1 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
) ISCR Case No. 18-01955 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
For Government: Tara Karoian, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Ryan C. Nerney, Esq. 
______________ 
Decision 
______________ 
GLENDON, John Bayard, Administrative Judge: 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines B (foreign influence) 
and C (foreign preference). Applicant, a U.S. citizen, chose to become an Israeli citizen 
and to live and work in Israel for a number of years. She also has substantial retirement 
assets in an account in Israel. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
Statement of the Case 
On August 25, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) sent Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security 
concerns under Guidelines B and C. The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended 
(Exec. Or.); DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance 
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative 
guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security 
Adjudicative Guidelines (December 10, 2016), for all adjudicative decisions on or after 
June 8, 2017. 
04/30/2019
 
2 
 
 The SOR alleges under Guideline C that Applicant acquired Israeli citizenship in 
August 1997 even though she was a U.S. citizen by birth. The SOR alleges under 
Guideline B that she has a pension fund in Israel with a value of approximately U.S. 
$109,000 and a bank account in Israel with a current balance of approximately U.S. 
$16,000. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR on September 14, 2018, (SOR Response) and 
provided extensive background information and a number of character references. In her 
SOR Response, she admitted each allegation of the SOR with explanations. She 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was initially assigned to 
another judge, but on December 13, 2018, the case was reassigned to me. On January 
3, 2019, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing 
scheduling the hearing to be held on January 10, 2019, via video tele-conference. I 
convened the hearing as scheduled.  
 
Department Counsel offered two documents into evidence, which were marked as 
Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2. These exhibits were admitted into evidence without 
objection. She also offered the Government’s request for administrative notice regarding 
Israel, which I have marked as Government Administrative Notice (GAN) I. Applicant had 
no objection to Department Counsel’s administrative notice request. Applicant testified 
and offered 33 exhibits, which were marked as Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through GG 
and were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant’s counsel also offered a 
request that I take administrative notice of certain additional facts regarding Israel. He 
marked this request as AE HH, and I have remarked this as Applicant Administrative 
Notice (AAN) I. Department Counsel had no objection to Applicant’s request. Two 
character witnesses also testified on behalf of Applicant. DOHA received the transcript of 
the hearing (Tr.) on January 25, 2019.  
 
Request for Administrative Notice  
 
As noted, Department Counsel and Applicant’s counsel requested that I take 
administrative notice of certain facts about Israel. The facts administratively noticed are 
summarized in the Findings of Fact, below. 
 
Findings of Fact1 
 
 Based upon Applicant’s admissions in her SOR Response and a careful review of 
her testimony and that of her character witnesses, the documentary evidence admitted 
into the record, the extensive, additional information provided by Applicant in her SOR 
Response, and the parties’ administrative notice requests, I make the following findings 
of fact. 
 
                                                          
1 Applicant’s personal information is extracted from her security clearance application, dated January 19, 
2016, (GE 1), unless otherwise indicated by a parenthetical citation to the record. 
 
3 
 
Applicant is a 60-year-old software engineer, who is now specialized as a web 
developer. She has worked and studied in the information technology and related fields 
for most of her adult life. From 1997 until January 2015, she lived and worked in Israel. 
In 1997, she obtained employment in Israel as a software engineer for a German 
company. She then worked as an analyst for an Israeli contractor of an international 
technology company. From June 2007 until January 2015, she worked as a technical 
writer for an Israeli-based technology company. In January 2015, she relocated from 
Israel to the United States and was unemployed for about a year. In January 2016, she 
began working for her security clearance sponsor. While unemployed and living in the 
United States, she sought employment, and for a period, she was a full-time student 
taking classes in computer coding. (GE 2 at 3-4; SOR Response 3-4; AE B at 1; Tr. 15-
17 and 34.) 
 
 Applicant was born and educated in the United States. In 1980, she earned a 
bachelor’s of science degree in computer science-mathematics. She has never married 
and has no children. Her mother, father, stepmother, sister, brother-in-law, and their 
children are U.S. citizens and residents. (Tr. 44.) 
 
