1 
 
                     
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
  DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
 
                                         
      
       
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Name Redacted]   )  ISCR Case No. 18-02191 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Leon J. Schachter, Esquire 
 
05/07/2019 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOGAN, Erin C., Administrative Judge: 
 
On September 26, 2018, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing  
security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence and Guideline C, Foreign 
Preference. The action was initially taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of 
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines 
(AG) implemented within the Department of Defense on June 8, 2017. 
  
 On October 22, 2018, Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on 
November 14, 2018. The case was assigned to me on February 12, 2019. On February 
13, 2019, a Notice of Hearing was issued, scheduling the hearing for March 28, 2019. 
The hearing was held as scheduled. During the hearing, the Government offered six  
exhibits. Government exhibits 1-5 were admitted without objection. Applicant’s counsel 
objected to the admission of Gov 6 on the basis of paragraph E3.1.20 of the Directive. 
Gov 6 was not admitted. Applicant offered nine exhibits, which were admitted as 
Applicant Exhibits (AE) A – H, without objection. The Government and the Applicant 
requested administrative notice be taken of certain facts regarding the country of Iraq. 
2 
 
The administrative notice documents were marked as Administrative Notice Document I 
(Admin Not I) and Admin Not II. The transcript was received on April 11, 2019. Based 
upon a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified 
information is granted.  
 
Administrative Notice  -  Iraq  
 
 A coalition of countries led by U.S. and British forces invaded Iraq on March 20, 
2003. Dictator Saddam Hussein was deposed and on May 12, 2003, the United States 
established the Coalition Provisional Authority as the interim civil authority in Iraq. About 
one year later, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignity to the new 
Interim Iraqi Government led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Throughout the governance 
of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the peaceful transfer of power, the role of Iraqi 
interpreters was vital to U.S. military success. Recognizing the role of local Iraqi 
interpreters – and the dangers they faced as a result of their assistance to the United 
States – Congress authorized a “Special Immigrant Visa” program that allowed local 
interpreters who served with distinction to immigrate to the United States. (Admin Not II) 
 
 Since 2005, the U.S. government has approved more than $18.6 billion worth of 
foreign military sales to Iraq. U.S. security assistance supports the development of a 
modern, accountable, and professional Iraqi military capable of defending Iraq and its 
borders. U.S. security assistance programs also promote civilian oversight of the 
military, adherence to the rule of law, and the respect for human rights, while 
simultaneously increasing the Iraqi military’s capability to respond to threats and 
counter-terrorism operations. The U.S. Embassy Baghdad maintains the Office of 
Security Cooperation – Iraq to further these goals and to facilitate Iraq’s role as a 
responsible security partner, contributing to the peace and security of the region. 
(Admin Not ll)   
 
 Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014 
parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair elections 
and led to the peaceful transition of power from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. (Admin Not 1) 
 
 The U.S. Department of State warns that travel within Iraq remains very 
dangerous and the ability of the U.S. Embassy to assist U.S. citizens is extremely 
limited. U.S. citizens in Iraq are at high risk for kidnapping and terrorist violence. 
Numerous terrorist and insurgent groups are active in Iraq, including ISIS. Such groups 
regularly attack Iraqi security forces and civilians. Anti-U.S. sectarian militias may also 
threaten U.S. citizens and western companies throughout Iraq. (Admin Not 1)  
  
 Severe human rights problems are widespread in Iraq. Sectarian hostility, 
widespread corruption, and lack of transparency at all levels of government and society 
weakened the government’s authority and worsened effective human rights protections. 
Problems include harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities; 
arbitrary arrests and lengthy pretrial detention; limits on freedom of expression to 
include press, social, religious and political restrictions in academic and cultural matters; 
discrimination against and societal abuse of women and ethnic, religious, and racial 
3 
 
minorities; seizure of property without due process and limitations of worker rights. 
(Admin Not 1)  
 
Findings of Fact 
  
Applicant is a 39-year-old linguist employed by a Department of Defense 
contractor since August 2017. He is currently stationed overseas. He is applying for a 
security clearance. He became a U.S. citizen in May 2016. He was born, raised, and 
educated in Iraq. He received a college degree in Iraq. He is single and has no children. 
(Gov 1; AE F) (Note: The facts in this decision do not specifically describe employment, 
names of witnesses, or locations in order to protect Applicant and his family’s privacy. 
The cited sources contain more specific information.)  
  
