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        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE        
 DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS          
In the matter of: )
)
) ISCR Case No. 18-01763 
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Michelle Tilford, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Alexander Laughlin, Esq. 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
04/26/2019
BENSON, Pamela C., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant’s longstanding U.S. ties and his strong devotion to the United States 
mitigate security concerns raised by his familial relations in South Sudan. Foreign 
influence security concerns are mitigated. Clearance is granted. 
History of Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on August 25, 2016. 
On July 3, 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The action was taken under 
Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on June 8, 2017.    
Applicant answered the SOR on July 27, 2018, and requested a hearing before an 
administrative judge. I was assigned to the case on October 29, 2018. On December 31, 
2018, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the 
hearing was scheduled for January 16, 2019. I convened the hearing as scheduled. 
Government’s Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 and Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through V, were 
 
 
 
 
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admitted without objection. Applicant called two witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
Applicant testified, and I agreed to hold the record open until February 16, 2019, in the 
event either party wanted to submit additional documents. Applicant submitted two 
documents post-hearing (AE C and D), which are admitted without objection. I received 
the completed transcript (Tr.) on January 25, 2019. 
 
Administrative Notice 
 
 I took administrative notice of facts concerning South Sudan. Those facts are set 
forth in the Government’s Request for Administrative Notice for South Sudan. (GE 1) 
These documents are included in the record. Administrative or official notice is the 
appropriate type of notice used for administrative proceedings. See McLeod v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986). Usually 
administrative notice at security clearance proceedings is accorded to facts that are either 
well known or from government reports. See Stein, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Section 
25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). The 
facts administratively noticed are limited to matters of general knowledge and matters not 
subject to reasonable dispute. (Tr. 14; GE 1) 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
In his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted all of the SOR allegations. 
Applicant is approximately 34 years old,1 and he was born in South Sudan. In 1993, when 
he was approximately 8 years old, he left South Sudan and travelled to a refugee camp 
with his older brother. He is considered to be one of the “Lost Boys of Sudan.”2 At the end 
of 1993, Applicant’s uncle, a Catholic priest, took Applicant and his brother out of the 
refugee camp to raise them. Applicant received a scholarship and attended a boarding 
school in Nairobi, Kenya. (Tr. 21-29, 87; AE A, AE B, AE C, AE D, AE E, AE H) 
 
In May 2007, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services notified Applicant that 
his request for refugee status had been approved under Section 207(a) of the U.S. 
Immigration and Nationality Act. On August 6, 2007, Applicant arrived in the United 
States. His airfare was paid by the Church World Service. His only requirement upon 
arrival to the U.S. was to register for Selective Service, which Applicant accomplished. 
(Tr. 21-29, 87; AE A, AE B, AE C, AE D, AE E, AE H) 
 
After arriving in the U.S., Applicant immediately sought full time employment and 
attended school. During his employment as a caregiver for individuals with developmental 
disabilities, Applicant received an award as employee of the month, and in 2010, he was 
awarded employee of the year. Applicant attended college, and he paid for his tuition with 
Pell grants, academic scholarships, and student loans. In December 2012, he became a 
                                            
1 Applicant does not know his actual date of birth and this is an estimated date of birth. 
 
2 The Lost Boys of Sudan was the name given to a group of over 20,000 boys who were displaced or 
orphaned during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1987-2005). The boys embarked on treacherous 
journeys to refugee camps. (Wikipedia) 
 
 
 
 
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naturalized U.S. citizen. The day after he took his oath of citizenship, Applicant graduated 
from college with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering. (Tr. 33-39; AE K) 
 
In 2013, Applicant took a trip to Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. This is the only 
trip he has taken to visit South Sudan. He used his U.S. passport for travel and disclosed 
all travel information on his SCA. He stayed for approximately two weeks in his city of 
birth visiting his mother, sister and five brothers. After he returned to the U.S., Applicant 
moved to another state to start his career as an engineer. He took a position in August 
2016 with his current employer, a Federal contractor.  
 
