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      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
) ISCR Case No. 18-01473 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Dave Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under Guideline B, foreign 
influence. He has numerous on-going contacts with citizens and/or residents of 
Afghanistan and/or Pakistan. Additionally, his extramarital affair with a foreign national 
created an unmitigated heightened risk for exploitation. He successfully mitigated the 
Guideline E, personal conduct security concern. National security eligibility for access to 
classified information is denied.  
Statement of the Case 
On August 22, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security 
concerns under Guidelines B, foreign influence, and E, personal conduct. The action was 
taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within 
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive); and Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 4, National Security 
Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), implemented June 8, 2017.  
03/14/2019
 
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 Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR on September 18, 2018, and elected 
to have his case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel 
submitted its file of relevant material (FORM) on January 28, 2019. Applicant received it 
on February 10, 2019. The Government’s evidence is identified as Items 1 through 11. 
The FORM notified Applicant that he had an opportunity to file objections and submit 
material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. 
Applicant submitted a one-page email in response to the FORM (Response) within the 
time period. Items 1 through 7 are admitted into the record. The case was assigned to me 
on March 4, 2019.  
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
 In the FORM, the Government requested I take administrative notice of certain 
facts relating to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Department Counsel provided summaries of 
the facts, supported by Government documents pertaining to Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
marked as Items 8 through 11. I take administrative notice of the facts included in the 
U.S. Government reports. They are limited to matters of general knowledge, not subject 
to reasonable dispute. They are set out in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Pursuant to Additional Procedural Guidance ¶¶ E3.1.2, E3.1.3, E3.1.7, and 
E3.1.13 of the Directive, Department Counsel moved in the FORM to amend the SOR 
issued to Applicant to conform to the evidence. Applicant raised no objections to the 
amendment in his Response, and I grant the motion. The SOR ¶ 1.j is amended to: 
 
1.j. You have provided approximately $1,000 in financial support to your 
father-in-law. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.g and 1.j. He denied SOR ¶¶ 1.h, 1.i, 
and 2.a. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the 
following findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is a 31-year-old linguist for a government contractor, with whom he has 
been employed since October 2017. He previously worked as a linguist in Afghanistan 
for another government contractor from 2011 to 2014. He was injured while in Afghanistan 
and recuperated in the United States from January 2012 to April 2012. He returned to 
Afghanistan until 2014. It is unknown whether his injury related to his job as a linguist. 
(Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
 
Applicant was born in Afghanistan. He attended high school in Pakistan. He 
immigrated to the United States in 2008. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 2017. He 
resides in a home owned by his father in the United States. His mother, father, and 
brothers are citizens and residents of the United States. His sister is a permanent resident 
in the United Sates and a citizen of Afghanistan. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
 
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 In 2014, Applicant married his wife in Pakistan. Together, they have one child born 
in 2017. His wife is a 24-year-old citizen of Afghanistan and resides with Applicant in the 
United States. She is a homemaker. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a 38-year-old citizen and 
resident in Afghanistan. She is a homemaker. Applicant’s father-in-law is a 49-year-old 
citizen and resident in Afghanistan. He is self-employed in an import-export business. 
Applicant disclosed on his security clearance application that he sent his father-in-law 
$500 twice. Applicant later corrected this statement to clarify that he sent his father-in-law 
two payments totaling $500 to assist with Applicant’s wife’s move to the United States. 
Applicant has not spoken to his in-laws since his wedding. The record does not indicate 
the frequency at which Applicant’s wife contacts her parents or if she visits them in 
Afghanistan. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
  
 Applicant’s grandmother is a citizen of Afghanistan and resident in Pakistan. 
Applicant last had in-person contact with her in 2014. Applicant maintains monthly 
telephonic contact with his grandmother. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
 
 Applicant has two cousins who are citizens of Afghanistan, but reside in Pakistan. 
Neither cousin has served in the military. They are both self-employed. The SOR alleged 
that Applicant sent approximately $12,000 in support to one of his cousins. That allegation 
was based upon Applicant’s disclosure on his security clearance application that he 
provided his cousin $2,000 on six occasions. Applicant denied that amount in his Answer. 
He recalculated the funds sent to his cousin by adding up receipts for the transactions 
and found that he sent a total of $3,105 over four to five years. (Answer; Item 3; Item 4; 
Item 5; Item 6.) He indicated: 
 
The reason of sending this amount is because of my spouse expenses and 
my own cloths, dry fruit and because of Muslim Eid occasion where we sent 
money to do Sacrifices of a Goat, cow [sic] from behalf of me and my family. 
(Answer.) 
 
 Applicant maintained contact with two childhood friends. One is a citizen of 
Afghanistan who resides in Pakistan. This friend is a student and supports himself by 
performing odd jobs. Applicant speaks to him once or twice a year by phone. The other 
is a citizen and resident of Pakistan. He runs a gas station. Neither friend has “military 
experience.” Applicant last saw the second friend in 2014 at Applicant’s wedding, and has 
one or two telephone conversations with him yearly. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) 
 
 Applicant had an extramarital relationship with an Afghan citizen residing in the 
United Kingdom from approximately October 30, 2017 to January 2018. They met on a 
social media platform. The relationship ended after the woman became engaged to marry 
another man. She was a student and worked part-time in an electronics store. Applicant 
has not had contact with her since January 2018. Applicant told “his wife he was traveling 
to England to visit a friend, and that is all she is required to know . . . in his culture he is 
not required to tell his wife any further information.” He did not plan to tell his wife about 
his extramarital relationship. Applicant did not feel the information could be used to 
 
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blackmail him because he knows his wife “would never believe he would ever be 
unfaithful.” (Answer.) 
 
