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       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
   DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
)
-------------------- ) ISCR Case No. 18-02856 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
Appearances 
 For Government: Benjamin Dorsey, Esquire 
  For Applicant: Pro se 
05/30/2019
______________ 
Decision 
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MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge: 
    Statement of the Case 
On January 9, 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated 
Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement). The action was taken 
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on or after June 8, 2017. In a 
response transmitted on January 30, 2019, he admitted the eight allegations raised and 
requested a determination based on the written record.  
On February 21, 2019, the Government issued a File of Relevant Material 
(FORM) with four attachments (“Items”). The case was assigned to me on May 10, 
2019. Based on my review of the case file and submissions, I find Applicant failed to 
mitigate drug involvement security concerns. 
     Findings of Fact 
Applicant is a 23-year-old man who, as last documented, was anticipating 
graduation from undergraduate school in May 2018. (Form, Item 4) At the time he was 
 
 
 
 
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interviewed as part of this process, he was a part-time intramural sports supervisor. He 
has also held other part-time jobs typical of a university student. He has been extended 
an offer for a position by a defense contractor.  
 
In about November 2010, during his freshman year in high school, Applicant first 
tried marijuana after a friend brought it to his home. The marijuana plant “bud” provided 
was sufficient to make one “blunt” suitable for smoking. (FORM, Item 4) Applicant knew 
using the substance was illegal, but he had a “desire to try it.” (FORM, Item 4)  After an 
unrecalled number of inhalations, he felt the drug’s effects. Applicant continued to use 
the drug because he “enjoyed it.” (FORM, Item 4) He used the drug, on average, one or 
two times a week until at least December 2018. (FORM, Item 4) No information 
regarding his drug use after that date was offered. 
 
Before his December 2018 usage, Applicant first purchased about 3.5 ounces of 
marijuana. While he knew the purchase was illegal, he did so because “he wanted to.” 
(FORM, Item 4) Initially, Applicant noted that he intended to use marijuana into the 
future if it was legalized, he then later stated he intended to quit using it in the future -- 
“after 5/2018 and college” -- to focus on work. (FORM, Item 4) At that point, he planned 
to “kick his habit” of marijuana use. (FORM, Item 4) He noted that he had been unaware 
that federal law specifically prohibits the use of illegal drugs by employees of defense 
contractors. Applicant concedes he was immature when he began using the drug, but 
represents himself now as mature. (FORM, Item 4) He considers his drug use to be 
voluntary and not very serious because he believes he can cease his “habit” whenever 
he needs to do so.  
 
In his teens and early 20s, Applicant also tried illegal hallucinogenic mushrooms 
in June 2017. He used Adderall that had been prescribed to another individual from 
about February 2015 to about May 2017. He similarly used someone else’s prescription 
Hydrocodone on multiple occasions in about November 2015. About twice, he 
recreationally used another person’s Xanax, from about February 2012 to about 
October 2015. Throughout this time, he was aware it was illegal to use someone else’s 
prescription medication. (FORM, Item 4) Applicant socially tried the hallucinogenic 
compound known as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), in August 2015. Before going out 
to socialize and party over alcoholic beverages once in February 2015, he also used 
cocaine.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Recognizing the complexities of 
human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the 
 
 
 
 
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adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, 
impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of 
a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge 
must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, 
favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. Under the 
AG, any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of the national interest. In reaching this decision, I 
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the 
evidence contained in the record.  
 
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in 
the SOR. Under the Directive, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and 
other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or 
proven by Department Counsel and has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a 
favorable security decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of 
trust and confidence in those granted access to classified information. Decisions 
include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or 
inadvertently fail to safeguard such information. Decisions shall be in terms of the 
national interest and do not question the loyalty of an applicant.  
 
Analysis 
 
The security concern for this guideline is set forth in AG ¶ 24, where it is noted 
that the illegal use of a controlled substance, and the use of other substances that can 
cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their 
intended purpose, can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and 
trustworthiness. Such use also raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to 
comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Here, Applicant admitted that he used multiple 
illegal drugs or illegally used prescription drugs between November 2010 and at least 
December 2018. During that time frame, he also purchased illegal substances. These 
admitted facts are sufficient to raise AG ¶ 25: 
 
(a) any substance misuse . . , and 
 
(c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation,  
processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
 
 
 
 
 
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The Government’s substantial evidence, as confirmed by Applicant’s own admissions, 
raises security concerns under Guideline H. Therefore, the burden shifts to Applicant to 
produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate related security concerns.  
 
Under Guideline H, conditions that could mitigate security concerns arising from 
drug involvement and substance misuse are enumerated. The following mitigating 
conditions under AG ¶ 26 potentially apply to Applicant’s case:  
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or 
does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;   
 
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and 
substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to 
overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of 
abstinence, including but not limited to: (1) disassociation from 
drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the 
environment where drugs were used; and (3) providing a signed 
statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and 
substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or 
misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.   
 
Regarding AG ¶ 26(a), Applicant’s marijuana “habit” continued from his early 
teenage years into his 20s. It is unclear whether he actually ceased socially using illegal 
drugs after college graduation or thereafter. It is shown, however, that any decision to 
quit marijuana use would be based, at least in part, on whether the drug continued to be 
classified as illegal, whether its cessation was needed to help him focus on his career, 
or both. His current relationship with marijuana and other drugs is unclear and left 
undefined, as is his relationship with both peers who use and purchase drugs and 
venues in which illegal drug use is accepted. What is clear is that his knowing use of 
illegal substances continued up to at least the time he was offered professional 
employment with a defense contractor. However, with scant supplemental information 
or argument justifying or mitigating such drug use, AG ¶ 26(a)-(b) do not apply under 
these facts.  
  
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, one must evaluate security clearance eligibility 
by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances. 
Consideration shall be given to the nine adjudicative process factors listed in the AG. 
The final determination must be an overall commonsense judgment based on careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.     
    
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, and conducted a whole-person 
 
 
 
 
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analysis based on the record. In addition to Applicant’s drug use, I considered available 
facts related to his age, reasons for using illegal drugs or illegally using prescription 
medications, maturation, professional status, educational attainments, lifestyle, and 
future intentions regarding illegal substances.  
 
This is not a situation involving youthful indiscretion. During his period of 
marijuana abuse, Applicant has matured from a young teen to a man in his mid-20s 
pursuing a professional position with a defense contractor. While it may be unclear 
whether he knew all along that marijuana use was antithetical to working for a defense 
contractor, it was shown he has admitted knowing some, if not all, of his drug use was 
patently illegal. Cases under this guideline can be reviewed with consideration of a 
number of factors that might prove to be mitigating or may show circumstances that 
were extenuating. Here, however, Applicant has simply admitted the SOR allegations 
with no rebuttal. Without more, drug involvement security concerns remain unmitigated.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline H:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.h:   Against Applicant 
 
          Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
                                                     
_____________________________ 
Arthur E. Marshall, Jr. 
Administrative Judge