. (Tr. 32-40)   
 
 Applicant submitted two letters of recommendation. Applicant’s former 
Commander for two years wrote that Applicant “was an exceptional performer . . . a great 
teammate, and served his country honorably.” (AE A) Based on his observation of 
Applicant during combat, he has no reservations about Applicant’s ability to handle 
sensitive information. (AE A) A soldier, who served with Applicant, stated that Applicant 
“was a charismatic, dependable, and hard worker, even when faced with adverse 
condition.” (AE B) 
 
 Applicant provided performance evaluations from 2016 and 2017. They document 
his successful work, potential, and good attitude. (AE C, D, E, F) 
 
Policies 
 
This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which were effective 
within the DOD on June 8, 2017.  
  
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the 
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations 
for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating 
conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. 
 
 These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(c) describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire 
process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of 
variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider 
 
 
 
 
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all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or 
conjecture.  
 
 Directive ¶ E3.1.14 requires the Government to present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Directive ¶ E3.1.15 says that an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 A person applying for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national 
security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the 
applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as 
to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information.  
 
 Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “[a]ny determination 
under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national 
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information.) 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse 
 
AG ¶ 24 describes the security concern involving drug involvement and substance 
misuse as follows: 
 
The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of 
prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances 
that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner 
inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an 
individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may 
lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises 
questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations. Controlled substance means any "controlled substance" as 
 
 
 
 
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defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in 
this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. 
 
AG ¶ 25 sets out conditions that could raise a security concern. Three may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) any substance misuse (see above definition);  
 
(c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, 
processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of 
drug paraphernalia; and 
 
(f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or 
holding a sensitive position. 
 
Applicant admitted that he illegally purchased and used marijuana, cocaine, and 
anabolic steroids periodically from October 2007 to January 2015. Some of that time, he 
held a security clearance. The evidence established the above disqualifying conditions. 
 
Conditions that could mitigate drug involvement and substance misuse security 
concerns are provided in AG ¶ 26. The following are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt 
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and 
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance 
misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and 
has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to: 
 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;  
 
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
and 
 
(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future 
involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security 
eligibility. 
 
 The last time Applicant used an illegal substance, marijuana, was in January 2015, 
prior to submitting his April 2015 SCA. He used marijuana once while he was deployed 
to a combat zone after being injured and losing friends. He also used cocaine and 
anabolic steroids during the deployment from 2012 to 2013. He used cocaine to stay 
awake while on missions. His last usage occurred over three years ago and does not cast 
 
 
 
 
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doubt on his current trustworthiness. The evidence establishes mitigation under AG ¶ 
26(a).  
 
Applicant acknowledged his past drug involvement and substance misuse. In early 
2016, he received treatment and medication for PTSD, an underlying cause of his drug 
use. Since October 2017, he has been under the care of his primary care physician for 
his medical issues and has continued to take appropriate medication, as prescribed. He 
no longer associates with people who use illegal drugs and has changed his priorities. He 
emphasized that he has no intention to use illegal drugs in the future, but he did not sign 
a statement confirming his intention. The evidence establishes partial mitigation under 
AG ¶¶ 26(b)(1) and (2), but not under AG ¶ 26(b)(3). 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct 
and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security 
eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guideline H in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 
2(d) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
After observing Applicant’s demeanor and listening to his testimony, I found him 
candid and honest. He disclosed his illegal drug use in his 2015 SCA. While not 
condoning his previous drug abuse, he explained that a significant portion of it occurred 
while deployed to a combat zone. He is now engaged and purchased a house. He is 
addressing his PTSD. He understands the ramifications that future drug misuse could 
have on his employment. Given these factors, letters of recommendation from two 
individuals with whom he served, and the fact that he voluntarily stopped using all illegal 
drugs in January 2015, I do not believe that he will engage in similar conduct in the future. 
 
 
 
 
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Overall, the record no longer raises doubt as to Applicant’s present eligibility and 
suitability for a security clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline H:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
       Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f:      For Applicant 
        
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security to continue Applicant’s access to 
classified information. National security eligibility is granted. 
                                        
 
         
 
SHARI DAM 
Administrative Judge