1 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
)
[Redacted] ) ISCR Case No. 17-03026 
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Ross Hyams, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Anthony H. Kuhn, Esq. 
______________ 
Decision on Remand 
______________ 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines B (Foreign 
Influence) and C (Foreign Preference). Eligibility for access to classified information is 
granted. 
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on May 16, 2016. On 
December 20, 2017, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility 
(DOD CAF) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under 
Guidelines B and C. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines 
(AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security 
Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), for all adjudicative decisions on or after 
June 8, 2017. 
03/04/2019
 
2 
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on February 19, 2018, and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on May 2, 
2018, and the case was assigned to an administrative judge on August 7, 2018. On 
August 13, 2018, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified 
Applicant that the hearing was scheduled for September 13, 2018. The case was 
reassigned to me on September 4, 2018, due to the unavailability of the previously 
assigned administrative judge. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Department 
Counsel submitted Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 4, which were admitted without 
objection. Applicant testified, presented the testimony of one witness, and submitted 
Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through T, which were admitted without objection. On 
October 12, 2018, I granted Applicant’s application for a security clearance.  
 
 At the hearing, Department Counsel refused to submit any official government 
documents to support a request for administrative notice about the United Kingdom. He 
stated, “Department Counsel does not provide administrative notice where there’s no 
country conditions that are relevant to the larger, heightened-risk analysis . . . . [we] do 
not have administrative notice that is going to provide country conditions for countries 
we consider the neutral or friendly nations.” (Tr. 13.) He further explained, “[T]he Chief 
Department Counsel has determined that we’re not arguing country conditions and . . . 
administrative notice is not a requirement in every Guideline B case and should only be 
made when the Government believes it’s relevant to its case.” His final comment in 
response to my question whether he was “willing to leave this in a vacuum” was, “Yes, 
Your Honor. We’re not providing the administrative notice for friendly countries. It 
wouldn’t be – amount to anything more than a travelogue of what it is.” (Tr. 15.) 
 
I concluded that Department Counsel had not submitted sufficient evidence to 
establish a “heightened risk” of foreign influence or a “potential conflict of interest.” I 
granted Applicant’s application for a security clearance. 
 
 Department Counsel appealed my favorable decision, and the Appeal Board 
remanded my decision on January 16, 2018. The Appeal Board held that it was error to 
grant Applicant a security clearance without evidence in the record of the nature of the 
country involved and to appropriately consider the nature of the foreign contacts 
involved in the case. The Appeal Board authorized me to reopen the record on the 
motion of either party. 
 
 On January 30, 2019, Department Counsel requested that the record be 
reopened and submitted a request for administrative notice of relevant facts concerning 
the United Kingdom. (Remand Exhibit I.) I reopened the record and granted the request 
for administrative notice without objection from Applicant. The facts administratively 
noticed are set out in my findings of fact. On February 18, 2019, Applicant 
supplemented the record with Applicant’s Exhibit (AX) U. Neither party requested that 
additional testimony be presented. The record closed on February 21, 2019. 
 
 
3 
 
 The Appeal Board decision and the remand order addressed only the Guideline 
B issues. I adhere to my previous findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions regarding 
the allegations in the SOR under Guideline C. 
 
Findings of Fact1 
 
 Under Guideline B, the SOR alleges that that Applicant served as an officer in 
the British Army from 1980 to 2001 (SOR ¶ 2.a); that he expected to inherit a share of 
his mother’s property and assets located in the United Kingdom (UK) (SOR ¶ 2.b); that 
he maintained contact with “many foreign nationals” due to his UK citizenship and 
service in the British Army (SOR ¶ 2.c); that he has friends and acquaintances who are 
serving in the British Military (SOR ¶ 2.d); and that he possessed a security clearance 
from the UK Ministry of Defense (SOR ¶ 2.e). 
 