 In 1997, Applicant acquired Israeli citizenship under the Israeli Aliyah program 
based upon her Jewish heritage and her desire to live and work in Israel. She chose to 
do this because she wanted to experience her Jewish heritage. She was about 39 years 
old at the time. In her SOR Response, she wrote that “it would have been incredibly 
difficult, probably impossible, to work for [the German company] in Israel without acquiring 
citizenship.” She testified at the hearing that she understood that it would be “very difficult 
to obtain a work visa” in Israel. She provided no collaborating evidence to support her 
vague claim that becoming an Israeli citizen was “probably” a prerequisite to being able 
to live and work in Israel. She noted in her SOR Response that she carefully confirmed 
that by becoming an Israeli citizen, she would not adversely affect her status as a U.S. 
citizen. She is presently a dual U.S. and Israeli citizen. She acquired an Israeli passport 
in 1998, which she renewed in 2010. Her passport expires in 2020. In connection with her 
application for a security clearance, she surrendered this passport to her sponsor’s 
Facility Security Officer (FSO), but when federal personnel security policy regarding 
foreign passports was revised, the FSO returned Applicant’s passport to her. Applicant 
has no intention to renew the passport when it expires.2 (GE 2 at 2-3; SOR Response 3, 
6, and 8; Tr. 21-22, 31, 35, and 41.) 
 
 During the period 1989 to 1997, Applicant lived and worked in Germany for an 
international technology company. She was permitted to work there without becoming a 
German citizen. At the hearing, she speculated that she might have had a German work 
visa, though she could not recall. She was about 31 years old when she moved to 
                                                          
2 Applicant has not returned to Israel since January 2015, but if she does, she must enter and exit Israel 
using her Israeli passport. Applicant’s FSO testified that Applicant had no need for her passport because 
she did not intend to return to Israel, at least as of the time she surrendered her passport to the FSO. 
Applicant testified that she has no “concrete plans” to visit Israel, but she is open to doing so in the future. 
She may have to return to Israel in 2021, however, after she turns 62 to close her pension and bank 
accounts there, which are detailed below. (GAN I at 4; Tr. 22-23 and 58-59.) 
 
4 
 
Germany for that employment. She worked for the same company in the United States 
for about two or three years before she transferred to Germany. Prior to relocating to 
Israel in 1997, she applied for and obtained an Israeli visa and then Israeli citizenship 
under the Aliyah program. She obtained employment with the Israeli subsidiary of the 
German company a number of months later. (GE 2 at 5; SOR Response 3; AE A; Tr. 36, 
43, and 45-49.) 
 
 While working in Israel, Applicant and her employer contributed to a retirement 
account, which presently has a value of U.S. $109,000. Prior to moving to Israel, she 
accumulated assets and retirement accounts held by U.S. financial institutions that are 
today worth more than $533,000. She also has assets in Germany worth about $6,000-
$7,000 that she acquired while working there. She does not have any significant, non-
financial assets in the United States, however, such as a residence. (Tr. 37-41 and 45-
46.) 
 
 Applicant’s Israeli pension account is similar to a U.S. company-sponsored 401K 
or retirement savings account. Her ability to establish and save these retirement funds 
are a benefit she received from her Israeli citizenship.3 She has chosen to leave the Israeli 
retirement assets in Israel because she would incur an Israeli tax penalty of 35 percent if 
she withdrew the funds before she was 62 years old. She also has a bank account in 
Israel with a balance of about U.S. $16,000. She maintains this account as a requirement 
to receive the Israeli pension funds when she turns 62 in about two years.4 At that time, 
she intends to close both accounts and transfer the funds to the United States. She 
believes it would be financially irresponsible to remove the retirement funds from the 
Israeli account at this time because of the tax penalty. She also believes that her Israeli 
assets could never be used for coercion or exploitation purposes. Although Applicant has 
stated that she is willing to renounce her Israeli citizenship, she told her FSO that she 
needed to maintain her Israeli citizenship to be eligible to receive her retirement assets in 
Israel. Applicant confirmed this by testifying that she would only be willing to renounce 
her Israeli citizenship if she were required to do so to obtain a U.S. security clearance 
and if she could do so after she closed her pension and bank accounts. She also testified 
that if she renounced her Israeli citizenship, she would lose her Israeli identification 
number, which is needed to access her Israeli pension and bank accounts.5 (SOR 
Response 6 and 8; Tr. 22-23, 27, 37-41, and 58-60.) 
 