Foreign Influence 
 
Between April 2004 and February 2011, Applicant served as a local hire with the 
U.S. government in Iraq. He started out as a security guard in the Green Zone. In 2007, 
he became a linguist. From December 2008 to October 2009, he served as an 
instructor. He worked with U.S. trainers who were training Iraqi police. From December 
2009 to February 2011, he worked as a linguist. Applicant often encountered danger 
while working in Iraq as a U.S. contractor. He testified that the base would experience 
mortar attacks on a weekly basis. He had to be situationally aware when he left the 
base because assassination groups were watching any vehicles that left the base. He 
took security precautions such as keeping his badges under his shoe cushion and 
traveling different routes every day. He told his friends and family that he was working 
as a security officer at the ministry of industry. In February 2011, he immigrated to the 
United States with the help of the U.S. government and the International Organization 
for Migration, an organization that helps Iraqis who work for the U.S. government in Iraq 
to immigrate to the United States in order to protect them from the risk of violence. (Tr. 
50-54; Gov 1; AE B; AE D; AE E)  
 
When he first arrived in the United States, Applicant worked for a temp agency. 
In November 2011, he found a full-time job working for a large on-line retailer in a 
warehouse. In December 2015, he was promoted to supervisor. In August 2017, he 
became a linguist overseas with a U.S. contractor. He initially deployed to a middle-
eastern country (not Iraq) with the U.S. Army.  In January 2019, Applicant was 
transferred to a linguist position in another middle-eastern country (not Iraq). He 
decided to become an overseas linguist again out of gratitude to the United States for 
allowing him to become a U.S. citizen. He saw it as an opportunity to serve his new 
country. (Tr. 50-54; Gov 1; AE B; AE F)  
 
The SOR raises security concerns because Applicant has family members who 
are citizens of and reside in Iraq. Specifically, Applicant’s mother, three brothers and 
three sisters are citizens and residents in Iraq. (SOR ¶ 1.a and SOR ¶ 1.b). His oldest  
brother also serves as a senior officer in the Iraqi military. (SOR ¶ 1.c) Applicant admits 
the allegations. His mother is 74. She is a housewife. She lives in a house with one of 
Applicant’s sisters. Applicant’s oldest sister is seven years older than him. She is a 
housewife. Another sister is a teacher. She is five years older than Applicant. His third 
4 
 
sister is three years older than him and is a housewife.  His sisters and his mother are 
not connected to the Iraqi government. (Tr. 39-41, 47-48, 58) 
 
Applicant has two older brothers. His oldest brother is 14 years older than him. 
Applicant’s younger brother is a sergeant in the Iraqi military. He is four years younger 
than Applicant. His middle brother is a radiologist who works at a hospital. Applicant’s 
family members are not aware that he works for the U.S. government. He tells them that 
he works for a private company. (Tr. 43-46; Gov 1; Gov 3, 4, 5)  
 
Applicant provided information about his family members, each time he 
completed a counter-intelligence update when he was employed with DOD contractors 
while he was a citizen of Iraq. His family members raised no issues at the time. (Tr. 60; 
Gov 3, 4, 5) 
 
Foreign Preference 
 
Under the Foreign Preference concern, it is alleged that Applicant used his Iraqi 
passport in lieu of the U.S. passport to enter and exit the United States in April 2017.   
Applicant testified that he used his U.S. passport to exit and enter the United States 
after becoming a U.S. citizen in May 2016.  He admits that he used his Iraqi passport to 
enter and exit Iraq even though he had a U.S. passport. He used the Iraqi passport 
because he did not need a visa and it was easier to go through the security lines at the 
Iraqi airport.  Since that trip, Applicant renounced his Iraqi citizenship and surrendered 
his Iraqi passport to his facility security officer in April 2017. I find for Applicant under the 
security concern under Foreign Preference, because he no longer possesses an Iraqi 
passport. Under the new guidelines effective on June 8, 2017, the possession of a 
foreign passport does not raise security concerns as long as Applicant informed his 
facility security officer. (Tr. 66-69; AE H)  
   
Whole-person Factors  
 
 Applicant’s dream was to become a U.S. citizen. He has established a life here. 
His bank accounts are located in the United States. He owns stock. He bought a car in 
the United States. He has friends in the United States. He saved up $83,000 in hopes of 
eventually purchasing a home in the United States. He attempted to sign up for the 
selective service, but was advised he was not required to because of his age. He is 
registered to vote in the United States. In September 2018, he received a performance 
bonus based on his performance and conduct during the first year of his current linguist 
contract.  (Tr. 55-57; AE A; AE C – AE F) 
 
 In 2010, he received a Longevity Award, for his exemplary performance and 
dedication to duty while serving as a linguist. (AE E) Several of his co-workers provided 
letters attesting to his trustworthiness and reliability.  A former co-worker, who has 
known Applicant for 12 years, states Applicant is “very respectful and dedicated to his 
work and the people that worked with him.” He said Applicant described the United 
States as “the best place on earth!” (AE G)  
  
 
5 
 
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), 
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the 
“whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access for national 
security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship 
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government 
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to 
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk 
that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
   AG ¶ 6 explains the Government’s concern under Foreign Influence:   
 
Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, 
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they 
result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern 
if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to 
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign 
contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign 
contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations 
such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or 
sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 lists conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. The following are applicable to Applicant’s case: 
 
(a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business 
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or 
resident in a foreign  country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the 
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing 
that information or technology. 
 