 In Applicant’s answer to the SOR, he admitted SOR ¶ 2.a, and 2.e. He denied 
SOR ¶ 2.b, denied ¶ 2.c in part, and denied ¶ 2.d. His admissions in his answer and at 
the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 56-year-old employee of a federal contractor. He was born in the 
United Kingdom, graduated from the UK military academy at Sandhurst, and served as 
an officer in the British Army and held a UK security clearance from 1980 to 2001, when 
he retired as a lieutenant colonel. While in the British Army, he served as an exchange 
officer with the US Army from 1997 to 1999. He held a limited DOD security clearance 
while serving as an exchange officer. (Tr. 31.) He received two evaluation reports from 
US Army officers while he was an exchange officer. His rater was a US Army colonel 
and his senior rater was a US Army brigadier general. Both reports gave him the 
highest possible rating. One report commented, “Every day he turns in an outstanding 
performance,” and he “has made it hard for anyone else to be the best.” The other 
report commented that he had “far exceeded all other majors and the vast majority of 
lieutenant colonels.” (AX R.) 
 
Applicant testified that he started thinking about “retirement and the next things in 
life” when he completed his exchange tour and returned to the British Army. When a US 
defense contractor offered him a job in the United States, he and his family decided to 
“completely move.” He submitted his application for early retirement at some time 
before March 2001 and retired in August 2001. Applicant and his wife sold their 
residence in the United Kingdom, and the entire family came to the United States in 
August 2001. Applicant has been employed continuously by federal contractors in the 
United States as a senior systems engineer from September 2001 to the present. (GX 2 
at 16; AX S.)  
 
Applicant and his family became permanent US resident aliens, applied for US 
citizenship as soon as they were eligible, and became naturalized US citizens. 
                                                          
1 Applicant’s personal information is extracted from his security clearance application (GX 1) unless 
otherwise indicated by a parenthetical citation to the record. 
 
4 
 
Applicant, his wife, and one son became US citizens in October 2013. His other two 
sons became US citizens in July and December 2014. His daughter became a US 
citizen in June 2014. His daughter lives in the United States and is a recruiting manager 
for a major security company. One of his sons lives with his daughter. His oldest son is 
an investment banker working in the United States. His youngest son also works and 
lives in the United States. (GX 3 at 9-10; AX P; AX Q; Tr. 49-50.) 
 
 Applicant has a UK passport that was issued in January 2010 and will expire in 
January 2020. He has not used it for foreign travel since he became a US citizen and 
obtained a US passport. (GX 2 at 8-9; GX 3 at 8.) 
 
 Applicant receives a pension from the United Kingdom for his military service. 
When he and his wife reach age 67, they will qualify for retirement pensions from the 
United Kingdom, similar to US Social Security.  
 
 Applicant’s father is deceased. His mother is a citizen and resident of the United 
Kingdom. She is in failing health, suffers from dementia, and lives in an assisted living 
facility. Applicant and his brothers expected at one time to inherit his mother’s home and 
assets, but the home has been sold. His mother’s medical expenses are covered by the 
National Health Service in the United Kingdom, but the cost of living in an assisted living 
facility is not covered. (Tr. 61.) Applicant anticipates that his mother’s estate will have 
some cash when she passes away, and it will be split among Applicant and his two 
brothers. (Tr. 41-42.) 
 
 Both of Applicant’s brothers are citizens and residents of the United Kingdom. 
One is a security officer employed by an educational institution. The other is self-
employed as a used-car salesman. (GX 2 at 35-38; GX 3 at 10.) 
 
 Applicant and his wife purchased a plot of undeveloped property on a remote 
island in the Bahamas in 2001 for the equivalent of about $8,000. They purchased the 
property as an investment. They have never visited the property and it remains 
undeveloped. (Tr. 39-40.) 
 
 Applicant maintains a bank account with a small balance in the United Kingdom, 
which he uses for convenience when he visits and to pay the expenses incurred for his 
mother’s care. His British Army pension, which is about $2,000 per month, is deposited 
directly into a bank account in the United States. (Tr. 35.) It was previously deposited in 
a UK bank, but he changed it to the US bank in January or February 2018 after learning 
that a foreign bank account might cause a problem with his application for a security 
clearance. (Tr. 52.) He contributes the maximum allowable amount into a 401(k) 
retirement plan with his current employer. (Tr. 38.) 
 
