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        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-00962 
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Nicholas T. Temple, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
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Decision 
______________ 
LOUGHRAN, Edward W., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant did not mitigate the drug involvement and substance misuse security 
concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.  
Statement of the Case 
On May 11, 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H, drug 
involvement and substance misuse. Applicant responded to the SOR on June 18, 2018, 
and elected to have the case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.  
The Government’s written case was submitted on August 6, 2018. A complete 
copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was 
afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or 
mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on August 10, 2018. As of 
September 28, 2018, he had not responded. The case was assigned to me on January 
28, 2019. The Government exhibits included in the FORM are admitted in evidence.  
02/05/2019
 
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Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant is a 33-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has worked for 
his current employer since March 2017. He has a bachelor’s degree, awarded in 2006, 
and a master’s degree, awarded in 2007. He is single without children.1 
  
Applicant smoked marijuana when he was in college and graduate school and 
less frequently after he graduated. He held a security clearance when he worked for a 
defense contractor from 2007 to 2011. He reported on a Questionnaire for National 
Security Positions (SF 86) in April 2017 that he used marijuana on about 60 occasions 
between 2002 and 2016, including while holding a security clearance. He stated that he 
did not intend to use marijuana in the future: 
 
My use has always been casual, and only when it was offered to me. I’ve 
generally been unemployed or self-employed, and usually in 
states/countries where it’s already been legalized. I don’t have any desire 
to use it when it would directly affect my livelihood.2 
 
In response to DOHA interrogatories in April 2018, Applicant admitted that he ate 
cookies baked with marijuana in July 2017, and that on October 31, 2017, a friend 
offered him a “vaporizer-pen with some marijuana in its contents.” Applicant “took a 
single pull and barely felt any effects.” He again stated that he did not intend to use 
marijuana in the future: 
 
Though I have admitted that I am not against Marijuana, I also use it very 
infrequently. Since the experience on October 31st, I haven’t used it since. 
I have never purchased it, nor any related paraphernalia. Upon conducting 
the clearance interview [in December 2017], I realized that I would not 
want to jeopardize my employment for its occasional use.3 
 
In his June 2018 response to the SOR, Applicant stated that he was an 
infrequent marijuana user, and that he “clearly underestimated the gravity and severity 
of choosing to use marijuana during this specific period [2009-2011] under which [he] 
held a clearance.” His marijuana use never adversely affected his job performance, and 
he volunteered to work in Iraq. He now fully understands that marijuana use is 
inconsistent with holding a security clearance. He moved to a different city, away from 
the people with whom he used marijuana. He signed a statement of intent to abstain 
from all drug involvement and substance misuse.4  
  
 
                                                          
1 Item 3. 
 
2 Item 3. 
 
3 Item 4. 
 
4 Item 2-4. 
 
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Policies 
 
This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became 
effective on June 8, 2017. 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse 
 
 The security concern for drug involvement and substance misuse is set out in AG 
¶ 24:   
  
The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of 
prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances 
that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner 
inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior 
may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises 
questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, 
and regulations. Controlled substance means any “controlled substance” 
as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term 
adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above. 
 
 The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 25. The following are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
 (a) any substance misuse (see above definition); and 
 
(f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or 
holding a sensitive position. 
 
 Applicant used marijuana, including while holding a security clearance. The 
above disqualifying conditions are applicable. 
 
 AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following 
are potentially applicable:  
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt 
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
and 
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and 
substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this 
problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not 
limited to: 
 
 (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; 
 
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
and 
 
 
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(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug 
involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future 
involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security 
eligibility.  
 
 Applicant has not used marijuana since October 31, 2017. He stated that he has 
matured and realizes that his past marijuana use was unacceptable, and that he will 
never use illegal drugs again. He signed a statement of intent not to use any illegal 
drugs in the future. He is credited with his honesty and truthfulness throughout these 
proceedings. However, he used marijuana while holding a security clearance and after 
he submitted an SF 86 in which he stated that he did not intend to use marijuana in the 
future. Applicant’s conduct continues to cast doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, and 
good judgment. His illegal drug use is not mitigated. AG ¶ 26(a) is not applicable, and 
AG ¶ 26(b) is partially applicable. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline H in my whole-person analysis.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts about 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude Applicant did not 
mitigate the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline H:   Against Applicant 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.b:   Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for 
a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Edward W. Loughran 
Administrative Judge