In Applicant’s case, AG ¶ 7(a) and AG ¶ 7(b) apply. The mere possession of 
close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, 
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country 
and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create 
the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of 
classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); 
ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). Applicant’s mother, three brothers and 
three sisters are citizens of and reside in Iraq. This creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion because of Iraq’s serious 
human rights problems, and its issues with terrorism. The government of Iraq has made 
some progress, but a heightened risk remains. Applicant’s family in Iraq also create a 
potential conflict of interest between his obligation to protect classified information and 
his desire to help his family members by providing that information. The risk is 
heightened further because one of Applicant’s brothers is a senior officer in the Iraqi 
Army. 
 
7 
 
 The Government produced substantial evidence of disqualifying conditions AG 
¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b). The burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence and prove a 
mitigating condition. The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the 
Government.  
  
AG ¶ 8 lists conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following 
mitigating condition applies: 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, 
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the 
individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the 
U.S. interest.  
 
 I considered the totality of Applicant’s ties to Iraq. The nature of a nation’s 
government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are 
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to 
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater 
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated 
with or dependent upon the government, the country is known to conduct intelligence 
operations against the United States, or the foreign country is associated with a risk of 
terrorism.  
  
 At great risk to himself, Applicant worked for the U.S. government in Iraq from 
2004 to 2011 while he was an Iraqi citizen.  His efforts resulted in the U.S. government 
granting Applicant permanent residency. Applicant immigrated to the United States in 
2011. He settled in the United States and found a good job. He became a U.S. citizen in 
May 2016. Out of gratitude for being granted citizenship, Applicant became a contractor 
supporting the U.S. government as a linguist. While previously working as contractor-
linguist in Iraq, he worked alongside U.S. forces under combat conditions. In ISCR Case 
No. 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006), the Appeal Board discussed this issue as 
follows: 
 
As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s prior 
history of complying with security procedures and regulations significant 
probative value for the purposes of refuting, mitigating, or extenuating the 
security concerns raised by that applicant’s more immediate disqualifying 
conduct or circumstances. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-03357 at 4 (App. 
Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No. 02-10113 at 5 (App. Bd. Mar. 25, 
2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 30, 2006). 
However, the Board has recognized an exception to that general rule in 
Guideline B cases, where the applicant has established by credible, 
independent evidence that his compliance with security procedures and 
regulations occurred in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances 
in which the applicant had made a significant contribution to the national 
security. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14, 
2006). The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to an 
8 
 
applicant’s assertion that he can be relied upon to recognize, resist, and 
report a foreign power’s attempts at coercion or exploitation.  
I considered Applicant’s longstanding commitment to the United States as well as 
his favorable contributions to national security. He worked under dangerous conditions 
as a security guard and linguist for the U.S. government. His efforts resulted in him 
being granted permanent residency in the United States.  I find that Applicant can be 
expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the United States. AG ¶ 
8(b) is applicable. The security concerns under Foreign Influence are mitigated.  
Guideline C, Foreign Preference  
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Preference is set out in 
AG & 9:       
  
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to 
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
the United States.  
 
The guideline notes several disqualifying conditions that could raise security 
concern under paragraph 10. The following potentially applies in Applicant’s case:  
 
AG & 10(c): failure to use a U.S. passport when entering or exiting the 
U.S. 
           
 The above disqualifying condition does not apply to Applicant’s case.  During a 
trip to Iraq after Applicant became a U.S. citizen, he used his U.S. passport to exit and 
enter the United States. He used his Iraqi passport to enter and exit Iraq. He fully 
disclosed the use of his Iraqi passport to security officials at his present employer.  In 
April 2017, he destroyed his Iraqi passport in the presence of his facility security officer. 
Based on the facts of this case, AG ¶ 10(c) does not apply to Applicant’s case. The 
Foreign Preference concern is found for Applicant. 
    
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
9 
 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered Applicant’s gratitude to 
the U.S. government for accepting him as a refugee and granting him U.S. citizenship. I 
considered his support of the U.S. government overseas both before and after 
becoming a U.S. citizen. Applicant hopes to earn enough income to purchase a home 
so that he can provide for his future family in the United States.          
 
I considered the reference letters and awards indicating the valuable service  
Applicant provided as a linguist for the U.S. government working on sensitive projects 
that were vital to U.S. national security. The foreign influence and foreign preference 
security concerns are mitigated.     
 
Formal Findings 
  
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a -1.c:   For Applicant 
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline C:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.c:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is  
clearly consistent with the national security interests of the U.S. to grant Applicant 
eligibility for a security clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is 
granted. 
 
                                                
_________________ 
ERIN C. HOGAN 
Administrative Judge