DATE: January 2, 2004

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SSN: -----------

Applicant for Security Clearance

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

JAMES A. YOUNG

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT

Kathryn A. Trowbridge, Esq., Department Counsel

FOR APPLICANT

Pro Se

SYNOPSIS

Applicant is a naturalized U.S. citizen whose parents and siblings are Pakistani citizens. Her parents and one of her siblings still reside there. Applicant also had delinquent debts. Although she has made substantial progress in paying these debts off, the status of several of the debts remains unclear. Clearance is denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. On 1 May 2003, under the applicable Executive Order ⁽¹⁾ and Department of Defense Directive, ⁽²⁾ DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR), detailing the basis for its decision-security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of the Directive. Applicant answered the SOR in writing on 25 June 2003 and elected to have her case decided on the record without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government's written case on 5 November 2003. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, and she was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the SOR. Applicant received the FORM on 17 November 2003 and responded on 25 November 2003. The case was assigned to me on 22 December 2003.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant was born in Pakistan in 1963. She immigrated to the U.S. and became a U.S. citizen in 1986. In 1996 she married a Pakistani citizen. Applicant and her husband had four children, all born in the U.S. Her husband left her and she was divorced in 2000. Applicant's parents were born in India, but are citizens and residents of Pakistan. Applicant has two sisters and five brothers; all but one brother are Pakistani citizens. The other brother is a U.S. citizen. All of Applicant's siblings, except one sister, live in the U.S. She lives in Pakistan.

Applicant traveled to Pakistan in December 1994 to visit her family due to the illness of one of her relatives. As her job in the U.S. was terminated, Applicant remained in Pakistan until November 1995. She also visited her family in Pakistan in 1998 for five weeks, 1999 for three weeks, and in 2001 for 10 days. Applicant personally financed all of these trips.

The SOR's allegations of financial problems and their current status are summarized in the following chart:

POLICIES

"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance." Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has "the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information." Id. at 527. The President has restricted eligibility for access to classified information to United States citizens "whose personal and professional history affirmatively indicates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information." Exec. Or. 12968, Access to Classified Information § 3.1(b) (Aug. 4, 1995). Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the security guidelines contained in the Directive.

Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personal security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The Directive presumes a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the disqualifying conditions listed in the guidelines and an applicant's security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002); see Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant "has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance." ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3.

CONCLUSIONS

Guideline B-Foreign Influence

In the SOR, DOHA alleged Applicant mother, father, and one sister are citizens and residents of Pakistan (¶ 1.a.); her ex-spouse, four brothers. and one sister are citizens of Pakistan who reside in the U.S. (¶ 1.b.); and she lived in Pakistan from 26 December 1994 until 5 November 1995 (¶ 1.c.). A security risk may exist when an applicant's immediate family, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the U.S. or may be subject to duress. Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.1.

The Government established by substantial evidence and Applicant's admissions that members of Applicant's immediate family are citizens of Pakistan and some are residents of Pakistan. DC E2.A2.1.2.1. Although Pakistan has aided the U.S. in its fight against international terrorism, it remains a dangerous place. Sectarian and separatist terrorists within Pakistan continue to target Americans. Bombings and assassinations continue to occur throughout the country. Item 7. Although none of her relatives appear to be agents of a foreign power, the fact that her siblings are Pakistani citizens and her parents are citizens and residents of Pakistan place Applicant in a position of vulnerability to be influenced by coercive or noncoercive means. See ISCR Case No. 00628 at 5 (App. B. Feb 24, 2003). Applicant's stay in Pakistan from December 1994 until November 1995 is evidence of the close relationship she has with her family and with the nation of Pakistan. There is no evidence Applicant is other than a loyal U.S. citizen. Nevertheless, she has not overcome the evidence that she is in a position of vulnerability to foreign influence. Accordingly, I find against Applicant on ¶ 1.

Guideline F-Financial Considerations

In the SOR, DOHA alleged Applicant was financially overextended as evidenced by her many delinquent debts (¶¶ 2.a. - 2.e., 2g., and 2.h.), had an unsatisfied judgment (¶ 2.f.), and had her wages garnished for an unpaid debt (¶ 2.i.). An applicant who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Directive ¶ E2.A6.1.1.

The Government established by substantial evidence and Applicant's admissions that she had a history of not meeting hr financial obligations (DC E2.A6.1.2.1.) and was unable or unwilling to satisfy her debts (DC E2.A6.1.2.3.). Applicant claims her debts were, in large part, attributable to her ex-husband, the divorce proceedings, and medical costs-conditions that were largely beyond her control. MC E2.A6.1.3.3. Applicant claims she is now debt free. The evidence of record establishes that she had paid off many of the debts, but it is unclear about several others. Applicant did not provide sufficient documentation to show that the debts alleged in ¶¶ 2.b, 2.d., 2.g., and 2.h. have been satisfied or are being satisfied. Accordingly, I find against Applicant on ¶ 2.

FORMAL FINDINGS

The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:

Paragraph 1. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 1.b.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 1.c.: Against Applicant

Paragraph 2. Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 2.a.: For Applicant

Subparagraph 2.b.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 2.c.: For Applicant

Subparagraph 2.d.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 2.e.: For Applicant

Subparagraph 2.f.: For Applicant

Subparagraph 2.g.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 2.h.: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 2.i.: For Applicant

DECISION

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.

James A. Young

Administrative Judge

1. Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.

2. Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended and modified.