 Applicant and his wife own their home in the United States. The market value of 
their home is about $400,000, and they have equity in the home of about $220,000 (Tr. 
41; AX K.) 
 
 
5 
 
 While Applicant was on active duty and an exchange officer with the US Army, 
he worked on a system of computer networks for combat vehicles. (Tr. 30.) After he 
retired and was hired by his current employer, he continued to work on basically the 
same program, which had been adopted by the US Army. (Tr. 29-30.) 
 
 Applicant testified, “I retain friendship with probably about ten, if that, people.”2 
(Tr. 43.) All have retired, except for one, a lieutenant general who is still on active duty. 
Applicant testified that a few of his retired colleagues were employed in the defense 
industry, but he did not know the identity of their employers. He believed that one of his 
retired colleagues may be employed by the military. (Tr. 57.) Applicant and the 
lieutenant general knew each other on active duty and were neighbors when they both 
attended a military school, but Applicant has not maintained contact with him. (Tr. 44.) 
Applicant’s relationship with the lieutenant general was a subject of concern in the 
Appeal Board’s decision.  
 
The lieutenant general was present at joint US-British Army staff talks on 
interoperability between their military units in February 2017. During the staff talks, 
Applicant made a presentation on behalf of the US Government and his program office. 
His presentation was designed to convince the British Army to buy and adopt the 
computer system for combat vehicles developed by his employer and adopted by the 
US Army, because it would promote interoperability between US and British military 
forces. (Tr. 58.) After his presentation, he “bumped into” the lieutenant general, not 
expecting him to be there, and they talked briefly. (Tr. 44-45, 58.) Neither Department 
Counsel nor Applicant’s attorney questioned Applicant about the substance of their brief 
conversation.3 
 
Applicant maintains regular contact with a retired British brigadier,4 who was a 
classmate at Sandhurst. (Tr. 56.) They served in the same regiment, and they have 
contact about six times a year. (GX 2 at 19.) The record does not reflect whether the 
brigadier is currently employed or has any connection, other than his retired status, with 
the UK Government. 
 
Applicant has quarterly contact with another retired British officer with whom he 
served. (GX 2 at 42.) This officer lives in India and is self-employed. (GX 4 at 3.) 
                                                          
2 In Applicant’s submission on remand, he argues that his contacts from his former service in the British 
Army are “acquaintances” rather than “friends.” Some of the information in Applicant’s submission is 
testimonial, providing additional descriptions of the nature of his contacts with present and former British 
officers. Since neither party requested that the record be opened for additional testimony, I have treated 
Applicant’s submission as argument based on the testimony reflected in the hearing transcript and not as 
additional testimony.  
 
3 In Applicant’s submission on remand, he proffered testimony that his conversation with the lieutenant 
general was limited to niceties and questions about family. I have not considered his proffer, because 
neither side requested that the record be reopened for additional testimony. 
 
4 The Appeal Board decision refers to this officer’s rank as “brigadier general.” The officer’s rank is 
brigadier, which is the British rank equivalent to a US brigadier general. 
 
6 
 
Applicant has quarterly contact with another retired British officer, with whom he 
attended high school and with whom he served in the same regiment. Applicant is 
godfather to this retired officer’s son. This retired officer is not currently employed or 
affiliated with the UK Government. (GX 2 at 40-41; GX 4 at 3; AX T at 32.) 
 
Applicant also maintains occasional contact with a retired British Army officer in 
Nepal, who was his second in command of a squadron in a British Gurkha brigade and 
his son’s godfather. They have “occasional, yearly” email contact and see each other on 
Facebook. (Tr. 54-55.) This officer has no current connection with the UK Government. 
 