 Since returning to the United States after living abroad for most of her adult life, 17 
years of which were in Israel, Applicant moved to a location far from where her parents 
and sister reside. She moved there to take classes in computer coding. She visits her 
                                                          
3 The SOR does not contain any allegations regarding Applicant’s exercise of the rights and benefits she 
received as an Israeli citizen. 
 
4 Applicant also testified that she left funds in that account for her future use if she returns to visit Israel. (Tr. 
58-59.) 
 
5 Applicant also testified that if she were to renounce her Israeli citizenship, she could probably reapply 
under the Aliyah program and obtain Israeli citizenship again. (Tr. 51-52.) 
 
5 
 
family members once or twice a year. Applicant has become involved in a local folk-
dancing community. She teaches and participates in several different kinds of dance 
classes and clubs and socializes with the other participants. The record evidence contains 
a large number of highly favorable reference letters. In addition, her sponsor’s FSO and 
her supervisor provided favorable testimony at the hearing regarding Applicant’s work 
ethic, character, trustworthiness, and loyalty and connections to her country of birth, the 
United States. (SOR Response 4 and 9; Tr. 52.) 
 
Israel 
 
 Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament called the 
Knesset and a prime minister, who exercises extensive executive power. Members of the 
Knesset, including the prime minister, are elected in free and fair elections. The United 
States recognized Israel as an independent state on May 14, 1948, and established 
diplomatic relations with Israel the following year. The United States and Israel have had 
strong bilateral relations since that period. The United States extends substantial foreign 
aid to Israel and provides significant military support as well. The United States is also 
Israel’s largest trading partner. Israel cooperates closely with the United States and other 
countries on counterterrorism issues. (AAN I at 2-7; GAN I at 2.) 
 
Despite its close relationship with the United States, Israeli has been involved in 
numerous instances of illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of U.S. restricted and 
classified technology and products, including dual-use technology. The illegally 
transferred technology and products obtained for Israel’s benefit includes spy software, 
encryption software, parts for fighter jets, components of U.S. HAWK surface-to-air 
missiles and F-4 Phantom fighter jets, and digital oscilloscopes capable of being used in 
the development of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery. (GAN I at 2-3.) 
 
Israel generally respects the rights of its citizens. When human-rights violations 
have occurred, they have involved Palestinian detainees or Arab-Israelis. Terrorist 
suicide bombings are a continuing threat in Israel, and U.S. citizens in Israel are advised 
to be cautious. (GAN I at 3-5.) 
 
Israel considers U.S. citizens, who also hold Israeli citizenship or have a claim to 
dual nationality, to be Israeli citizens for immigration and other legal purposes. Dual 
U.S.-Israeli citizens must enter and depart Israel using Israeli passports. U.S. citizens 
visiting Israel have been subjected to prolonged questioning and thorough searches by 
Israeli authorities upon entry or departure. (GAN I at 4-5.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
 
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eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.  
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules 
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge 
applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An 
administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense 
decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information 
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Exec. Or. 10865 
§ 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant 
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have 
established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria 
listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 
(App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016). 
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if 
they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
 The SOR contains one allegation under Guideline C. It alleges that Applicant 
acquired Israeli citizenship in August 1997, even though she was a U.S. citizen by birth. 
(SOR ¶ 1.a.)  
 
 The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 9, as follows: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide 
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United 
States. Foreign involvement raises concerns about an individual's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness when it is in conflict with U.S. 
national interests or when the individual acts to conceal it. By itself; the fact 
that a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of another country is not disqualifying 
without an objective showing of such conflict or attempt at concealment. 
The same is true for a U.S. citizen's exercise of any right or privilege of 
foreign citizenship and any action to acquire or obtain recognition of a 
foreign citizenship. 
 
 Applicant’s admissions in her SOR Response and the record evidence establish 
the following potentially disqualifying condition: 
 
 AG ¶ 10(a): applying for and/or acquiring citizenship in any other country. 
 
It is important to note that dual citizenship standing alone is not sufficient to warrant 
an adverse security clearance decision. ISCR Case No. 99-0454 at 5 (App. Bd. Oct. 17, 
2000). Under Guideline C, “the issue is not whether an applicant is a dual national, but 
rather whether an applicant shows a preference for a foreign country through actions.” 
ISCR Case No. 98-0252 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 15, 1999). The admitted fact that Applicant, 
a U.S. citizen, acquired Israeli citizenship is potentially disqualifying under this 
adjudicative guideline because her actions may show a preference for Israel over the 
United States. 
 