Applicant failed to list the woman with whom he had the extramarital affair with on 
his November 17, 2017 security clearance application under foreign contacts. However, 
he denied that the omission was intentional. (Item 3; Item 4; Item 5; Item 6.) He explained: 
 
I have mention[ed] [name omitted] during my CI interview with full detail and 
the reason [I] first missed it to put it in (e-QIP) Maybe because [I] didn’t 
double check my all detail and was unable to put everything’s which [I] 
should have, it [was] also possible because when there is too much paper 
work there is always a chance a person missed some of the information to 
put because naturally a person want to finish things in a hurry. (Answer.) 
 
 Applicant provided a copy of his itinerary showing that he flew to London in October 
2, 2017, and returned early November 2017. His child was born the day after his return 
to the United States. He disclosed this travel on his security clearance application and 
listed the purpose of his trip as “tourism.” He disclosed his extramarital affair with the 
resident of the United Kingdom at his November 20, 2017 counterintelligence screening. 
(Item 6.) The next day, November 21, 2017, he signed his security clearance application. 
(Item 4.) Despite disclosing the extramarital relationship to the Government, his wife does 
not know of the affair. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
The U.S. Department of State has issued a travel warning for Afghanistan, due to 
crime, terrorism, civil unrest, and armed conflict. It notes that travel to all areas of 
Afghanistan is unsafe due to the ongoing risk of kidnapping, hostage taking, military 
combat operations, suicide bombings, and insurgent attacks. Attacks may target official 
Afghan and U.S. governmental convoys and compounds. Extremists associated with 
Taliban networks and the Islamic State are active throughout Afghanistan. Widespread 
human rights abuses are reported. (Item 9.) 
 
Pakistan 
 
 The U.S. Department of State has issued a travel warning for Pakistan due to 
terrorist threats. Terrorists in Pakistan attack with little or no warning and target public 
places like shopping malls, airports, universities, military installations, and tourist 
locations. Further, human rights abuses including extrajudicial and targeted killings, 
disappearances, torture, lack of rule of law, and vigilante justice exist in Pakistan. (Item 
10.) 
  
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s national security eligibility, the administrative judge 
must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, 
 
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the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used 
in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known 
as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have 
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence 
contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere 
speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Directive ¶ E3.1.15 states an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. 
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, 
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Finally, Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms 
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
 
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Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. Four are potentially applicable in this case:   
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology;  
 
(e) shared living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship 
status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(i) conduct, especially while traveling or residing outside the U.S., that may 
make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a 
foreign person, group, government, or country. 
 
  Applicant has close connections to his wife, who is a citizen of Afghanistan, 
residing with Applicant in the United States. Her parents are citizens of and residents in 
Afghanistan. Applicant’s grandmother, with whom he has monthly contact, is a citizen of 
Afghanistan residing in Pakistan. His cousins and friends are residents of Pakistan. 
Further, there is an articulated heightened risk associated with having ties to family 
members and friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan, due to the activities of terrorist 
organizations and human rights abuses within their borders. There is also a heightened 
risk associated with having an extramarital affair with a foreign national. His extramarital 
relationship with an Afghan citizen residing in the United Kingdom may make him 
vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, 
or country. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.  
 
 
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 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the agency head or designee; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements 
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, 
groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be 
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
 
 Applicant failed to meet his burden to present sufficient evidence to establish any 
of the above mitigating conditions. Applicant is in contact with his family and friends in 
both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He provided some financial support to his family in 
Pakistan. Due to Applicant’s relationship with his family, and the terrorist threats and 
human rights abuses in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I cannot find it is unlikely he would be 
placed in a position of choosing between them and the interests of the United States. 
Further, his wife is not aware of his extramarital affair. He could be subject to coercion as 
a result. He failed to demonstrate deep and longstanding loyalties to the United States 
that would demonstrate he would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. 
interest. While he is credited for his years of service to the United States as a linguist, the 
record contains little information on assets, or physical or emotional bonds to the United 
States, aside from the presence of his immediate family, parents and siblings in the United 
States. Without more information, it cannot be determined that Applicant would resolve 
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.  
 
 
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Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern for personal conduct:  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information or sensitive information. Of special interest is any 
failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national 
security investigative or adjudicative processes.  
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. I find the following potentially applicable:  
 
(a) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts 
from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, 
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security 
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities. 
 
Applicant failed to identify a foreign contact when he omitted his girlfriend on his 
November 2017 security clearance application, even though he had visited her in England 
just 19 days prior to completing the form. However, that omission was not intentional, as 
he had reported his extramarital relationship to the Government during his 
counterintelligence screening the day prior to submitting his security clearance 
application. He also reported his travel to the United Kingdom. AG ¶ 16(a) is not 
applicable.1  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
                                                          
1 The SOR did not allege Applicant’s extramarital affair was disqualifying because it was conduct that 
created a vulnerability to exploitation under Guideline E. As a result, it is not proper to consider his 
extramarital affair as disqualifying outside of the falsification allegation under Guideline E. However, it is 
appropriate for examination under the whole-person concept. 
 
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(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for 
a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept. Applicant 
served honorably as a linguist. However, the record lacks information to support a finding 
that he would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. He has placed 
himself in a position that could easily lend itself to coercion by participating in an 
extramarital affair with a foreign national, and concealing that relationship from his then 
pregnant wife. His indiscretion was recent, and he has provided no evidence of 
rehabilitation. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light 
of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me with doubts as to Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance. He 
failed to meet his burden to mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for 
foreign influence. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:        AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.j  Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:        FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a     For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant access to classified 
information. National security eligibility is denied. 
                                                     
_____________________________ 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge