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        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE        
 DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS          
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-00117 
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Aubrey M. De Angelis, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
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DAM, Shari, Administrative Judge: 
Applicant did not mitigate the foreign influence security concerns arising from his 
connections to family and friends in Afghanistan. He did not mitigate the financial 
considerations security concerns related to his unpaid delinquent debts. Based upon a 
review of the pleadings and exhibits, national security eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
History of Case 
On May 12, 2017, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On February 2, 2018, the Department of Defense 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), and Guideline 
F (Financial Considerations). On March 23, 2018, Applicant answered the SOR in writing 
and requested that his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record 
without a hearing. (Item 3)  
02/19/2019
 
 
 
 
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 On July 18, 2018, Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case. 
A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM), containing 10 Items, was mailed 
to Applicant and received by him on September 20, 2018. The FORM notified Applicant 
that he had an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, 
or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. Applicant did not submit a 
response to the FORM, submit additional material, or file objections to its contents. 
Hence, Items 1 through 10 are admitted into the record. The Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) assigned the case to me on December 13, 2018.  
 
Procedural Ruling 
 
I take administrative notice of facts concerning Afghanistan. Those facts are set 
out in the Government’s Request for Administrative Notice - Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, marked as Item 7. The facts administratively noticed are limited to matters 
of general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable dispute. The pertinent facts 
are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant is 26 years old and married. He was born in Afghanistan in 1991. In 1992, 
his father, a commander in the Afghan military, was assassinated. Shortly thereafter, his 
mother fled to Pakistan with Applicant, his sister, and his brother. They remained in 
Pakistan until 2001 when they immigrated the United States as refugees. They became 
U.S. citizens in 2007 and continue to reside in the United States. (Item 4) 
 
 Applicant graduated from high school in 2009. He subsequently obtained student 
loans and attended a U.S. college between August 2010 and May 2015. He did not 
complete a degree. While in college, he was unemployed for some months and financially 
supported by his brother. (Items 4-6)  
 
 Applicant visited Afghanistan multiple times since becoming a U.S. citizen in 2007: 
from December 2013 to January 2014; June 2014 to July 2014; December 2014 to 
January 2015; March 2015; July 2015; August 2016; June 2017; and August 2017. In 
December 2013, Applicant married his wife in Afghanistan. She is an Afghanistan citizen 
and was residing there at the time. (Items 4 and 6) Applicant and his wife had a son born 
in Afghanistan. In 2017, his wife moved to the United States with their young son and she 
became a permanent U.S. resident. (Item 3)  
 
 Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. His mother-in-law is a homemaker and his father-in-law is a taxi driver. His 
father-in-law is also Applicant’s uncle. Applicant has three brothers-in-law. Two are 
citizens and residents of Afghanistan. One brother-in-law is citizen of Afghanistan and a 
permanent U.S. resident. That brother-in-law previously worked for the Afghan police. 
Applicant has monthly contact with his in-laws residing in Afghanistan. Applicant stayed 
with his in-laws when he visited Afghanistan. (Item 3, 4, 6)  
 
 
 
 
 
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 Applicant has eight friends and a cousin, who are citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. He has yearly contact with six friends and quarterly contact with two friends. 
He contacts his cousin yearly. (Item 5) Applicant said that since his wife has moved to the 
United States, he no longer needs to maintain contact with multiple family members or 
friends in Afghanistan. (Item 3) 
 
 Based on credit bureau reports (CBR) from May 2017, January 2018, and May 
2018, the SOR alleged six debts that became delinquent between 2014 and 2018, and 
totaled over $14,503. They included an automobile repossession, three unpaid credit 
cards, an unpaid cell phone bill, and unpaid tuition. (Items 8, 9, 10) 
 
 In his Answer, Applicant stated that he is responsible for resolving the alleged 
debts. He said that he is making payments on the $371 credit card debt. The most recent 
CBR confirmed that the $371 debt listed in SOR ¶ 1.a had a balance of $143 as of April 
2018. (Item 10). He also stated that he paid the $143 cell phone debt, but there is no 
evidence to confirm that status. Applicant said he intended to pay the other four debts 
when he has more money. (Item 3)  
 
 According to the May 2018 CBR, Applicant has student loans that total about 
$53,350. SOR ¶ 1.f alleged that one of those loans has a delinquent balance of $2,607. 
Applicant has not made arrangements to make payments on that loan. He makes nominal 
payments of $1 to $3 on several other student loans. (Item 10)  
 
 Applicant was employed full-time from October 2015 to January 2016 with a 
temporary staffing firm. He then obtained a full-time position with a healthcare company. 
He continues to work for that company while his application for a security clearance is 
pending. (Item 6)  
 
 Applicant admitted that he provided $19,400 of financial support to his wife from 
2013 until 2017, before she moved to the United States. Throughout the case file, he 
stated that as a consequence of sending her money and traveling to Afghanistan, he did 
not have sufficient money to pay the alleged delinquent debts. (Items 3-6) 
 
 Applicant did not provide a current budget or other information related to his 
financial obligations from which to determine his current financial reliability, compliance 
with payment agreements, or ability to maintain payments on the debts. There is no 
evidence that he has financial investments or other monetary connections in the United 
States. Applicant asserts that his loyalty is to the United States. (Item 2)   
 
Afghanistan 
 
I have taken administrative notice of facts contained in U.S. Government 
pronouncements concerning the state of Afghanistan. Specifically, Afghanistan faces 
many challenges fueled by sectarian and ethnic divisions. Numerous terrorist groups are 
increasingly active throughout Afghanistan. Threats of kidnapping and violence are high, 
and the Department of State warns U.S. citizens that all travel to Afghanistan should be 
 
 
 
 
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avoided. Of particular significance are the poor human rights situation; the active and 
hostile presence of Al Qaida, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network; and other insurgent and 
extremist groups that generate instability and openly attack police, security and military 
forces, the local populace, and U.S. persons and interests. 
.  
Policies 
 
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, 
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position 
(AG) effective within the DOD after June 8, 2017. 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for national security eligibility, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in 
evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility. 
 
 These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire 
process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of 
variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider 
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or 
conjecture.  
 
 Directive ¶ E3.1.14 requires the Government to present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 A person applying for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national 
 
 
 
 
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security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the 
applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as 
to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information.  
 
 Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “[a]ny determination 
under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national 
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information.) 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for foreign influence is set out in AG 
¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline describes conditions that could raise security concerns and may be 
disqualifying under AG ¶ 7. Two are potentially applicable in this case:  
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 1  and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
                                            
1 The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of 
law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country and an applicant 
has contacts with that relative, that factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and 
could potentially result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. 
Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
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protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology.  
 
Afghanistan has significant internal anti-western terrorism threats that operate 
openly and contrary to U.S. interests. Accordingly, Applicant’s close connections and 
frequent visits to family and friends there generate  significantly heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶ 7(a). 
 
Applicant has ongoing connections with his in-laws and friends, who are citizens 
and residents of Afghanistan. He frequently visited those in-laws and provided support to 
his wife from 2013 until 2017 while she lived there with her parents. These relationships 
create a heightened risk of foreign pressure or attempted exploitation because terrorists 
and insurgents in Afghanistan seek intelligence or engage in behaviors that are hostile to 
the United States’ interests. Applicant’s relationship with family members and friends 
creates a potential conflict of interest between Applicant’s obligation to protect sensitive 
information or technology and his desire to help family members living in Afghanistan. 
The evidence is sufficient to raise a disqualification under AG ¶ 7(b).  
 
  After the Government produced sufficient evidence of those disqualifying 
conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut them or otherwise prove mitigation. 
Three mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable to the disqualifying 
security concerns based on these facts: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;   
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western insurgent and terrorism threats 
in the region, Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely he could be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government 
and those of the United States due to his family ties there. He has perfectly legitimate and 
appropriately close relationships with family members and friends now living in 
 
 
 
 
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Afghanistan, and a strong interest in protecting those people. His communication and 
contact with them are neither casual nor infrequent. Accordingly, he failed to establish the 
mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (c). 
 
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b). A key 
factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and longstanding relationships and 
loyalties in the United States.” Applicant has some connections to the United States: his 
mother, and two siblings are citizens and residents of the United States; he graduated 
from a U.S. high school in 2009; he is currently employed with a U.S. healthcare company; 
and in 2017, his wife and child came to live with him in the United States. However, those 
connections do not outweigh his strong and recent connections to Afghanistan where he 
spent a significant amount of time between 2013 and 2017, met his wife, married, and 
had his son. While there, he stayed with his in-laws and saw friends. His father-in-law is 
also his uncle. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Applicant’s U.S. ties are so 
deep and longstanding that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interests 
involving to his family in Afghanistan in favor of the U.S. interests. Accordingly, he did not 
fully mitigate the security concerns raised under this condition. 
 
Guideline F: Financial Considerations 
 
 The security concerns relating to the guideline for financial considerations are set 
out in AG ¶ 18, which reads in pertinent part:       
 
Failure to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial 
obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to 
protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be 
caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other 
issues of personal security concern such as excessive gambling, mental 
health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An 
individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to 
engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. 
 
 AG ¶ 19 describes three conditions that could raise security concerns and may be 
disqualifying in this case:  
 
(a) inability to satisfy debts; 
 
(b) unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do so; and 
 
(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.  
 
This concern is broader than the possibility that an individual might knowingly 
compromise classified information in order to raise money. It encompasses concerns 
about an individual’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting 
 
 
 
 
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classified information. An individual who is financially irresponsible may also be 
irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handing and safeguarding classified 
information.2 
 
Based on his admissions and CBRs, Applicant has a history of being unable and 
unwilling to meet financial obligations, which began in 2014 and continues into the 
present. The evidence raises security concerns under the above disqualifying conditions, 
and shifts the burden to Applicant to rebut, extenuate, or mitigate those concerns.  
 
 The guideline includes conditions in AG ¶ 20 that could mitigate security concerns 
arising from Applicant’s financial problems. Four are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt 
on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;  
 
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond 
the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, 
unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation, clear 
victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the 
individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 
 
(c) the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the 
problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit 
counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control; and 
 
(d) the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay 
overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts. 
 
The delinquent debts alleged in the SOR arose between 2014 and 2018; five of 
the debts remain unresolved. AG ¶ 20 (a) does not apply, as his failure to address the 
delinquent debts over the past years casts doubt on his reliability and judgment. Applicant 
stated that he could not pay his debts after he married in 2013 because he was sending 
his wife financial support and traveling to Afghanistan to visit her. Both of those 
circumstances were within his control. He did not provide evidence that he attempted to 
responsibly manage his financial obligations. AG ¶ 20(b) does not apply. There is no 
evidence that Applicant participated in credit or financial counseling, and that his 
delinquent debts are being resolved and under control. AG ¶ 20(c) does not apply. He 
provided evidence that he was paying the debt in SOR ¶ 1.c, establishing mitigation under 
AG ¶ 20(d) for this debt. He did not submit evidence that he made-good faith efforts to 
repay or resolve any of the other five debts. AG ¶ 20(d) does not apply to them.  
 
 
                                            
2 See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
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Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct 
and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security 
eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under 
Guidelines B and F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
The Guideline B security concerns do not arise from any questionable conduct by 
Applicant, but rather circumstances that are normal results of his family situation. There 
is no evidence that he has ever taken any action that could cause potential harm to the 
United States. He expressed loyalty to the United States. Although his immediate family 
members now live in the United States, he (and presumably his wife) continues to have 
strong connections to Afghanistan, as demonstrated by his numerous trips there between 
2013 and 2017, and consistent contact with family and friends since then. As a 
consequence of those relationships, he has chosen not to prioritize the resolution of 
financial obligations he incurred in the United States, which establish the security 
concerns raised under Guideline F.  
 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all pertinent facts 
and circumstances in the context of the whole-person, I conclude Applicant failed to 
mitigate the security concerns pertaining to foreign influence and financial considerations. 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with substantial questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 
 
 
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 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:      AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.d:   Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline F:      AGAINST APPLICANT 
   
Subparagraph 2.a:                        For Applicant 
 
Subparagraphs 2.b through 2.f:   Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant a security 
clearance. National security eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
                                        
         
 
SHARI DAM 
Administrative Judge