Applicant is required to attend security training at his place of employment, even 
though he does not currently possess a DOD security clearance. Applicant has learned 
that if an individual expresses any special interest in his work duties, he will immediately 
report that information to his facility security officer. No one, including his family members 
in South Sudan, have asked any detailed questions about his work with a Federal 
contractor. If any of his family members were threatened due to his status as a U.S. citizen 
or DOD contractor, Applicant would also immediately report that information to his 
security officer. (Tr. 39-49, 84-85) 
 
Applicant makes approximately $91,000 annually. He is financially stable and pays 
his student loans, car payment, and monthly bills. He also repaid his airfare expense to 
the World Church Service. He is current on all of his Federal, state, and local taxes. He 
is not married and does not have any children. (Tr. 49-50, 57-58; AE N, AE M, AE P, AE 
Q) 
 
SOR ¶ 1.a alleges that Applicant’s mother is citizen and resident of South Sudan. 
The SOR also alleges that he has five brothers and a sister, who are also citizens and 
residents of South Sudan. (SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c.) He admitted these allegations. Applicant 
calls one of his family members approximately every three weeks. His mother is 
approximately 68, and she currently resides with two of his brothers in a single room hut 
in a village. His mother has no formal education and is a subsistence farmer. Applicant’s 
family have no connection to the government or military of South Sudan. (Tr. 84, 88 
 
The two brothers who reside with Applicant’s mother provide for her needs as 
farmers. Since he graduated from college, Applicant has provided financial support for 
his mother. In 2014 he sent his family $1,985. In 2015, he sent $8,330, which was money 
for his mother and for a brother who wanted to finish his college education. In 2016 he 
sent $252; in 2017 he sent $255; and in 2018 he sent $775. In addition, whenever 
Applicant is overseas for work, he sends about $200 to $300 every three months to family 
members. Applicant reported all pertinent information on his SCA and to the authorized 
DOD investigator during his background interview. He does not have any financial 
interests in South Sudan. (Tr. 62- 66, 71-77; GE 2, GE 3; AE V) 
 
Applicant expressed his desire to serve the United States because this country 
gave him a new beginning. He believes that working with a company that provides secure 
facilities for Americans around the world is a good opportunity for him to give back to this 
 
 
 
 
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country. Applicant considers himself to be 100 percent loyal to the United States of 
America. (Tr. 77-78, 91) 
 
Administrative Notice – South Sudan3 
 
 South Sudan became an independent nation in July 2011. Shortly thereafter, 
conflict broke out between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-
North in states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (together known as the Two Areas), 
which resulted in 1.1 million internally displaced persons or severely affected persons 
needing humanitarian assistance. A separate conflict broke out in the western region of 
Darfur in 2003, displacing nearly 2 million people and causing thousands of deaths. 
Fighting in both the Two Areas and Darfur has largely subsided, however the civilian 
populations are affected by low-level violence including inter-tribal conflict and banditry, 
largely a result of weak rule of law. The United Nations (UN) and the African Union have 
jointly commanded a Darfur peacekeeping operation (UNAMID) since 2007. 
Peacekeeping troops have struggled to address insecurity in Darfur and have increasingly 
become targets for attacks by armed groups. Sudan also has faced refugee influxes from 
neighboring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, and 
South Sudan. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and denial of access by both 
the government and armed opposition have impeded the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to affected populations. Of note, in June 2018, the United States State 
Department reported South Sudan travel advisory at:  
 
Level 4 – Do not travel to South Sudan due to crime and armed conflict. 
Violent crime, such as carjackings, shootings, ambushes, assaults, 
robberies, and kidnappings is common throughout South Sudan, including 
Juba. Armed conflict is ongoing throughout the country and includes fighting 
between various political and ethnic groups, and weapons are readily 
available to the population.  
 
 The UN, human rights organizations, and media reported the government or its 
agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces, opposition forces, armed 
militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and ethnically based groups 
were also responsible for extrajudicial killings in conflict zones.4 South Sudan is not 
known for intelligence collection efforts against the United States or U.S. citizens. 
 
