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       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
   DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-01593 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Bryan Olmos, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
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Decision 
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GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under Guideline B, foreign 
influence. His spouse, parents, four siblings, and in-laws are all citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. He failed to show sufficient deep and longstanding ties to the United States 
to mitigate the security concerns raised by his relatives’ presence in Afghanistan. National 
security eligibility for access to classified information is denied.  
Statement of the Case 
On June 18, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility 
(DOD CAF) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security 
concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. The action was taken under Executive 
Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 
1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and Security 
Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines 
(December 10, 2016), implemented June 8, 2017.  
02/28/2019
 
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 Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR on September 25, 2018, and elected 
to have his case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel 
submitted its file of relevant material (FORM) on October 23, 2018. Applicant received it 
on November 27, 2018. The Government’s evidence is identified as Items 1 through 10. 
The FORM notified Applicant that he had an opportunity to file objections and submit 
material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. 
Applicant submitted no response to the FORM (Response) within the time period. Items 
1 through 9 are admitted into the record. The case was assigned to me on February 11, 
2019.  
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 In the FORM, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain 
facts relating to Afghanistan. Department Counsel provided a six-page summary of the 
facts, supported by seven Government documents pertaining to Afghanistan, marked as 
Item 10. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the U.S. Government reports. 
They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject to reasonable dispute. They 
are set out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted all of the allegations in the SOR, with clarifications. After a 
thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following findings 
of fact. 
 
 Applicant is a 31-year-old employee of a government contractor. He was born in 
Afghanistan. He and his immediate family fled to Pakistan from Afghanistan in August 
2001 to escape the presence of the Taliban. They returned to Afghanistan in September 
2003, after the U.S. presence in Afghanistan made it safe to return. He lived in 
Afghanistan through 2011. He graduated from high school in Afghanistan and attended 
some college there. He married a U.S. citizen in 2010, and immigrated to the United 
States on a spousal visa in July 2011. He has one minor child from that marriage. 
Applicant returned to Afghanistan as a translator for U.S. forces in late 2011 through May 
2013, when he returned to the United States. Applicant and his spouse divorced in 
October 2014. His former wife has custody of their child, and Applicant pays child support. 
He married his second wife, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan, in April 2015. In 2017, 
he returned to Afghanistan as a translator. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in June 
2017. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
 
 Applicant’s wife is a full-time student and resides with her parents in Afghanistan. 
His in-laws are citizens of Afghanistan. Applicant’s father-in-law is self-employed in a 
stationery supply company. His mother-in-law is a homemaker. Applicant has filed a 
petition to sponsor his wife to immigrate to the United States. They reside in a $4,000,000 
home owned by Applicant’s father-in-law in Afghanistan. (Item 8.) 
 
 
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 Applicant’s mother, father, two brothers, and two sisters all are citizens and 
residents of Afghanistan. He also has two sisters who are permanent residents of the 
United States. One of his U.S.-resident sisters works as a dental assistant and the other 
is a homemaker. His family in Afghanistan reside together in an apartment owned by his 
mother. The apartment is valued at approximately $150,000. Applicant’s father is a real 
estate agent. His mother is a school teacher. His two of his sisters and two brothers in 
Afghanistan are students. Applicant sends approximately $2,500 to $3,000 monthly to his 
parent to assist with his siblings’ education. He also provides money for his parents’ food 
and living expenses. (Item 6; Item 7; Item 8.) 
 
 Applicant “does not feel he can live [in Afghanistan] because [he] grew up in an 
educated family, and [he] feels like [he] is not suited for the country (Afghanistan). [He] 
does not like the poverty in the country or the discrimination [he] received for growing up 
in a modern household.” (Item 6 at 3.) 
 
Afghanistan 
 
The U.S. Department of State has issued a travel warning with respect to 
Afghanistan, due to crime, terrorism, civil unrest, and armed conflict. It notes that travel 
to all areas of Afghanistan is unsafe due to the ongoing risk of kidnapping, hostage taking, 
military combat operations, suicide bombings, and insurgent attacks. Attacks may target 
official Afghan and U.S. governmental convoys and compounds. Extremists associated 
with Taliban networks and the Islamic State are active throughout Afghanistan. 
Widespread human rights abuses are reported. (Item 10.) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility, the administrative judge 
must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, 
the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used 
in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known 
as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
 
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contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere 
speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Directive ¶ E3.1.15 states an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. 
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, 
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Finally, Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms 
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Two are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
 
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(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology. 
 
  Applicant has close connections to his wife, parents, siblings, and in-laws, who are 
citizens and residents of Afghanistan. He provides support for his family there. Further, 
there is an articulated heightened risk associated with having ties to family members in 
Afghanistan, due to the activities of terrorist organizations and insurgents operating within 
its borders. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.  
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the agency head or designee; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements 
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, 
groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
 
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(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 None of the above conditions are mitigating in this instance. Applicant is in close 
contact with his wife, parents, siblings, and in-laws in Afghanistan. He provides 
substantial financial support to his parents and siblings. Due to Applicant’s close 
relationship with his family and the terrorist threats and human rights abuses in 
Afghanistan, I cannot find it is unlikely he would be placed in a position of choosing 
between them and the interests of the United States. He failed to demonstrate deep and 
longstanding loyalties to the United States. While he is credited for his years of service to 
the United States as a linguist, the record contains little information on assets, or physical 
or emotional bonds to the United States, aside from the presence of his child and two 
sisters in the United States. Without more information, it cannot be determined that 
Applicant would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept. Applicant 
served honorably as a linguist. However, the record lacks information to support a finding 
that he would resolve any conflicts of interest in favor of the United States. I considered 
the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and 
circumstances surrounding this case. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with doubts 
as to Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to 
mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for Foreign Influence. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
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 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:        AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.g:  Against Applicant 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant access to classified 
information. National security eligibility is denied. 
                                                     
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Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge