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       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
   DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 17-03798 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Nichole A. Smith, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant provided sufficient information to mitigate security concerns for 
handling protected information under Guideline K. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is granted. 
Statement of the Case 
Applicant was granted eligibility for access to classified information in June 1984. 
Applicant submitted his latest Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing 
(e-QIP) to retain his eligibility for access to classified information required for 
employment by a defense contractor on July 12, 2017. (Government Exhibit (GX 1)) 
An incident report in the Joint Personnel Adjudication system (JPAS), dated April 
17, 2017, listed three security violations by Applicant. (GX 2) The first incident was on 
November 29, 2016; the second was on January 9, 2017; and the third was on March 8, 
2017. On November 27, 2017, the Department of Defense issued to Applicant a 
Statement of Reason (SOR) detailing security concerns for protecting protected 
information under Guideline K. The action was taken under Executive Order (E.O.) 
02/08/2019
 
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10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on June 8, 2017.  
 
Applicant answered the SOR on December 15, 2017, admitting the three 
allegations of deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for 
handling protected information under Guideline K. He provided explanations for his 
mishandling of protected information on the three occasions. Department Counsel was 
prepared to proceed on January 29, 2018, and I was assigned the case on July 14, 
2018. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing 
on September 20, 2018, for a hearing on November 14, 2018. I convened the hearing 
as scheduled. The Government’s two exhibits (GX 1 and 2) were admitted without 
objection. Applicant and three witnesses testified. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of 
the hearing on November 26, 2018.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant’s admissions are included in my findings of fact. After a thorough 
review of the pleadings, hearing transcript, and exhibits, I make the following additional 
findings of fact. Applicant is 60 years old. He received a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer 
Science in February 1981. He has never served in the military. He has worked as an 
Oracle data base administrator for defense contractors since 2007. He first married in 
1981, divorced in 1993, and married again in 2002. He has five children. (GX 1, e-QIP, 
dated July 12, 2017) 
 
 Some of Applicant’s work was performed in a Special Compartmented 
Information Facility (SCIF). The SOR alleges three incidents of Applicant failing to 
properly secure the door to the SCIF as required by security procedures. There was no 
compromise of classified information as a result of the incidents. 
 
 Applicant had shoulder surgery on October 4, 2016. He was in pain for a few 
weeks after the surgery, not sleeping well, and taking narcotic pain relievers. He was 
cleared by his doctor to return to work by late October. 2016. He continued with physical 
therapy until early spring 2017. (Tr. 11-14) 
 
 The first incident (SOR 1.a) was on November 29, 2016. Applicant admitted he 
did not properly secure the door to the SCIF. The required procedure was for the last 
person to use the SCIF in a day to lock the door by spinning the dial, setting the alarm, 
and signing the security check sheet. If you were not the last person to use the SCIF in 
a day, an individual just closed the door and spun the combinations locking dial. There 
was no requirement to set the alarm or sign a security check sheet.  
 
 On November 29, 2016, Applicant did not believe he was the last person that 
would use the SCIF that day. However, he did not check with the person that he 
believed would use the SCIF after him to be assured that some would follow him to use 
 
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the SCIF. Applicant just closed the door and spun the dial. He did not set the alarm or 
sign the check sheet. The failure to set the alarm and sign the check sheet was 
discovered later that evening by building security. Applicant was verbally counseled by 
his supervisor and reread the security procedure guide. (Tr. 14-18) 
 
 The second incident occurred on January 9, 2017. Applicant’s wife called him at 
about 1730, and told him that there was an emergency issue with one of his children. 
He left work immediately to assist his wife. The SCIF was not secured and the proper 
procedures were not followed. Applicant admitted he was the last person in the office 
and should have ensured that the SCIF was secured. He stated he had no excuse and 
he should have locked the SCIF. He received a written warning from his supervisor and 
was required to receive extra training on open and close procedures. He also received 
an additional security briefing. (Tr. 18-20) 
 
 The third incident happened on March 8, 2017. Applicant could not explain why 
he did not secure the facility before he departed. He was still in some pain and was 
receiving physical therapy. But he still had no idea why he did not properly secure the 
facility that night. (Tr. 20-21) 
 
 Applicant no longer works on a contract that requires him to open and close a 
SCIF. However, he has thought of procedures he can institute himself to assist him in 
remembering to follow the proper procedures to open and close a facility in the future. 
(Tr. 21-23) 
 
 Applicant’s supervisor at the time of the three incidents testified that he was 
aware that Applicant had surgery in October 2016, was in pain for a time, and taking 
medication. Applicant was not the only employee that had an issue with securing the 
SCIF. He was informed by building security when the SCIF was not properly locked. He 
discussed the first incident with Applicant and determined that he did not need 
additional training. He decided that their discussion would be sufficient counseling. He 
had no concern at that time that there would be a similar incident. Applicant did not tell 
him that his pain was a factor in his failure to secure the facility.  
 