 The security concern under this guideline is not limited to countries hostile to the 
U.S. “Under the facts of a given case, an applicant’s preference, explicit or implied, even 
for a nation with which the U.S. has enjoyed long and peaceful relations, might pose a 
challenge to U.S. interests.” ADP Case No. 07-14939 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 11, 2009). AG 
¶ 10(a) makes this point by specifically referencing the act of acquiring citizenship “in any 
other country.” 
 
 
 
 
 
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 The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 11(a): the foreign citizenship is not in conflict with U.S. national 
security interests; 
 
AG ¶ 11(b): dual citizenship is based solely on parental citizenship or birth 
in a foreign country, and there is no evidence of foreign preference; 
 
AG ¶ 11(c): the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce the 
foreign citizenship that is in conflict with U.S. national security interests; 
 
AG ¶ 11(d): the exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign 
citizenship occurred before individual became a U.S. citizen; 
  
AG ¶ 11(e): the exercise of the entitlements or benefits of foreign citizenship 
do not present a national security concern; 
 
AG ¶ 11(f): the foreign preference, if detected, involves a foreign country, 
entity, or association that presents a low national security risk; 
 
AG ¶ 11(g): civil employment or military service was authorized under U.S. 
law, or the employment or service was otherwise consented to as required 
by U.S. law; and 
 
AG ¶ 11(h): any potentially disqualifying activity took place after receiving 
the approval by the agency head or designee. 
 
 The mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 11(b), (g), and (h) have no application 
under the facts of this case. AG ¶¶ 11(a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) have potential application 
and are discussed further below.  
 
 Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 11(a) has been partially established by the undisputed 
fact that the United States enjoys friendly relations with Israel. As noted above, however, 
the nature of the relations between the United States and Israel is not determinative. 
Under the facts of this case, Applicant’s expertise and employment in the area of 
information technology, both in Israel and now in the United States, raises the potential 
that her decision to become an Israeli citizen could create a conflict with U.S. national 
security interests. This conflict is illustrated by the pattern of numerous incidents over a 
number of years of U.S. export-controlled technologies being illegally imported by Israel 
and Israeli companies. In the circumstances of this case, Applicant’s choice to become 
an Israeli citizen creates a potential conflict with U.S. national security interests. 
Accordingly, AG ¶ 11(a) does  not fully apply. 
 
 Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 11(c) has been partially established because Applicant 
has expressed a willingness to renounce her Israeli citizenship. She, however, failed to 
 
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establish that it would be “financial responsible,” in her words, to do so if her renunciation 
of her citizenship could result in her loss of eligibility to collect her retirement account in 
Israel. Her FSO testified that Applicant admitted to her that Applicant maintains her Israeli 
citizenship so she can collect her pension in Israel when she turns 62. Applicant 
confirmed that she would lose her pension and bank accounts if she renounced her Israeli 
citizenship before she closed those accounts at age 62.  
 
To render Applicant’s stated willingness to renounce her Israeli citizenship more 
than just words, she has the burden to prove that if she renounces her Israeli citizenship, 
she could still collect her retirement account as a U.S. citizen or be willing to accept the 
loss of her Israeli retirement and bank accounts. Her testimony does not support either 
option. Moreover, she offered no evidence that she had even looked into the procedures 
for renunciation under Israeli law and the other possible consequences or taxes that 
might be imposed on her by the Israeli government if she did renounce her Israeli 
citizenship, or whether it is even possible to do so under Israeli law.  
 
Furthermore, Applicant presented no evidence that she could not have applied for 
an Israeli work visa to live and work in Israel as a U.S. citizen, especially as a U.S. citizen 
with valuable skills and experience in the information technology field. Her claim that her 
only alternative to achieve her desire to experience her Jewish heritage by living and 
working in Israel was to become an Israeli citizen required corroborating evidence that 
was not forthcoming. The absence of such evidence raises significant issues that her 
choice to become an Israeli citizen was a matter of preference rather than necessity for 
her to live and work in Israel. Under the facts of this case, Applicant’s expressed 
willingness to renounce her Israeli citizenship does not carry the same weight as it would 
for someone who obtained foreign citizenship by birth in a foreign country or through 
parents who are foreign citizens.  
 
Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 11(d) is not applicable under the facts of this case. The 
SOR does not allege Applicant’s exercise of her rights and privileges as an Israeli citizen.6 
Also, as a U.S. citizen by birth in this country, Applicant exercised the rights and privileges 
of her Israeli citizenship after, not before, she obtained her U.S. citizenship. This fact 
negates the application of this mitigating condition. 
 
Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 11(e) is applicable under the facts of this case. Separately 
considered, Applicant’s exercise of the entitlements and benefits of her Israeli citizenship 
do not present a national security concern. As noted, however, the SOR contains no 
allegations regarding Applicant’s exercise of the entitlements and benefits of her Israeli 
                                                          
6 Although the SOR does not allege Applicant’s exercise of the rights and benefits of Israeli citizenship as 
a disqualifying fact, the record reflects that in addition to accumulating a tax-advantaged pension account 
in Israel, she voted in Israeli elections, and as noted above, she maintains her Israeli citizenship to qualify 
to receive her Israeli pension when she turns 62. I also note that the record is silent as to whether Applicant 
is entitled to receive a pension from the Israeli government as a result of her 17 years of employment in 
that country. In light of the single SOR allegation under Guideline C regarding her acquiring Israeli 
citizenship in 1997, I have not considered Applicant’s exercise of her rights and benefits as an Israeli citizen 
as potentially disqualifying. 
 
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citizenship as disqualifying facts. As a result, this adjudicative guideline has no bearing 
on the security concerns alleged in the SOR. 
 
 Mitigation under AG ¶ 11(f) is not established. I have taken administrative notice 
of facts set forth above that demonstrate that under the facts of this case, Israel does not 
present a low national security risk. Applicant’s education, expertise, and experience in 
the information technology field combined with Israel’s extensive history of illegally 
acquiring U.S. technology undercuts a favorable mitigation conclusion under this 
adjudicative guideline. If Applicant was an elementary school teacher, a college professor 
of English literature, or a dance instructor, the analysis under this guideline might be 
different. Granting Applicant a security clearance so that she can work as a defense 
contractor on classified contracts creates a risk that any preference she holds for Israel 
could harm U.S. national security. The nature of the national security risk presented by 
the facts in this case cannot be characterized as “low.” 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The SOR sets forth two allegations under Guideline B regarding Applicant’s 
financial assets in Israel. The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6, 
as follows: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result 
in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they 
create circumstances in which the individual maybe manipulated or induced 
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way 
inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure 
or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and 
interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest 
is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or 
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
 The evidence establishes the following potentially disqualifying conditions:  
 
AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that creates a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation 
to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology; and 
 
AG ¶ 7(f): substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could 
subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation 
or personal conflict of interest. 
 
 
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Applicant’s admissions in her SOR Response of the two Guideline B allegations in 
the SOR and her testimony regarding her financial assets in Israel establish these 
potentially disqualifying security concerns. The amount of the assets in Israel is large 
enough to create a heightened risk of a personal conflict of interest. 
 
 The following mitigating condition is potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 8(f): the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or 
property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and 
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the 
individual. 
 
 Applicant’s refusal to incur a tax penalty in Israel by withdrawing the assets in her 
Israeli retirement account to mitigate security concerns under this guideline suggest that 
even 35 percent of her retirement assets are sufficiently important to her to give rise to a 
potential conflict of interest. The Israeli assets represent about one-sixth of her overall 
assets. If she were to forfeit them or otherwise lose them, she would have a limited 
opportunity at age 60 to reacquire assets of this magnitude for her retirement. The value 
of Applicant’s assets in Israel are sufficiently large to preclude a conclusion that they are 
unlikely to result in a personal conflict of interest. Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 8(f) is not 
established. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances and applying the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d).7  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines C and B in my whole-person 
analysis. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under these guidelines 
and evaluating all of the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant 
has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her acquiring Israeli citizenship and by 
her significant financial assets in Israel. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The factors are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) 
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for 
the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of 
continuation or recurrence.  
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:   Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b: Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the 
United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance 
is denied. 
 
 
 
 
John Bayard Glendon 
Administrative Judge