 Applicant’s facility security officer (FSO) is also a part owner and vice-president 
of the company by whom Applicant is employed. He has worked closely with Applicant 
and has socialized with his family. He testified that Applicant has ties to his past military 
service and is proud of it, but he is also very proud of being a US citizen. The FSO 
strongly supports Applicant’s application for a security clearance. (Tr. 18-22.) 
 
 A retired US Army colonel who worked with Applicant from 2001 to 2017 
considers him a lifelong friend. He admires Applicant for his commitment to the success 
of the US military. He considers Applicant to be honest, dependable, and sincere in his 
devotion to the United States. (AX H.)  
 
 Applicant’s performance evaluation for the period ending in January 2018 rated 
him as exceeding expectations. He was commended for defining and developing 
systems-engineering processes and his “dogged determination to do the right thing,” 
whether it was for a customer, the company, or another employee. (AX G.) 
 
 I have taken administrative notice of the facts recited in the Department of State 
Fact Sheet, US Relations with United Kingdom (Feb. 26, 2018), which states in 
pertinent part: 
 
The United States has no closer ally than the United Kingdom, and British 
foreign policy emphasizes close coordination with the United States. 
Bilateral cooperation reflects the common language, ideals, and 
democratic practices of the two nations. Relations were strengthened by 
the United Kingdom’s alliance with the United States during both World 
Wars, in the Korean conflict, in the Persian Gulf War, in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and in Afghanistan, as well as through its role as a founding 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO. The United 
Kingdom and the United States continually consult on foreign policy issues 
and global problems and share major foreign and security policy 
objectives. 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 US 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
 
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“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge 
applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and 
commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 US at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-
01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr.20, 2016).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
 
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01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 US at 531.  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6:  
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual maybe manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with US interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target US citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
 The following potentially disqualifying conditions under this guideline are 
relevant:   
 
AG ¶ 7(a): contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen 
of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's 
obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and 
the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by 
providing that information or technology;  
 
AG ¶ 7(c): failure to report or fully disclose, when required, association 
with a foreign person, group, government, or country; and 
 
AG ¶ 7(f): substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could 
subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation or personal conflict of interest. 
 
 In Applicant’s answer to the SOR and at the hearing, he denied that his 
connections to the United Kingdom made him vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation, 
 
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or coercion; and he denied that they created a potential conflict of interest. Department 
Counsel set out the Government’s position in this case as follows: 
 
[T]he Government’s heightened risk concern is based primarily upon 
Applicant’s status as a retired senior British army officer receiving a 
pension from the British Government, his ongoing relationships with other 
British military officers, including two Generals, and his various other ties 
to the United Kingdom, rather than specific country conditions in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
(Remand Exhibit I.) 
 
 The United States and the United Kingdom are close allies, and the armed forces 
of both countries have a history of bilateral exchanges and cooperation. However, 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United States 
has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any 
person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of 
whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the 
United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).  
 
 Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the 
United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national 
security.” ISCR Case No. 00-0317 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). Finally, we know friendly 
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the 
economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s 
government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are 
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant or an applicant’s family members 
are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of direct or indirect coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, an applicant or an applicant’s family members or friends are associated 
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence 
operations against the United States.  
 
  Applicant’s mother and two brothers, with whom he has regular contact, are 
citizens of the United Kingdom. However, his family members are not in positions likely 
to cause a conflict of interest. His mother has dementia and resides in an assisted living 
facility, one brother works for an educational institution, and the other brother is a used-
car salesman.  
 
 I conclude that the “heightened” risk under AG 7(a) is not established. The 
amicable and cooperative relationships between the United States and the United 
Kingdom and their armed forces and their shared ideals and democratic practices are 
inconsistent with the coercive and manipulative measures contemplated by AG ¶ 7(a). 
 