 On the second incident, He gave Applicant a written reprimand. He did not 
remember any reason Applicant provided for his failure the follow procedures. On the 
third incident, Applicant could not provide a reason for his failure to secure the room. 
Applicant was upset that he did not lock the room. As a result of this incident, the 
witness removed Applicant’s access to the room. There have been no other security 
incidents involving Applicant either before or after these events. (Tr. 30-38) 
 
 One of Applicant’s coworkers testified that he has worked with Applicant since 
2015. He knows that Applicant had surgery in October 2016. At the time, Applicant 
looked like he was in pain and had limited sleep. The witness was only told that there 
were lapses in properly securing the SCIF. He also knew that Applicant was upset when 
he realized that he had not properly security the SCIF. At present, Applicant is working 
 
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on a non-secure program and does not require access to classified information. He is 
not aware of any other security breach incidents involving Applicant. (Tr. 39-43) 
 
 Applicant’s current supervisor testified that he has worked with Applicant for 
about 18 months. The project they are working does not require them to have open and 
closing privileges. Applicant is security aware and careful with his work product. His skill 
set is very good. (Tr. 43-47) 
  
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record.    
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
 
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extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of the national 
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access 
to classified and sensitive information) 
 
Analysis 
 
Handling Protected Information: 
 
 Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for handling 
protected information-which includes classified and other sensitive government 
information, and proprietary information-raises doubt about an individual’s 
trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such 
information , and is a serious security concern. 
 
 Applicant three times failed to follow the proper method of securing a SCIF. He 
was counseled after the first incident and received a written reprimand after the second 
incident. His failures to properly follow the administrative procedures for securing the 
SCIF, in spite of counseling, raises the following protected information disqualifying 
conditions under AG ¶ 34: 
 
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or 
sensitive information; and 
 
(h) negligence or lax security practices that persist despite counseling by 
management. 
 
 There is no evidence in the case file to establish that Applicant’s failure to 
properly secure the SCIF resulted in any damage to the national security. In fact, the 
evidence shows that there was no compromise of classified information. The 
disqualifying condition at AG ¶34 (i) (failure to comply with rules and regulations that 
result in damage to the national security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or 
negligence) is not raised. 
  
 I have considered the following mitigating conditions under (AG ¶ 35): 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so 
infrequently or under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to 
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
 
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(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security 
training and now demonstrates a positive attitude towards the discharge of 
security responsibilities; 
  
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training or 
unclear instructions; and 
 
(d) the violation was inadvertent, it was properly reported, the is no 
evidence of compromise, and it does not suggest a pattern. 
 
 The mitigating conditions apply. Applicant violations were acts of omission not 
commission. He violated administrative rules in the proper method to lock and secure a 
SCIF. Applicant had open and close privileges for a SCIF for many years with no other 
reported violations. The three incidents happened in a four month period, the last about 
two years ago. There has not been a violation of security procedures by Applicant since. 
The three violations are not recent and frequent. There have been only these three 
security procedure violations by Applicant in over 30 years of holding a security 
clearance. The three violations were while Applicant was in pain from a shoulder 
surgery and while taking narcotic and other pain medications. The violations are not 
likely to happen again. Based on the testimony of his supervisor, Applicant responded 
favorably to counseling. He was warned and counseled. He showed remorse for his 
violations and responded favorably to the counseling. Applicant presented sufficient 
information to mitigate the allegations of mishandling protected information by 
negligently not following proper procedure for securing a SCIF.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information by considering the totality of the 
applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should 
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
access to classified information must be an overall common-sense judgment based 
upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
 
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 I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered Applicant’s many years 
of working for defense contractors. Applicant’s failure to follow the proper administrative 
procedures for securing a SCIF was not a deliberate act but an act of omission. Under 
the circumstances, his conduct does not raise questions about his judgment, reliability, 
trustworthiness, and ability to comply with rules and regulations. He adequately 
articulated the circumstances and reasons for his mishandling of the proper procedures 
and mitigated the security violations. Overall, the record evidence leaves me without 
questions and doubts concerning Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. 
He established his suitability for access to classified information. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from mishandling of 
protected information.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline K:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a -1.c:   For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to 
classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge