1 
         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-00148 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Tara R. Karoian, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: John Martinson, Personal Representative 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
COACHER, Robert E., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant mitigated the security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. 
No disqualifying concerns were established under Guideline C, foreign preference. 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance is granted. 
Statement of the Case 
On March 23, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security 
concerns under Guidelines B and C. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (EO) 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance 
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative 
guidelines implemented on June 8, 2017 (AG). 
Applicant answered (Ans.) the SOR on April 26, 2018, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. On September 18, 2018, the case was assigned to me. 
01/31/2019
 
2 
 
 
On October 18, 2018, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified 
Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for November 28, 2018. I convened the 
hearing as scheduled. Government exhibits (GE) 1 through 4 were admitted in evidence 
without objection. The Government’s exhibit list and request for administrative notice 
were marked as hearing exhibits (HE) I and II. Applicant testified and offered exhibits 
(AE) A through C, which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript 
(Tr.) on December 7, 2018. 
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
I took administrative notice of facts concerning Iraq. Department Counsel 
provided supporting documents that verify, detail, and provide context for the requested 
facts. The specific facts noticed are included in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for 
administrative proceedings.1 Usually administrative notice in ISCR proceedings is 
accorded to facts that are either well known or from U.S. Government reports.2  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b-1.e, 
with explanations. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 2.a. His admissions are 
incorporated into the findings of fact. After a thorough and careful review of the 
evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is 35 years old. He was born in Iraq in 1983. He lived there until he 
immigrated to the United States in 2008. He became a U.S. citizen in 2013. In 2006, he 
received his bachelor’s degree from an Iraqi university. He is employed in the private 
sector, but is pursuing a linguist position with a federal contractor, for which he is 
seeking a security clearance. He has never been married and has no children.3 
 
 The SOR alleged that Applicant’s mother, four brothers and his sister are all 
residents and citizens of Afghanistan. It further alleged that one brother works for the 
Iraqi National Police. The SOR also alleged that Applicant has one friend, who is a 
resident and citizen of Iraq, and who is also currently enlisted in the Iraqi Army; and a 
second friend, a resident and citizen of Iraq, who is employed by the Iraqi 
Counterterrorism unit. The SOR alleged that Applicant admitted his allegiance to the 
United States and Iraq was divided to about 50 percent to each country. 
                                                          
1 See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. 
Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
2 See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for 
administrative notice).  
 
3 Tr. at 20, 22, 65, 78; GE 1. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 Applicant was hired locally as a linguist from 2004 to 2008 for U.S. forces in Iraq. 
He provided linguist services at several different locations and for several different 
missions. In approximately 2005, he began working at a police academy providing 
linguistic services to U.S. forces who were training Iraqi police candidates. He later 
transitioned to missions that had him working “outside the wire” providing linguistic 
services to U.S. forces at roadside checkpoints and providing liaison services between 
U.S. forces and local leaders. His work was hazardous. He experienced frequent rocket 
propelled grenade (RPG) attacks from insurgent forces. In approximately 2007, he 
began providing linguistic services at an Iraqi detention facility. At this facility, where 
approximately 20,000 Arabic-speaking detainees were held, Applicant translated 
sensitive written and oral documents for U.S. forces. He was awarded a certificate of 
appreciation from a U.S. Army Military Police Battalion for his work at the detention 
facility.4 
 
 The current status of Applicant’s relatives listed in the SOR is as follows: 
 
 1. Applicant’s mother (M). M is 68 years old and in poor health. She immigrated 
to the United States in 2015. She is a legal resident alien in this country (green card 
holder). She lives with Applicant who provides for her. She is currently visiting Iraq. She 
returned to Iraq in May 2018 to visit her husband’s gravesite (he passed away in 
January 2018). She intended to stay approximately 15 days. She experienced bleeding 
while there and was diagnosed with cancer. Currently, she is undergoing chemotherapy 
and unable to travel. She is staying in the house her husband owned presently occupied 
by her sons and daughter. She intends to return to the United States when she is 
healthy enough to do so. She has no affiliations with the Iraqi government or military.5  
 