 However, AG ¶ 7(b) does not include an element of “heightened risk.” Instead, it 
requires a lower standard of a “potential” conflict of interest. Of the retired officers with 
 
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whom Applicant has continuing contact, three have no current connection to the United 
Kingdom beyond their retired status. The record does not reflect whether the retired 
brigadier, Applicant’s closest friend, has any current governmental connection. 
However, the active-duty lieutenant general has a professional interest in the 
technology being developed by Applicant and his federal employer. Even though 
Applicant does not maintain social contact with the lieutenant general, Applicant’s 
military status and connections to former comrades in arms, including a retired brigadier 
(whose current employment, if any, is not reflected in the record) are sufficient to raise 
the potential conflict of interest contemplated by AG ¶ 7(b).  
 
 The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable:  
 
AG ¶ 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country 
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States; 
 
AG ¶ 8(b): there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s 
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the 
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such 
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, 
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in 
favor of the US interest;  
 
AG ¶ 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
AG ¶ 8(d): the foreign contacts and activities are on US Government 
business or are approved by the agency head or designee; 
 
AG ¶ 8(e): the individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from 
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
AG ¶ 8(f): the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or 
property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and 
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the 
individual. 
 
AG ¶ 8(a) is partially established. The United States and United Kingdom have a 
close, amicable, and cooperative relationship with shared ideals. All but one of 
Applicant’s military comrades in arms are retired. Three of the four with whom he 
maintains regular contact have no current affiliation with the UK government beyond 
 
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their retired status. He has had no contact with the active-duty lieutenant general except 
for the unexpected meeting in February 2016. 
 
 AG ¶ 8(b) is established. Applicant served honorably in the British Army for 21 
years, including two years as an exchange officer with the US Army, during which he 
held a limited clearance from the DOD and established a track record of protecting 
sensitive and classified information. While serving as an exchange officer, he developed 
a strong affinity for the United States. Since Applicant’s immigration to the United States 
in August 2001, he has developed deep and long-standing relationships and loyalties in 
the United States. When presented with an opportunity to pursue a second career as a 
US citizen, he and his family jumped at the opportunity, moved to the United States, and 
became US citizens as soon as possible. His children have established careers in the 
United States. He has substantial financial interests in the United States. He has been 
employed by US defense contractors for more than 17 years. As a US citizen and the 
employee of a defense contractor, he has earned a reputation as a talented, honest, 
dependable, and loyal member of the US defense establishment.  
 
 AG ¶ 8(c) is established for most of Applicant’s former comrades in arms except 
for the retired brigadier, the retired officer for whose son Applicant is a godfather, and 
the retired officer who is the godfather for one of Applicant’s sons. Applicant’s only 
contact with the active-duty lieutenant general was the one unexpected meeting in 
February 2016. 
 
 AG ¶ 8(d) is established for the February 2016 meeting with the lieutenant 
general, which was during official US business. 
 
 AG ¶ 8(e) is established for the retired brigadier and the four retired officers with 
whom Applicant maintains contact. He disclosed those relationships in his two SCAs 
and during interviews with security investigators. There is no evidence in the record 
showing a requirement for after-the-fact reporting of the unexpected meeting with the 
lieutenant general. 
 
 AG ¶ 8(f) is established. Whatever inheritance, if any, Applicant may receive after 
the demise of his ailing mother is substantially outweighed by his financial interests in 
the United States. Department Counsel conceded that its concern is based on 
Applicant’s retired military status and his ongoing relationships with British officers. 
Thus, there is no issue regarding the likelihood that that Applicant’s military pension and 
entitlement to a retirement pension at age 67 would be leveraged by the UK 
Government to coerce him to disclose sensitive or classified information is not at issue. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
 
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security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances and applying the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d).5  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B and C (in my original 
decision) in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant has 
been candid and open throughout the security-clearance process. He retains an affinity 
for certain cultural aspects of the United Kingdom, but he has clearly demonstrated his 
loyalty to his adopted country. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions 
under Guidelines B and C, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole 
person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his former 
life as a British military officer, his continued affinity for his former friends and comrades 
in arms, his minimal foreign financial interests, and his family members residing in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C (Foreign Preference): FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e:    For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline B (Foreign Influence):  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.e:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the 
United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance 
is granted. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge 
                                                          
5 The factors are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances 
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the 
conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which 
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral 
changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.