Policies 
 
This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
                                            
3 The information herein on South Sudan is generally taken from GE 1. 
4 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, United States Department of State, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 
 
 
 
 
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1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became 
effective on June 8, 2017. 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction 
with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2, describing the adjudicative process. The administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. 
 
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number 
of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must 
consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable 
and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security 
eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.”  
 
According to Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to 
establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant 
is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision.  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. 
Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, 
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant 
concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access 
to classified or sensitive information).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
    
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern relating to the guideline for foreign influence is set out in 
AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
The guideline includes several conditions that could raise security concerns under 
AG ¶ 7. The following are potentially applicable in this case:  
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information or technology. 
 
The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, 
as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in 
a foreign country and an applicant has contacts with that relative, that factor alone is 
sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the 
compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 
15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
AG ¶ 7(a) requires evidence of a “heightened risk.” The “heightened risk” required 
to raise this disqualifying condition is a relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes 
a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a close relationship with an individual 
living under a foreign government. The mere possession of a close relationship with an 
individual in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. 
If an applicant has such a relationship, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential 
 
 
 
 
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for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified 
information.5  
 
As noted, a heightened risk is associated with South Sudan with its persistent 
violence and human-rights problems. The evidence and Applicant’s admissions are 
sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.  
 
Here, Applicant’s relationship to his extended family members in South Sudan is 
far deeper and more than casual, as previously reported. Applicant maintains frequent 
and regular contact with family members in South Sudan. He has repeatedly provided 
financial support for his mother and for his brother’s college education. After considering 
and weighing the evidence, I find that Applicant did not rebut the legal presumption of 
close familial bonds or ties to his family in South Sudan. The relationship with his mother, 
sister, and five brothers leaves him vulnerable to foreign influence, and creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation and coercion and the potential risk for a conflict of 
interest. AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are established. 
 
After the Government produced substantial evidence of those disqualifying 
conditions, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut them or otherwise prove mitigation. 
The guideline includes several conditions that could mitigate security concerns under AG 
¶ 8. The following are potentially applicable in this case:  
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;   
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
An applicant with relatives, financial interests or other substantial 
connections to a foreign country faces a high, but not insurmountable hurdle, in 
mitigating security concerns raised by such foreign ties. An applicant is not 
required “to sever all ties with a foreign country before he or she can be granted 
                                            
5 See generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. 
Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
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access to classified information.”6 However, what factor or combination of factors 
may mitigate security concerns raised by an applicant with relatives in a foreign 
country is not easily identifiable or quantifiable.7 Moreover, an applicant with 
familial or other connections to a hostile foreign country faces a heavy burden in 
mitigating security concerns raised by such foreign ties.8 
 
Applicant’s strong and longstanding ties to the United States, including his 
work as a Federal contractor, raises favorable inferences regarding his suitability. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that South Sudan has tried to use his family as 
a means to influence him. The government has no burden of showing that South 
Sudan officials have attempted to exploit Applicant; however, if such evidence 
existed, it would cause grave security concerns about foreign influence. His oath 
of allegiance to the United States and Applicant’s security training, honesty in self-
reporting his foreign connections, and the candor he exhibited at hearing are 
sufficient to fully mitigate the security concerns raised by Applicant’s familial 
connections to South Sudan. Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest with respect to South Sudan in favor of the United States.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing 
of national security eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person. 
An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG 
¶ 2(d): 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation 
and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; 
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 I have incorporated my comments under the guideline at issue in my whole-person 
analysis, and I have considered the factors in AG ¶ 2(d). After weighing the disqualifying 
and mitigating conditions under this guideline, and evaluating all the evidence in the 
                                            
6 ISCR Case No. 07-13739 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 12, 2008). 
 
7 ISCR Case No. 11-12202 at 5 (App. Bd. June 23, 2014). 
 
8 ISCR Case No. 12-05092 at 5 (App. Bd. Mar. 22, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
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context of the whole person and the heightened risk associated with South Sudan, 
Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence security concerns at issue.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as 
required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c:   For Applicant  
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the 
United States to grant Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance 
is granted. 
                                        
         
     
 
Pamela C. Benson 
Administrative Judge