 2. Applicant’s four brothers and sister (B1-B4, S1). B1 immigrated to this country 
in 2015 with his mother. He is a legal resident alien (green card holder). He lives with 
Applicant and their mother. He works for a private sector employer. He took his mother 
to Iraq in May 2018, but returned alone after 15 days when she experienced medical 
issues. B2 is a resident and citizen of Iraq. He works for the Iraqi National Police as a 
corrections officer. Applicant has infrequent contact with him, possibly on a quarterly 
basis through social media. B3 is a resident and citizen of Iraq. He is unemployed. He 
has no government or military affiliation. Applicant has contact with him approximately 
twice a year. B4 is a resident and citizen of Iraq. He works in customer service for a 
telecommunication company. He has no government or military affiliations. Applicant 
has quarterly contact with him. S1 is a resident and citizen of Iraq. She is a school 
teacher. Applicant has quarterly contact with her. All of Applicant’s siblings were aware 
of his linguist work for U.S. forces from 2004 to 2008. There were no repercussions as a 
result.6 
                                                          
4 Tr. at 23-25, 28-30, 34-35; Ans. (See attachment). 
 
5 Tr. at 59-64; GE 3. 
 
6 Tr. at 43-51; GE 3. 
 
 
4 
 
 
 3. Applicant’s two friends (F1 and F2). Both F1 and F2 are residents and citizens 
of Iraq. Applicant met them when he was attending college. Applicant’s last contact with 
F1 was in 2016. Applicant knew that F1 was in the Iraqi Army at one time, but now he 
has no idea as to F1’s status. Applicant’s last contact with F2 was in April 2017. He 
knew that F2 was working for an Iraqi counterterrorism unit. At present, Applicant has 
no idea what F2 does for a living.7 
 
 Applicant addressed his apparent statement to a defense investigator in June 
2017 during his background interview. The investigator noted in his report that Applicant 
stated that his allegiance to the two countries was 50 percent each. In March 2018, 
when given a chance to review the investigator’s summarized interview, Applicant 
explained that he meant that he still appreciated the culture, history, and the arts of Iraq, 
however, he has no allegiance to the government of Iraq. His undivided allegiance is to 
the United States as demonstrated by his willingness to put himself in harm’s way while 
working with U.S. forces in Iraq. During his testimony, he reiterated his allegiance to the 
United States, while also explaining that he will always love the history and culture of 
Iraq. He documented that his Iraqi passport expired in 2016 and has not been renewed. 
He has a current U.S. passport that was issued in 2017.8 
 
Character Evidence. 
 
 Applicant supplied character references from four military commanders 
associated with his translator duties from 2007 to 2008. All those commanders noted his 
trustworthiness and other positive character traits that made him a valuable asset. 
Additionally, the Deputy Task Force Commander, a Marine major general, stated that 
Applicant “risked his life in support of Coalition Forces in Iraq while other interpreters 
have been kidnapped, killed, or quit. [Applicant’s] dedication, commitment, and support 
to our cause no doubt saved the lives of American soldiers.”9 
 
Administrative Notice. 
 
 The U.S. State Department warns U.S. citizens against travel to Iraq as travel 
within the country remains dangerous. The U.S. Embassy warns that U.S. citizens are at 
high risk for kidnapping and violence and to avoid all but essential travel to Iraq. The 
U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. government personnel in Iraq to 
be serious enough to require them to live and work under strict security guidelines. The 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) remained the greatest terrorist threat globally, 
maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria.10 
 
                                                          
7 Tr. at 51-53; GE 3. 
 
8 Tr. at 54-56; GE 2; AE A-B. 
 
9 Ans. (See attachments). 
 
10 HE II. 
 
 
5 
 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(a), the entire process is a careful weighing of a number of variables known as the 
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national 
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access 
to classified or sensitive information).  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
  AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” as 
follows:  
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 indicates conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; and 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family 
members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, a family member or friend is associated with or dependent upon the 
government, the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against 
the United States, or the foreign country is associated with a risk of terrorism. The 
relationship between Iraq and the United States places a significant, but not 
insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships 
 
7 
 
 
with his relatives and friends living in Iraq does not pose a security risk. Applicant 
should not be placed in a position where he might be forced to choose between loyalty 
to the United States and a desire to assist his relatives and friends living in Iraq who 
might be coerced by governmental entities, or pressured to assist Iraq.  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.”11 Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound 
disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital 
interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in 
espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and 
technical fields.  
 
While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives from Iraq seek or have 
sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant, his relatives, or his 
friends living in Iraq, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. AG ¶¶ 
7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) apply based upon Applicant’s family members and two friends who 
are residents and citizens of Iraq, and his mother and B1’s living arrangements with 
him.  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns, 
including:  
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
                                                          
11 ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
 
 
8 
 
 
Applicant credibly testified that he has limited contact with his relatives and 
friends in Iraq. He presented sufficient evidence to establish that it is unlikely that he 
would be placed in a position to choose between the interest of his relatives and friends 
living in Iraq and those of the United States. He already has demonstrated that he would 
put the United States’ interests first when he worked as a translator from 2004 to 2008 
while his family members were living in Iraq. AG ¶ 8(a) applies. 
 
Applicant has met his burden to establish his “deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” He worked as a translator from 2004 to 2008 
performing different missions for U.S. forces where he earned praise for his loyalty, 
bravery, and trustworthiness while serving in harm’s way. He became a U.S. citizen in 
2013. He currently works and lives in the United States with his mother and B1. The 
evidence supports that Applicant has longstanding ties to the United States and would 
resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶ 8(b) applies. His 
contact with F1 and F2 is so infrequent, he does not know the current status of either. 
AG ¶ 8(c) applies. 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
  AG ¶ 9 explains the security concern about “foreign preference” as follows:  
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the 
United States. Foreign involvement raises concerns about an individual's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S. 
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By itself; the 
fact that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not 
disqualifying without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at 
concealment. The same is true for a U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or 
privilege of foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain 
recognition of a foreign citizenship. 
 
 AG ¶ 10 indicates conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case:  
 
(f) an act of expatriation from the United States such as declaration of 
intent to renounce U.S. citizenship, whether through words or actions. 
 
 While being questioned by a defense investigator, Applicant was trying to explain 
that although he was a proud U.S. citizen, a country he risked his life for, he would 
always have a love for the culture, history, and arts of his native country of Iraq. The 
investigator misconstrued Applicant’s explanation as an admission that his allegiance 
was split 50/50 between the two countries. Applicant credibly denied such was the case. 
Applicant’s actions and words clearly indicate that his preference is toward the United 
States over Iraq. AG ¶¶ 9 and 10(f) have not been established. 
 
9 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The circumstances tending to 
support granting Applicant’s clearance are more significant than the factors weighing 
towards denying his clearance. I considered the glowing comments by his commanders, 
who attested to Applicant’s loyalty and commitment to U.S. forces. I also considered his 
strong ties to this country as a translator serving in harm’s way while assisting U.S 
forces. He has demonstrated his longstanding loyalty to the United States. Therefore, 
he provided sufficient evidence to mitigate the security concerns. His actions also 
support his assertion that his allegiance is to the United States over Iraq.  
 
Overall the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude that the security concerns arising under Guideline B, foreign influence, were 
mitigated and that no disqualifying conditions were established under Guideline C.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    FOR APPLICANT 
 Subparagraphs     1.a: - 1.e:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:    FOR APPLICANT 
 Subparagraph       2.a:    For Applicant 
 
 
10 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
                                                     
_____________________________ 
Robert E. Coacher 
Administrative Judge