KEYWORD: Guideline K
DIGEST: With regard to SOR ¶¶ 1.c-1.f, he argues that he had a need-to-know the information
in question.  The issue of Applicant’s need-to-know is not pertinent to the security concerns
raised in this case.  SOR ¶¶ 1.c-1.f do not raise concerns about the legality of Applicant’s access
to the information in question; instead, they raise concerns about how he handled that
information.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASENO: 17-03588.a1
DATE: 03/07/2019
DATE: March 7, 2019
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 17-03588
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On
January 19, 2018, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline K (Handling Protected Information) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On December 11, 2018, after the hearing, Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Elizabeth M. Matchinski denied Applicant’s request for a
security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal:  whether the Judge’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  Consistent with the following, we affirm.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact and Analysis  
Applicant, who is 70 years old, has worked for his defense-contractor employer since 1987. 
He has a doctorate degree and was initially granted a security clearance in 1979.  Over the years, he
has received security refresher, classified information user, and related briefings. 
The SOR alleged that Applicant risked a data spill when he directed a secretary to type a
memorandum containing protected information on an unclassified computer in 1995 and did not
inform security officials of the potential data spill (SOR ¶ 1.a).   It also alleged that he improperly
emailed protected information on an unclassified network causing data spills in 1998 (SOR ¶ 1.b),
2006 (SOR ¶ 1.c), 2013 (SOR ¶ 1.d), 2014 (SOR ¶ 1.e), and 2016 (SOR ¶ 1.f).  The Judge found in
favor of Applicant on SOR ¶ 1.b and against him on the remaining allegations.  
Applicant’s security incidents were not deliberate but persisted despite counseling.  In 1995,
he created multiple copies of a document that should have been marked Secret.  Upon learning that
error, he asked his secretary to retrieve them, but did not notify security officials.  Not all copies of
the document were retrieved, some were apparently discarded in the trash.  His noncompliance with
reporting requirements may have led to compromise.  Additionally, his commission of four other
security violations since 2006 continues to cast doubt on his ability to handle classified information
appropriately.  
Discussion
In his appeal brief, Applicant notes he submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) in 2013 and argues that he was forced to submit another before
his five-year periodic submission was due.  Further, he contends that “[i]t is illegal to perform e-QIP
investigations in less than 3 years without merits . . . .”  Appeal Brief at 1.  However, nothing in the
Directive gives DOHA Judges or the Appeal Board jurisdiction or authority to pass judgment on the
necessity or sufficiency of security clearance investigations.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-19823 at
3-4 (App. Bd. Dec. 3, 2003).  Additionally, there is no right to a security clearance.  Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Nor does a prior favorable security clearance decision
give rise to a vested right or interest in continued retention of a security clearance.  To the extent that
Applicant’s argument could be construed as raising the question whether DoD is equitably estopped
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from denying or revoking his security clearance, it is unpersuasive.  The Federal Government is not
restricted in reviewing an applicant’s security clearance eligibility; especially, as in this case, when
an applicant has one or more security violations since submitting his or her previous e-QIP. 
Applicant’s prior favorable clearance determinations do not entitle him to continued retention of a
security clearance.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-19823 at 5. 
Applicant makes other arguments that we do not find persuasive.  First, he argues that,
because the Judge found for him on SOR ¶ 1.b, this confirms he always handled classified material
in an authorized location with no unauthorized persons present and, as a result, he never committed
the alleged security violation in SOR ¶ 1.a.  This argument is based on a false premise that the
Judge’s favorable finding under SOR ¶ 1.b is evidence as to how he handles classified material.  In
her findings, the Judge noted that the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b was apparently based on Applicant’s
2013 background interview in which his statements regarding an incident 15 years ago may have
actually been referring to the 1995 incident alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a.  The Judge’s conclusion that the
evidence fell short of establishing the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b does not support Applicant’s argument
that such a determination somehow establishes that the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a lacks merits. 
Second, with regard to SOR ¶¶ 1.c-1.f, he argues that he had a need-to-know the information in
question.  The issue of Applicant’s need-to-know is not pertinent to the security concerns raised in
this case.  SOR ¶¶ 1.c-1.f do not raise concerns about the legality of Applicant’s access to the
information in question; instead, they raise concerns about how he handled that information.  
Applicant also questions whether his company may have erred in its security procedures. 
Specifically, he contends that, while he knew the classification guide used in his department,  he did
not know the classification guide used in another department and other individuals failed in their
responsibilities to collect certain information from him.  At the hearing, the Government offered into
evidence investigation reports for each of the security violations that the Judge found against
Applicant.  Government Exhibits 3-11.  Each report concluded that Applicant committed the security
violation being investigated.  We give deference to the findings and conclusion of security personnel
in such investigations.   See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 15-08385 at 4 (App. Bd. May 23, 2018) (citing
ISCR Case No. 10-07070 at 8 (App. Bd. Apr. 19, 2012) for the proposition, “[B]ecause of the unique
position of employers as actual administrators of classified programs and the degree of knowledge
possessed by them in any particular case, their determinations and characterizations regarding
security violations are entitled to considerable deference, and should not be discounted or
contradicted without a cogent explanation.”).  We conclude Applicant’s argument that the company
erred in its security procedures is an insufficient basis to challenge successfully the Judge’s
unfavorable findings or conclusions under Guideline K.  
The balance of Applicant’s arguments amount to a disagreement with the Judge’s weighing
of the evidence.  In those arguments, he cites to such matters as his honesty and integrity in
disclosing his security incidents, the frequency of his security violations, and the length of time that
has passed since his last incident.  These arguments, however, are not sufficient to show that the
Judge weighed the evidence in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.   See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 14-06440 at 4 (App. Bd. Jan. 8, 2016).  Once it is established that an applicant has
committed security violations, he or she has a “very heavy burden” to mitigate the resulting security
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concerns,  insofar as security violations “strike at the heart of the Industrial Security Program.”  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 11-09219 at 3 (App. Bd.  Mar. 31, 2014).  
The Judge examined the relevant evidence and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the
decision.  The decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, at 528.  See also Directive, Encl. 2, App A. ¶ 2(b):  “Any doubt concerning
personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national
security.”
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Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Ra’anan        
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody          
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James F. Duffy            
James F. Duffy
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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